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Access control (AC) refers to mechanisms and policies that restrict access to resources, thus 
regulating access to physical or virtual resources of an information system. AC approaches 
are used to represent these mechanisms and policies by which users are granted access and 
specific access privileges to the resources or information of the system for which AC is 
provided. Traditional AC approaches encompass a variety of widely used approaches, 
including attribute-based access control (ABAC), mandatory access control (MAC), 
discretionary access control (DAC) and role-based access control (RBAC). Emerging AC 
approaches include risk adaptive access control (RAdAC), an approach that suggests that AC 
can adapt depending on specific situations. 
However, traditional and emerging AC approaches rely on static pre-defined risk mitigation 
tasks and do not support the adaptation of an AC risk mitigation process (RMP). There are 
no provided mechanisms and automated support that allow AC approaches to   construct 
RMPs and to adapt to provide more flexible, custom-tailored responses to specific situations 
in order to minimize risks. Further, although existing AC approaches can operate in several 
knowledge domains at once, they do not explicitly take into account the relationships among 
risks related to different dimensions, e.g., security, productivity. In addition, although in the 
real world, risks accumulate over time, existing AC approaches do not appropriately provide 
means for risk resolution in situations in which risks accumulate as different, dangerous tasks 
impact risk measures.  
This thesis presents the definition, the implementation, and the application through two case 
studies of a novel AC risk-mitigation approach that combines dynamic RMP construction 
and risk assessment extended to include forecasting based on multiple risk-related utilities 
and events; provides support for a dynamic risk assessment that depends on one or multiple 
risk dimensions (e.g., security and productivity); offers cumulative risk assessment in which 
each action of interest can impact the risk-related utilities in a dynamic way; and presents an 
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Risks are pervasive in modern software systems. These risks can be classified in many 
categories, which include risks associated with unauthorized or illegal data access, 
dissemination through intentional or accidental disclosure, modification, erasure, or copying. 
There are also risks involving productivity and financial organizational aspects. They can 
negatively impact all segments of society, including private companies, governments, and 
the general public, which often have sensitive and proprietary information that needs to stay 
confidential, have proprietary value, or resources that need to be protected. Traditionally, 
risks of unauthorized disclosure, modification, erasure or copying data are related to the 
security domain and can be mitigated by techniques such as an access control (AC).  
However, risks that are not directly related to the security domain, such as those 
related to productivity, public relations, sales or financial aspects, are usually not within the 
scope of an AC approach. Moreover, any of these risks can be interrelated with security 
procedures, causing each risk mitigation decision to influence other aspects of the system 





information can discourage a client from using the provided service, which directly affects 
the performance of a sales department. 
While any traditional AC approach generally results in a permit or deny outcome, an 
emerging approach, which is called risk adaptive access control (RAdAC), provides a 
paradigm for AC that considers a set of factors such as productivity and financial aspects to 
complement an analysis of security risks and benefits as part of an AC decision. RAdAC also 
assumes that any situational condition can influence the relative weight of these factors in 
determining the AC outcome. However, both traditional AC and RAdAC methods are unable 
to support the construction of  RMP dynamically based on utility measures associated with 
any existing risk factor.  
In addition, these methods can provide a permit or deny outcome, but they fall short 
in offering a permit or deny outcome combined with a set of extra tasks that need to be 
executed to mitigate any existing risk. For example, the solution to an AC request could 
permit the addition of a new user after the head of the new user’s department approves him 
or her or could permit the addition of the new user with limited privileges. Each of these 
alternatives would have a different risk level associated with it. This work aims at showing 
that in practice, there is a combined outcome in any situation that is less risky and more 
appropriate in terms of risk utilities than the traditional permit or deny outcome. 
Related work on RAdAC either provides a conceptual framework [1] or focuses on 
only a domain-specific solution [2] that cannot be reused in other knowledge domains, and 
supports only restricted outcomes (i.e., permit or deny). In contrast, this thesis presents a 
novel approach to AC risk assessment that focuses on dynamic risk mitigation process (RMP) 
construction based on risk-related utilities and events and extends risk assessment to 
forecasting. This thesis also provides practical case studies related to patient privacy and 
software development in which a pure permit or deny outcome can be dynamically combined 
with a set of additional tasks in order to mitigate any relevant risk. Using case studies, this 
thesis shows that the permit or deny outcome combined with the set of additional tasks can, 
in specific cases, be more useful than the pure permit or deny outcome. 
This research is motivated also by limitations of the current approaches such as de-





Control Markup Language (XACML) and emerging approaches, including RAdAC. The 
limitations of existing AC approaches due to the lack of AC risk accumulation over time 
have a significant role in critical problems in various areas within existing AC systems, 
including breaches in information security caused by a number of information leaks such as 
those involving Edward Snowden, Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning, and Julian Assange [3] 
and private information leaks [4], as well as an array of accidents related to proprietary data 
theft [5]. 
Moreover, existing approaches face certain challenges that are not appropriately 
addressed by existing approaches. Although most existing AC approaches rely on manual 
processes, the desire for an increased level of automation is often expressed in the literature 
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. However, existing AC approaches are unable to provide a roadmap to improve 
automation significantly. This lack of automation leads to a heavy involvement of human 
analysts, which is costly, error-prone, and vulnerable to an attack based on social engineering. 
As well, current approaches have problems with handling each risk in real-time, 
specifically when handling a previously unidentified threat [11, 12, 13]. Many of existing 
approaches base their decisions on a set of policies that are composed by a security analyst 
[14, 15], who cannot resolve AC situations in real time, but can deal only with problems that 
were identified previously. On the other hand,  critical situations involving security often 
happen after the risk assessment and the analysis of potential vulnerabilities are performed 
[16, 17]. Existing static risk assessment and AC methods do not provide an appropriate 
solution that can support the resolution of a complex dynamic AC situation. 
Existing approaches lack feedback [18] and possible options for resolving AC 
situations when a legitimate user or component is unable to continue its activity due to the 
necessity of access to a requested resource or service, when AC refuses this access for some 
reason. One of the common messages regarding denied access attempt states, that ‘access 
was denied’ without providing any other details. Such a message causes the user to ask a 
system administrator to make an exception for his or her activity, which interrupts ongoing 
business processes and increases load on system administrators [19, 20]. In addition, the 
traditional approach implies that there has to be an often-used system administrator role with 





compromised access to an account with the system administrator role leads to the system 
being completely exposed to malicious actions, and if the account is widely used, it is not 
possible to limit the risk of such an account being compromised. 
 
1.2 Motivating Example 
Denial to a legitimate AC request is not the only problem that existing and emerging 
approaches need to resolve. As a motivating example consider the following scenario 
involving a customer’s performing a daily banking transaction via an automated teller 
machine (ATM). The goal of the customer is to complete the transaction as quickly as 
possible, entering a minimal amount of information. The goal of the ATM software is to 
provide services to the bank client, helping each customer to achieve his or her goals while 
mitigating the risks related to unauthorized access. The customer follows a process specified 
by the ATM, which can be modified to attain a proper balance between reducing the time 
and effort spent by the customer and maintaining a sufficient level of security. 
Assume that a customer arrives at the ATM without his or her card. Normally, the 
ATM software would require the customer to insert a card into the machine and enter a PIN. 
In contrast, the proposed approach can modify the regular ATM process so that the customer 
would complete the transaction without the card. To achieve this, the RMP would use devices 
already available in existing ATM machines to: (i) perform a facial recognition procedure 
for authentication purposes; (ii) ask the customer to answer some security questions the bank 
software has on file; (iii) require the customer to provide his or her signature that could be 
scanned by bill acceptor; and (iv) send a security code to the customer’s cell phone for 
verification. Any or all of these and similar procedures could be in the RMP so that the 
customer, who was not able in the first place to finish the transaction, could perform low-risk 









Lack of Support for Process Adaptation  
Assume that the process of using the ATM requires the user to enter the amount related to 
his or her last credit card operation, but a server providing this data to the ATM is not 
responding for some reason. As a result, the customer would not be able to proceed with his 
or her transaction. In this case, the process being followed was pre-defined and cannot change 
in order to remediate the situation. There is a lack of support for adapting this process so that 
the customer would be able to complete the ongoing transaction. A possible RMP would be 
to change the authentication procedure to use data that is available to an ATM. In this case, 
the original pre-defined authentication procedure could not be completed since the access to 
the server was not possible. However, if the authentication process had support for 
adaptation, the ongoing process could be adapted to user another available server, for 
example, by making the ATM ask the user for his or her online banking password to verify 
the user’s identity. It would be nice not to be restricted by the pre-defined process and to be 
able to adapt the process under specific circumstances. In this way both the user and the AC 
system would be able to meet their goals: the user would be able to complete the transaction 
and the AC system would be able to prevent an unauthorized access.  
Lack of Support for Adapting Risk Assessment  
Assume that there is a customer transaction that is originating from Mexico, and the last 
known customer location is Canada. Historically, discrepancies between locations is a strong 
indication of an unauthorized access attempt. Therefore, this situation presents a significant 
security risk. Existing solutions can either accept the risk of unauthorized access or deny 
operation. Accepting risk of unauthorized access by allowing operation to proceed, can lead 
to fraud. Declare the transaction a fraud and deny operation can result in a dissatisfied 
customer. While each option has a risk associated with it, a pre-defined process with a static 
logic, which existing AC systems rely on, has no way of adapting to the situation. However, 
it is possible to adapt the process. Instead of allowing or denying the transaction, the bank 
can implement additional security checks, e.g., to send message (SMS, email or call) to the 
customer with a verification code and ask the customer to enter it at the ATM. This process 
adaptation, RMP, allows the ATM to authenticate the customer, reducing the risk of 





possible to incorporate all significant risk combinations into a logic of a business process, it 
overcomplicates logic and makes process both non-atomic and hard to revert. 
However, existing processes can benefit from adaptation even without significant 
risks present. For example, given that a customer wishes only to check a current balance, 
assuming that the balance is not considered highly sensitive information and a card is present 
in ATM, it is possible to provide this information without asking the customer to authenticate 
by entering a PIN. This process adaptation, RMP, would reduce the time and effort spent by 
the customer to perform the transaction. Given that there are no significant security risks 
present, the adaptation of omitting the authentication would increase the utility of the RMP. 
However, if subsequently the customer attempts to perform a risk-sensitive operation, the 
ATM would adapt the process by asking the customer to login before the operation can be 
performed. On the other hand, if the balance is considered a highly sensitive information, for 
example in case of a criminal stealing credit card information in batches, during evaluation 
of these cards, it is possible not only to block cards in question, but also to report wrong 
information about the balance which would alert legitimate cardholders and prevent criminal 
from obtaining required information. A set of possible ATM process adaptations for a 













Absence of Support for Accumulating Risks over Time.  
In situations with no significant risks present, AC typically just accepts insignificant risks 
without accumulating them. The analysis and design often includes limits set for security 
procedures to be activated. For example, as a part of the ATM requirements, there is usually 
a daily limit of the amount of cash a customer can receive from his or her card. This feature 
was designed to prevent a significant damage caused by a breach of security, e.g., by a 
malicious person making a copy of an existing bank card and using it to withdraw cash from 
ATM. However, after a day ends, the amount the customer can withdraw is reset and thus 
the risks are not accumulated, but disregarded.  
Another related example is a feature of a banking system involving not requiring the 
PIN while buying items with lower than a predefined threshold total value. While this feature 
reduces the time required by a customer to complete a transaction, it also reduces security 
levels by making it easier for a malicious attacker to abuse the security protocol. A typical 
example of this abuse is a check performed by a buyer of credit card numbers often sold in 
batches. To check a batch, the buyer would typically attempt to buy something cheap with 
one of the cards randomly selected from the batch. An insignificant transaction typically is 
unlikely to be classified as a fraud. Therefore, if the selected card is valid, the transaction 
would be allowed and therefore, the buyer can verify validity of these credit cards. 
Accumulating all encountered risks over time allows risk analysts and risk analysis 
algorithms to improve the identification of anomalies, risk quantification, and correlations. 
The analysis of complete risk chains can result in discovery of previously unknown cause 






1.3 Problem Statement 
Current AC approaches rely on static risk mitigation tasks. However, using a predefined, 
static AC reaction to certain risks can lead to a potential vulnerability. For example, assume 
that a malicious user has gained an unauthorized access to confidential information. An AC 
could attempt to notify a security analyst by sending email, following a static predefined AC 
policy. The malicious user can divert or intercept the email, e.g., by changing the 
configuration of a mail server or using a man-in-the-middle attack on the routing. 
Each of RAdAC and RBAC is a predefined approach that can be exploited. A decision 
made by an AC can be anticipated to benefit some malicious entity (e.g., by obtaining the 
credentials of a user with a high reputation, an attacker can make security skip part of an 
analysis, simplifying an attack problem). Both AC approaches do not support forecasting as 
time progresses and new risk-related events, tasks, and situations occur. 
Almost every AC approach operates in several knowledge domains at once, but it 
does not explicitly take into account the relationship among risks related to different 
dimensions. For example, when an AC system involves security and sales, it needs to take 
into account not only the set of requirements related to any risk of each dimension, but also 
the set of requirements related to how risks in one dimension affect risks in another 
dimension. In this case, if an AC system requires a customer to complete multiple forms to 
improve security prior to placing an order, the performance level of the sales department 
personnel decreases. 
The domain models for the case studies are presented to illustrate the applicability of 
a proposed approach. These models describe various domain, including security, business 
processes and computer-based systems. The set of the considered risks includes the risk of  
code being stolen and the risk of project delays. The corresponding risk dimensions include  
security, measured in security units, and productivity, measured in productivity units. 
Existing AC approaches are not designed to accumulate risks within ongoing 
dynamic processes, as opposing tasks. For example, in the case that an analyst tries to access 
a file that he or she is supposed to have access to, associated access risks are acceptable, 
because, of course, the analyst is allowed to access to this information. However, the risks of 





AC approaches do not support such an accumulation. The accumulated risks present a 
significant problem, e.g., when the analyst tries to copy an entire database file by file. That 
risk cannot be handled by considering only each access to a file. Instead, there is a need to 
define a RMP that combines multiple access attempts to different files in a dynamic way. 
Although in this example, a RMP involves only a single action performed a number of times, 
in general, a RMP can combine different tasks that, when performed, can lead to an 
undesirable risk level.  
Current AC approaches rely on human analysts to investigate AC problems. The 
resulting analysis is predefined. Therefore, the existing AC approaches cannot take into 
account a set of risk consequences due to an array of real-time user tasks. A predefined human 
analysis also often assumes that the privilege level that a user has is independent of a possibly 
adverse real-time action that the user may try to perform. However, these tasks need to be 
taken into account and should lead to dynamic decrease in the privilege level of the user. The 
adaptation of AC policies to a number of tasks with acceptable risk is not supported in 
existing AC approaches. 
Therefore, current AC approaches are based on predefined static risk mitigation 
methods, do not provide explicit risk dimensions differentiation, are unable to support 
accumulation of various risks adequately and make human intervention in risk analysis 
mandatory. 
 
1.4 Proposed Approach 
This thesis expands on the XACML architecture for AC as shown in Figure 2. Here a business 
process such as modifying a personnel record or withdrawing funds or paying a bill at an 
ATM uses a software component to access a resource such as a personnel record or one or 
more bank account records. Before accessing the record(s) the component must be given 
permission by a policy enforcement point. The policy enforcement point typically asks for 
some identifying credentials from the component, which are provided by the individual or 
systems implementing the business process. Two examples of credentials could be a userid 





 Once the credentials are supplied to the policy enforcement point they are sent to a 
policy decision point, which checks the credentials against a static AC policy. This policy 
could check against its list of valid credentials and if the user has supplied the correct 
information then access is approved, otherwise it is denied. 
 As explained under the ATM example earlier in this chapter in Section 1.2, one would 
like to have more flexible access policies, which would depend on the circumstances 
surrounding the access request and the risk associated with the specific access conditions. 
This means changing the policy decision point and static  policy to a dynamic one and so 
they are shown in bold in Figure 2. 
 Figure 3 provides the details that are implemented in this dynamic AC approach, that 
is, in the boxes shown in bold. Once the policy decision point determines the circumstances 
surrounding the request and constructs possible alternative sequences of tasks to mitigate the 
risks, then it simulates the alternatives to assess the risks.  
 For example in the ATM situation, if users do not have their debit cards, what is the 
risk associated with sending an access code to their phone and allowing users to acquire cash 
from the ATM. If the user just wants to pay a bill, then the risk associated with the transaction 
is much smaller. Based on the simulation, the policy decision point might deny access to 

























Figure 2. XACML architecture 
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 Similarly in a health application, what if the medical staff does not have access to a 
patient’s medical records and must wait for the person or organization that does? If the patient 
is being treated for a broken arm, then access can probably wait, but if the condition is life-
threatening then the policy decision point should decide to allow access as the risk of not 
doing so is too high. 
 Thus the policy decision point uses the simulation to compute the risks based on the 
circumstances surrounding the business process, and construct and select a sequence of risk 
mitigation tasks, which we call RMPs, that can minimize the risks. These sequences of tasks 
can be seen as alternatives that can be used to have access to a resource. 
 These examples summarize the ideas behind the approach. Chapter 3 provides the 




This work provides the definition of a novel approach to risk assessment and in particular to 
AC risk assessment that focuses on a dynamic RMP construction based on risk-related 
utilities and events. This new approach extends risk assessment to include forecasting, which 
has resulted in the development of a new risk mitigation FM, an automated support for the 
risk mitigation approach and its implementation, and two case studies involving risk-oriented 
dynamic applications.  
The thesis statement related to this research work follows: 
By introducing a new approach to AC risk assessment that focuses on a dynamic RMP 
construction based on risk-related utilities and events, a new design model and its 
implementation can be provided that supports the evaluation of risks and benefits at runtime, 
as opposed to the current static and predefined processes. Instead of giving a yes/no answer, 
the new design model provides alternative sequences of tasks that components (or users) can 
follow to obtain access to specific resources. 





1. the combination of dynamic RMP construction and risk assessment is extended to 
include forecasting based on multiple risk-related utilities and events; 
2. the risk assessment scope varies depending on the dynamic association of the 
components with one or multiple risk dimensions (e.g., security and productivity); 
3. the approach provides cumulative risk assessment in which, each action of interest 
impacts the risk-related utilities associated with components in a dynamic way; 
4. the adaptive simulation method is based on risk-related utilities and events. 
The contributions of this thesis include: 
 the introduction of a novel approach to risk assessment and remediation;  
 the definition  of a new risk mitigation FM; 
 the provision of automated support for the risk assessment and mitigation approach; 
 the applicability of the approach is illustrated through modelling and implementing 
case studies involving dynamic risks which provide risk assessment and set of 
custom-tailored RMP. 
 
1.6 Application of the Approach 
The proposed risk management approach offers a new method of AC adaptive risk 
assessment. The applicability of the proposed approach is illustrated by using two case 
studies: a first case study about the resolution of a medical emergency in a patient-privacy 
setting and a second case study about software development. 
Specifically, the application of the approach involves: (i) a manual quantitative risk 
assessment evaluation in the context of the software development and patient-privacy 
scenarios; (ii) the implementation of the core framework for supporting the automation of 
the AC risk assessment and the construction of a set of RMPs; and (iii) an automated 
quantitative risk assessment evaluation in the context of a scenario involving software 






1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 illustrates the related areas and explains the background necessary to understand 
the details of the proposed approach. 
Chapter 3 describes the details of the proposed approach, including architecture and the 
interaction for the external entities. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the applicability of the approach using two case studies and a 
comparison with RBAC and RAdAC. 
Chapter 5 states the conclusions of the thesis and identifies future work. 
Appendix A lists the complete source code of the implementation. Appendix B presents a 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram of the implementation classes. Appendix C 
contains a list of the implementation classes attributes, methods and their descriptions. 
Appendix D contains details about the risk calculation process. Appendix E provides a 















The  proposed approach is related  to several areas of the research, including: 
 AC approaches and policies; 
 RAdAC-based risk-benefit analysis; 
 XACML; 
 Obligations in AC; 
 Risk management approaches; and 
 Business process modelling and simulation. 
 In comparison with related work, this thesis introduces a new approach to AC risk 
assessment that focuses on a dynamic RMP construction based on risk-related utilities and 
events, and a new design model and its implementation is provided that supports the 
evaluation of risks and benefits at runtime, as opposed to the current static and predefined 
processes. Instead of giving a yes/no answer, the new design model provides alternative 







2.1 Access Control Approaches 
AC refers to mechanisms and policies that restrict access to resources, thus regulating access 
to a system for which AC is provided or to a collection of physical or virtual resources [21]. 
An AC approach is used to represent these mechanisms and policies wherein users are 
granted access and specific privilege to a system for which AC is provided, its resources or 
information [22].  There exists a variety of widely used AC approaches that include attribute-
based access control (ABAC) [23, 24], mandatory access control (MAC) [25], discretionary 
access control (DAC) [26] and role-based access control (RBAC) [27, 28, 29, 30]. 
Traditional AC approaches were designed to be reactive, not proactive[22].  Some of 
these approaches are based on a client-server architecture, in which an interaction has a 
reactive nature because it is started by each client’s explicitly invoking a server call. In 
contrast, a proactive interaction is dynamic and relies on implicit invocation. Further, 
traditional AC approaches cannot address dynamic context-aware scenarios and they lack 
support of dynamic and adaptive policies [22]. For example, a client-server application 
programming interface requires a fixed set of variables as input, but does not take into 
account a context of operation [31]. 
In addition to the well-known AC approach mentioned above, many other approaches 
have been proposed in the literature [32, 33, 34, 35]. For example, using the break glass AC 
approach suggests that “it is possible for a subject to break-the-glass and explicitly override 
the denied request” [36, 37]. In addition, certain approaches can be used to transform one 
form of AC approach into another, e.g., such as a “framework that uses attribute-based 
policies to create a more traditional RBAC” approach [30]. 
 An AC policy specifies how an access is managed and who may gain the access to 
information or service and under what conditions the access is granted. A standardized 
approach to represent AC policies is the XACML. XACML uses XML to encode a policy 
and an AC decision request/response language to execute a combination of policies and any 
AC request. This approach also provides a framework for describing data flow elements, 
including service requesters, resources, and AC policy decision points [38].   
 Traditional AC approaches consist of RBAC, MAC, ABAC and DAC. These 





problems [40, 41]. However, all of them were designed to provide a relationship between 
pieces of information associated with an AC rule logic [42] and a resource or record for 
which access is requested. For example, for RBAC, these pieces of information [43] are an 
action or a resource and a component role. Their association within the AC rule logic defines 
a set of conditions [44], which can be extended with a number of attributes that are optional 
to the AC approach, such as location. This method allows the implementation of the AC 
approach to formally guarantee [45] that only the intended set of users [46] or components 
would be able to obtain the access to the resource or service [47]. However, the 
implementation of the AC approach can be a subject to manipulation, which can range from 
an unexpected situation [48],  including poorly written AC policies [49] to a number of 
malicious entities acquiring access to a set of existing accounts with elevated AC privilege; 
in many of these cases the AC analysis [50] becomes invalid. At that point, a set of guarantees 
that the implementation of the AC approach was supposed to provide are no longer enforced 
[51]. Obviously, there are extensions to AC that can identify such problems [52, 53] including 
these involving pattern recognition. However, their possible integration into the AC approach 
is limited by narrow scope of these patterns and consequent insufficient level of precision 
including high number of false positives. 
 
2.1.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC is “used to regulate access to systems, resources or information based on the roles of 
individuals within an organization” [54]. According to this approach, only “individuals 
performing certain roles have the ability to access required resources or perform specific 
tasks such as view or modify data” [55]. This approach provides fine granularity and 
scalability, and can be easily implemented for a small and simple system for which AC is 





The RBAC approach is based on following entities: users, roles, operations, and 
objects [56]. A permission to access a resource is represented as a pair of an operation and 
an object, and the permission assignment is defined as a pair of permission and role. In 
addition, user assignment is defined as a pair of a user and a role. Figure 4 provides an 
overview of this approach. 
Although an entire implemented AC approach based on RBAC can be reviewed by 
one analyst or a few analysts when adopted within a small system for which AC is provided, 
the RBAC approach becomes increasingly complex for a large system due to the high number 
of rule exceptions involving a wide range of users, different knowledge domains and diverse 
scenarios [57, 58]. This complexity may lead a security analyst to omit critical scenarios that 
need  to be addressed. Further, AC rule exceptions made for certain cases accumulate [59] 
and the AC policies becomes increasingly difficult to understand. However, security analyst 
needs a good understanding while maintaining them [27]. 
 
2.1.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
MAC refers to an approach in which “classifications or security labels  are assigned to 
resources and access is granted only to entities (components, users, processes, devices) with 
a distinct level of authorization or clearance” [26, 60, 61]. This approach is often applied in 
systems with strict hierarchy, such as those used by the military. 





2.1.3 Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
ABAC is an approach in which “access rights are granted to users (e. g., components, 
persons, devices, processes) via the use of policies that combine attributes” [24, 62, 63]. 
These policies involve different types of attributes (e. g., component attributes, user 
attributes, resource attributes). “Time and space attributes are especially relevant when 
temporal and geo-spatial access control policies are required” [64, 65]. 
 
2.1.4 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
DAC constitutes an approach that “restricts access to resources based on the identity of users 
(e. g., components, persons, devices, processes) or groups to which they belong” [22]. This 
AC approach is called discretionary because in this approach a user with specific access 
permission can pass that permission to any other user at his or her discretion. Therefore, a 
user owning a resource can grant or deny access to other users. 
 
2.1.5 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
The XACML “is a widely used standard language for expressing access control policies. The 
XACML is developed by OASIS that uses XML to describe a policy language and an access 
control decision request/response language. The policy language allows administrators to 
define the requirements for accessing their application resources in a system for which AC 
is provided. The request/ response language describes request authorization queries and their 
responses. However, XACML lacks the knowledge representations needed to address 
computer-interpretable effects”. XACML data flow is defined according to [66] and 
presented in Figure 5.  
 The XACML data flow contains ten components and thirteen tasks related to an AC 
request. The first action in the XACML data flow is for the personnel controlling an AC 
process to define policies [67] using a policy administration point. Then, the XACML-based 
implementation of the AC approach waits for a service requester to submit a request for a 







Figure 5. XACML data flow [66] 
 
 The context handler notifies a policy decision point of the new request that needs to 
be resolved. The policy decision point queries the context handler for a set of required 
attributes. The context handler forwards the request to a policy information point, which 
collects the set of required attributes from a subject, the resource, and an environment. Once 
all required information is collected, including the resource context information, it is then 
passed to the context handler, which, in turn, forwards it to the policy decision point. After 
the policy decision point made its decision regarding the requested resource, the policy 
decision point sends the AC decision with its context to the Context Handler, which forwards 
the request to the policy enforcement point. The policy enforcement point then executes 
obligations from the AC decision in an obligations service. If the AC request is resolved 
positively, then once obligations are fulfilled, the service requester can finally obtain access 






2.1.6 Obligations in Access Control 
Traditional AC approaches offer a limited number of responses to a resource request. A 
common set of possible responses include ‘access granted’, ‘access denied’, ‘policy 
inapplicable’, and ‘result undefined’. However, conditions such as “Clearly there is no unique 
response to whether one option is better than the other, and which one is to be preferred 
depends on the specific context and information involved” [68] is not uncommon during 
analysis, and therefore, AC need more flexibility [69] in adjusting the component behaviour. 
“XACML defines obligations as actions that have to be returned to the policy enforcement 
point with the policy decision point response” [70]. Obligations examples include “obligation 
to anonymise data or an obligation that expresses authorisation timeout” [71], and “the policy 
may permit access to a resource but have the obligation that the owner of the resource is 
notified” [72]. 
 
2.2 Risk Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC) Based on Risk-Benefit Analysis 
RAdAC has been an area of active research [73, 74, 75, 76] from approximately 2009 to 
2016, and new methods have been introduced to resolve the problems inherent in traditional 
AC approaches, which, as software of systems for which AC is provided increase in size and 
complexity, start to compromise the AC approaches proper function and performance. 
RAdAC uses a risk calculation to determine whether access to resource should be granted or 
denied [77]. The risk calculation is based on a function that takes set of risks [78] into account 
through quantitative measures such as the ones involving reputation, security levels, and 
reliability [79]. In comparison with traditional AC approaches, RAdAC allows for a 
resolution of dynamic AC situation using the quantitative measures [80] in a way that 
minimizes entire collection of risks [81]. The functions that compute risk based on these 
measures rely on a risk-benefit calculation. 
The risk-benefit calculation indicate that it is not enough to calculate just a risk of 
granting an access [82], and that four types of risks and benefits are required. The first type 





information, there is the risk that this information can be maliciously disseminated e.g., 
information leak. The second type relates to the risk of denying access to a resource. For 
example, if access is denied to a requested piece of source code, the developer might be 
encouraged to follow a path that will lead to project delays. The third type relates to a benefit 
of granting access to resource. For example, by granting access to a resource such as software 
code, a possible project delay may be reduced. The fourth type relates to the benefits of 
denying access to a resource. For example, denying access to a file on a heavily loaded server 
can lead to a load decrease. 
A RAdAC approach uses “risk calculations to determine whether access to resources should 
be granted or denied” [83]. The risk calculation is based on a function that takes risks [84] 
into account through quantitative [85] measures such as the ones involving reputation, 
security levels, and reliability [86]. In comparison to traditional AC approaches (RBAC, 
MAC, DAC, ABAC), this approach allows for the “resolution of dynamic access control 
situations” [87] using a set of quantitative measures in a way that minimizes risks [88]. The 
function that computes risk based on these measures relies on risk-benefit calculations [89]. 
 Regarding information leakage, "the proposed applications that are available to tackle 
incidents of data leakage from outbound email are proposed as additional plugins in 
commercial email security platforms (McAfee Data Loss Prevention, Symantec Data Loss 
Prevention), as standalone applications (WebsenseTruWeb DLP, Proofpoint Enterprise 
Privacy, MailMarshal) or as features in networking devices (CISCO IronPort email)" [90]. 
However, "several security software vendors now offer “data loss prevention” solutions that 
use simple algorithms, such as keyword lists and hashing, which are too coarse to capture the 
features what makes sensitive documents secret" [91]. In contrast, a RAdAC approach can 
provide the basis [92] for a solution that not only makes it possible for critical document 
features to be captured, but also to relate these features to business processes, process-based 






2.3 Risk Management Approaches 
Risk management has been used since 1955 [94]. A number of standards have been 
developed [95, 96, 97] to resolve risks in general and to provide a framework and a 
methodology to handle new risks that are not yet handled in specific knowledge domains. 
 A proposed risk management approach is related to risk analysis. Risk analysis is a 
technique of projecting [98] known facts about the present and historical facts about the past 
into the future to provide a set of risks [99, 100] and probabilities of their realization [101, 
102]. Risk analysis has been applied for various purposes over the last 50 years in various 
knowledge domains [103, 104], including engineering [105], finance [106], and security 
[107]. Overall, risk management helps to mitigate risks by providing methods for their 
rigorous identification. Several standards were developed to provide specific risk analysis in 
an AC system [108, 109]. 
There are several approaches that provide risk management in specific knowledge 
domains. For example, in information security, Bayesian networks [110] are used to “better 
understand the causal relationships between preconditions, vulnerability exploitations, and 
postconditions. This is facilitated by computing the likelihoods of different outcomes 
possible as a result of the cause-consequence relationships” [111]. Risk occur in every aspect 
of knowledge, for example there is an entrepreneurial risk [112]. M.K. Sadgrove states that 
it “applies to any management decision that could have a good or bad outcome. It follows 
that most management projects and decisions contain risk” [113]. Another kind of risk 
management occurs in the health care field/industry, for instance, when physicians consider 
genetic testing for at-risk relatives of cancer patients [114]. 
In summary, the existing approaches to risk management vary from the general [115] 
to the specific and are designed to facilitate risk analysis and to develop risk mitigation 
strategies. However, the process of combining risks originating from different knowledge 
domains can be improved. 
2.4 Business Process Modelling and Simulation 
A risk management approach is related to business process modelling [116, 117, 118] due to 





[119]. Simulation relies on modelling of the business process to present a model [120] that 
will be used to assess a set of relevant risks. “Processes seen as systems might be modelled 
using simulation for the purpose either of understanding the behaviour of the process or of 
evaluating various strategies for the operation of it either for decision-making or for learning 
purposes” [121]. 
A simulation can be defined as a process of creating a FM as an abstract image of any 
system for which AC is provided to analyze variables and tasks controlling a state of the 
system to project this state into the future. Any existing and proposed systems for which AC 
is provided described quantitatively, using attributes, equations, and laws can be simulated. 
The goal of a simulation is to define mechanisms controlling a behavior of a system 
for which AC is provided. Moreover, the simulation can forecast a future state of the analyzed 
system and determine the best way to impact a state of the system in order to achieve its 
goals. Thus the identified required alterations to help an AC system to achieve its goals can 
be performed. 
For example, performing a number of asteroid trajectory simulations each modified 
by a possible way of an asteroid trajectory alteration can lead to a set of quantitative tasks to 
make sure that an asteroid does not impact any space vessels, or Earth. Indeed, an asteroid 
impacting Earth is a very real and ever-present possibility and a lot of efforts has been made 
to identify such threat to Earth as early as possible. Simulation is an essential method relevant 
to any spacecraft design or a mission involving asteroids, which include elements such as an 
asteroid identification, its orbit determination, and collision risk mitigation. 
Risk assessment accuracy is a critical feature of the proposed approach [122]. FM of 
the approach is complex with its several risk dimensions [123, 124], and thus, many details 
in a simulation are considered to forecast a possible future with a sufficient level of accuracy. 
Forecasting allows prediction of multiple details, including critical risks and utilities for a set 
of dimensions in one run. “Having accurate forecasts about the performance of the system 
based on an on-line fine-tuned simulation model also means more accurate decisions at any 

















Description of the Approach 
The proposed approach extends existing AC approaches, including RAdAC-based ACs. This 
chapter describes the overall structure of the approach and the functions of each of its parts, 
as well as details about how the approach can be applied. The main formal definitions of the 
concepts pertaining to the approach are also presented. 
 
3.1 Approach Architecture 
The proposed approach is an extension of the XACML model presented in Figure 6. Notice 
that this model uses static AC policies that are applied to control the access to a resources of 
a system as depicted by the shaded area in this figure. In the case of a banking application, 
for example, to get money (i.e., a service, box 2) from an ATM (i.e., following a business 
process, box 3), when a bank customer (i.e., a component, box 1), according to the bank’s 
static AC policy, needs to access (i.e., AC request, box 5) his or her account, a PIN is required 
by the ATM. The PIN has to match the bank record associated with this customer, and if the 
customer is unable to provide the PIN or provides it incorrectly the bank’s server (i.e., more 





point (box 6) to deny access to the account based on a set of static AC policies (box 7). In 
this example, the AC process is restricted to a single option, that is to provide a PIN.  
 
Figure 6. XACML architecture 
The proposed approach architecture is presented in Figure 7. 
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No alternatives are provided that take into account AC process variations related to 
different identification methods or to different risk levels of a transaction (e.g., checking the 
account balance is less risky than withdrawing money). First, AC decisions made by the 
policy decision point (box 6) is based on a set of static AC policies (box 7). Second, the AC 
decisions can only follow a predefined AC process that is unable to adapt to variations such 
as the ones previously described, for example, to different identification methods and 
different risk levels. Therefore, the traditional XACML model falls short in providing a 
dynamic and more flexible AC process. For example, in terms of a banking application, if 
customers forget their PIN, but have their cell phone with them, the banking system can send 
them a message containing a verification code to use as a substitute for requesting a PIN; 
also, if a customer frequently visits this location, it might be possible to omit the request for 
a PIN in case there is a positive match provided by facial recognition software and the 
customer wants to perform a low-risk transaction (e.g., to pay his or her credit card balance). 
Beyond these examples, there is a wide variety of other variations related to customer 
identification, risks, and other factors, that could, but are not currently supported. 
In addition, it would be beneficial to support the AC process variations such as the 
ones described in the ATM example (page 4), which include among others variations related 
to non-card based transactions, facial recognition, additional security questions, signature 
requests, and additional security codes sent to a cell phone. These cases further illustrate 
examples of possible AC process adaptations that could be made, but are not part of a static 
and non-adaptive AC solution.  
Besides providing variations involving access to resources based on existing access 
privileges, another important class of variations are those that restrict access privileges, 
which can happen especially in the context of malicious threats. For example, in a banking 
application, unauthorized access privileges resulting from ATM software bugs or exploits 
can be used to make the ATM dispense cash, and it would be helpful if the AC process can 
limit the remote unauthorized access once the ATM starts to malfunction. As another 
example, in a patient-privacy application, stolen doctor’s credentials can be used to obtain 
unauthorized access to a number of privacy-sensitive medical records, and it would be 




In order to address the limitations described in the previous paragraphs regarding the 
XACML model policy decision point (box 6) and static AC policies (box 7), a new dynamic 
and risk-based AC approach needs to be introduced. In Figure 7, which shows the proposed 
approach, the two boxes are replaced by parts that support dynamic AC process adaptations 
based on risks. These parts are represented in this figure by boxes in which bold style text is 
used. In essence, the new boxes 6 and 7 consist of a new policy decision point and a new FM 
that will be described in the following paragraphs. 
The policy decision point from the XACML model is replaced with parts (box 6 in 
Figure 7) that still need to make AC decisions, but they achieve this purpose in a very 
different way because these parts need to make the decisions by following the tasks related 
to a business process, assessing the risks and benefits related to these tasks dynamically, and 
constructing sequences of tasks that minimize the risks. Risks and benefits are counterparts 
in describing the negative and positive impact on the system and are measured through their 
utility, which is a number that represents the level of the risks and benefits. For example, 
some tasks such as adding a rule to the firewall in a software development setting to allow 
developers to access software code remotely may lead to an increase in the risk of this code 
being stolen because the new firewall configuration is more prone to threats. However, asking 
the project manager permission to add such a rule may reduce the risk of this code being 
stolen, because the project manager will be aware of the timetable of the developers and may 
be able to identify and prevent unauthorized access to the source code outside of regular 
working hours. Therefore, in this case, constructing and executing a sequence of these two 
tasks would minimize the risks related to source code being stolen. 
The static AC policies are replaced with the FM (box 7 in Figure 7) that is designed 
to project the constructed sequences of tasks into the future to find the outcomes of these 
sequences. A projection is performed through a simulation involving the same elements of 
the system subject to AC, which are depicted as a shaded area in Figure 7, that function as 
instantiated components in the FM. The outcomes of these sequences are the timelines of the 
risks that have occurred during the simulation. For example, projecting into the future a task 
of adding a rule to the firewall in a software development setting to allow developers to 




of the code being stolen compared to the previous configuration of the firewall. However, as 
time to access  a source code is also reduced, there is also a 25.4% increase in productivity 
of the software developers. Thus, projecting the constructed sequences of tasks into the future 
allows the approach to assess and quantify the risks related to the simulated execution of the 
constructed sequences of tasks. 
The new policy decision point (box 6) involves three parts: the risk quantification and 
analysis model (box 8 in Figure 7), which is responsible for converting the input containing 
data received from a number of different data sources into quantified risk-related data; the 
RMP construction part (box 9 in Figure 7), which provides a process to mitigate risks; and a 
part comprising a set of strategies (box 16 in Figure 7) that assess the timelines of risk utility 
in a form of utility graphs and choose the best applicable RMP candidates, that is, the 
sequences of tasks that minimize the risks. These sequences will be provided to a requesting 
component. 
The FM also includes three parts: the forecasting core model (box 11 in Figure 7) that 
initiates and drives the projection of each of the RMP candidates; the domain models (box 
13 in Figure 7), which represent the behaviour in domains such as banking and health; and 
reserves (box 14 in Figure 7) that are owned by components and represent previous 
accumulated risks and benefits as resources that can be used to mitigate future risks.  
In the next subsections, details about each part in box 6 and box 7 in Figure 7 are 
provided. Together, these parts constitute the new design model introduced by the proposed 
approach, which is called “Improved Design Model” in Figure 7. 
 
3.1.1 Risk Quantification and Analysis Model 
The first part of the new policy decision point, which is described in this subsection, is a risk 
quantification and analysis model (box 8 in Figure 7) designed to convert the input containing 
data received from several different data sources into quantified risk data. For example, in a 




result in a 30% risk of a two-day project delay assuming this task is critical in the project 
timeline. This number can be derived from a historical database of projects based on entries 
containing information about developers that have similar experience and estimated task 
durations. In general, the risk quantification and analysis model is used to identify and 
quantify risks, and perform a risk analysis that depends on the current state of the system. 
The risk quantification and analysis model receives an AC request as input. The AC 
request contains a requested resource (e.g., software code in a software development setting 
or a medical record in a patient-privacy setting) or service, an action type such as read or 
write, and the requesting component role and risk-related attributes (e.g., in a health setting 
a doctor and the number of resolved emergencies that he or she can handle). Based on a 
specific resource type and action type, certain risks can be applied. For example, in a patient 
privacy application access to a medical record might result in the unauthorized dissemination 
of this record, but refusing this access request can result in poor treatment quality. The risks 
to be applied are quantified through relevant risk related attributes known as QRMs. These 
QRMs are used in the risk analysis, which results in risk probabilities (e.g., the probability 
of the unauthorized dissemination of a medical record). These probabilities follow, for 
simplicity purposes, a normal probability distribution. For more details about the risk analysis 
refer to Appendix D. The output of the risk quantification and analysis model is a set of risks 
that must be addressed by the RMP candidates and set of QRMs describing the risk-related 
attributes.  
RMPs need to deal with both risks and benefits, where risks lead to negative 
consequences and benefits lead to positive consequences. For example, the risk of 
unauthorized medical record dissemination can lead to patient privacy violation, while the 
benefit of asking a medical doctor for an additional authentication reduces the probability of 
the risk of unauthorized medical record dissemination. Each identified risk that must be 
addressed by the RMP candidates is defined by an event or a set of events and the probability 
of the consequences of these events. Examples of risks are the risk of unauthorized 
dissemination of patient medical records, the risk of poor quality of medical treatment 
resulting from insufficient information, the risk of software product completion delay and 




penalties for violating patient’s privacy, providing treatment of poor quality, delaying 
product completion, and loosing reputation for unauthorized source code disclosure. The 
consequences can be either static or depend on the context and attributes of a system for 
which AC is provided. The probability of these consequences is defined by the likelihood 
and its dispersion (i.e., standard deviation). In addition, each risk is associated with one risk 
dimension, which is a group of risks related to a specific knowledge category such as security, 
productivity, and privacy. 
Each task sequence has a set of risks and benefits associated with it. The goal of the  
FM simulation is to project based on the current state of a system for which AC is provided 
each RMP into the future states of the system. After the simulation the future states of this 
system related to each RMP are compared and one or more task sequence is produced. For 
example, in a patient privacy application, when a doctor is handling an emergency, the 
requested information has a critical time to be delivered and if this information is not 
delivered at the proper time, the patient could die and the information would no longer 
become relevant. In addition, for example, in a software development setting, if the 
involvement of a developer in the development process is critical and the deadlines for 
project completion are achievable only if access to the source code is granted, the AC might 
choose to set an exception in the firewall and thereby allow access. This access leads to the 
benefit of reducing the project delay risk. However, the approach has to compare this benefit 
with a security risk that is created when the source code is allowed to be downloaded to a 
location that is deemed insecure. The approach can choose other tasks (non-mutually 
exclusive tasks) to mitigate the security risk of allowing access, such as verifying and or 
installing an antivirus, a firewall, disabling any potential access to any third party can have 
to this machine, or taking any additional steps to verify the identity of the developer. Given 
that these steps sufficiently mitigate a security risk and it would no longer outweigh the 
productivity benefits, the approach might accept such course of action. 
FM (6) is a model that represents the components of the system for which AC is 
provided, the external entities that communicate with these components, and the processes 
of the external entities. These processes are represented as directed graphs in which the tasks 




attributes and the context is a set of dynamic variables that can influence the task sequence 
executions at runtime. In this sense, process executions can be called context-aware. 
As an example of risk analysis in a software development setting, this analysis 
typically uses  historical databases of software development projects. Using these databases 
experts can estimate the duration of projects and these measures can be used in the risk 
analysis. For example, project delays can be calculated using well known project estimation 
techniques as the time Tdelay = Tpassed*(Treserve-Testimated)/Treserve, where  Tpassed is the current 
project duration; Treserve is defined as the duration of the critical project path minus the time 
left to complete the project on time; and Testimated is the current estimate of the remaining time 
to complete the critical path. However, in order to calculate the project delays more 
accurately, the risk analysis has to take into account other factors such as the availability of 
resources. Of course, if more information about which resources are available or not available 
is provided, the more accurate the project delays can be calculated and, therefore, the more 
accurate the risk analysis will be. 
The proposed approach is based on the RAdAC method. However, in contrast with 
the existing RAdAC approaches, this approach is designed to be modular and extensible in 
that  additional risks from new risk dimensions can be added to or removed from the risk 
analysis. The analysis is conservative: the results of the risk analysis based on one risk 
dimension are preserved when additional risk dimensions are introduced. In this way, it is 
possible for the FM to address not just one risk dimension, but a set of them (e.g., computer 
network, financial risks). The combined risks derived from the FM allow for a detailed 
projection of the processes into the future that involves a wide variety of interrelated risk 
dimensions. This evaluation of the combined risks is too complex to be compiled manually 
by experts. 
The risk analysis can be used both in RBAC (to infer what resources can be accessed 
by certain groups of users) and in RAdAC (to conduct static risk analysis). However, both 
approaches rely on a manual risk analysis paradigm and do not create possible projections 
over time, whereas  in the proposed approach the risk analysis is automated and the 





3.1.2 Risk Mitigation Process Construction 
After the risks are identified and quantified there is a need to construct a sequence of tasks, 
that is a process that mitigates these risks. That is a responsibility of the RMP construction 
component (box 9 in Figure 7). For example, in a patient-privacy setting, when a medical 
doctor has identified an emergency, it may be useful to request other medical personnel 
participating in the emergency resolution to confirm that this is indeed a medical emergency 
as opposed to a situation in which a malicious entity has gained access to one of the medical 
doctor credentials and is abusing the emergency procedure to gain access to data that would 
not be provided otherwise. Thus, the RMP construction provides as output a set of processes 
where the risks are mitigated and each of these processes can serve as a candidate in the AC 
decision. 
As mentioned previously, the processes are defined by directed graphs in which the 
vertices are tasks. The process description contains the following attributes: the name of the 
process graph, which is used for an identification process; the entry points, which is a list of 
starting tasks; and the exit points, which is a list of ending tasks.  
The results of the risk quantification and analysis model are forwarded to RMP 
construction (9), which takes as an input all relevant risks and risk-related attributes and 
constructs a set of possible RMPs (10) addressing the identified risks such as adding a task 
for adjusting the firewall rules to prevent code retrieval in a software development application 
or adding a task for shredding printed documents after a medical emergency has been 
resolved in patient-privacy setting. These RMPs (10) are an output of the RMP construction 
(9) and they contain the set of processes to address the identified risks. However, to identify 
the best RMPs among the constructed set there is a need to project each of them into the 
future using the FM (7) and compare them based on the projected risks.  
Figure 8 presents examples of an original process and a constructed set of three RMPs 
for a software development application. The initial software development process can be seen 
as a business process (3) in Figure 7, which a component (1) follows before an AC decision 
is reached. Some tasks may be mutually exclusive, which may lead sequences of tasks to be 




because the AC cannot allow and deny access at the same time. Option 2 represents an 
original process modified by adding a mutually exclusive task (that is, to allow access) and 
a mutually non-exclusive task (that is, to adjust firewall rules). Option 3 is option 2 extended 
with one additional mutually non-exclusive task (that is, to ask the project manager for 
permission).  
The RMP construction is in general a complex process, because the exploration of 
possible sequences of tasks that mitigate the involved risks involves a large number of 
possible task combinations. In order to provide a feasible solution the approach initially 
assesses all mutually exclusive tasks. After that, each mutually non-exclusive task, if there is 
any, is added to the task sequences in various positions to generate other task sequences, and 
these sequences are compared (16) with the previous sequences and compared with 
themselves based on the timelines of the risks (that is, the risks that are projected over time). 
The prerequisites of tasks and the task parameters (e.g., a code fragment identification for 
the task “get code”) define the order in which tasks (including tasks from the original process) 
are positioned. In selecting a possible task to build a RMP, a number of process-related 
attributes is used, including the component (1) role, resource type (2), action and context. For 
example, in a software development application, when there is a need for a software 
developer (role) to move (action) code (resource) from one location to another during his or 
her normal work hours (context), in order to reduce the risk of code being stolen, the task 
“adjusting firewall policies” is selected to limit the exposure of the code elements through 

























































Figure 8. Examples of the original process and the constructed set of RMPs for the 




Figure 9 presents examples of the original and the constructed RMPs for the patient 
privacy application. 
 











































































3.1.3 Forecasting Core Model 
As it was previously mentioned in subsection 3.1, the FM is designed to project RMPs into 
the future to find out the outcomes of these processes in terms of risks. The forecasting core 
model (box 11 in Figure 7) initiates and drives the projection of each of these RMPs, where 
a projection is a simulation of the processes taking into account the elements of the system 
for which AC is provided, namely the components, the business processes, and the resources 
used in a specific application. The simulation is event-based and driven by one or more foci 
of its components. Each event represents an occurrence, such as an action execution or a 
context change, within the simulated system. For example, an event happens when a doctor 
is notified that the requested medical record is available. There are cases in which one event 
is associated with risks from multiple risk dimensions. For example, allowing access (event) 
to source code provides productivity benefits and constitutes security risks at the same time. 
The focus of a component is a pointer to a task of a process graph that is being executed, and 
the focus pointer is stored as an attribute of some components. An example of a focus is a 
pointer to the task of retrieving a medical record that the doctor, which is represented as a 
component, is performing to resolve an emergency.  
 Some of the components that represent human users are associated with a role. This 
role describes a possible class of components which is associated with a specific process 
graph. For example, a specific doctor (a human user represented as a component) has the role 
of a medical personnel associated with a process graph that represents medical routines. The 
role has the following attributes: the location, which refers to the current location of the user 
with this role; the role name, which is the name of the role and is used for identification 
purposes; the computational unit for work that points to the computer selected by the user 
working in this role; data sources, which is a list of  applications known to this particular 
user, including usernames and passwords that represent a user’s memory of applications he 
or she has access to; and tasks, which lists the current tasks the user performs in this role.  
 The process execution starts with the focus pointing to one of the starting points of a 
process graph and traverses the process graph selecting and scheduling new tasks until it 




completed and no future tasks are scheduled. In terms of each task, the process execution 
schedules an event for the execution of the task logic, which is the behaviour of the task.    
The task concept serves two purposes. First, it describes the current state of the task 
that is executing and, second, it is used as a template from which the actual tasks are copied 
when instantiated. The task has two relevant methods, which are called choosecustomnext 
and taskactions. Because a task is represented as a template these two methods need to be 
defined when a task is introduced. The choosecustomnext method is invoked within the 
choosenext method, which selects the next task that must be executed after the current task 
has been completed (that is, task switching). The taskactions is called when the task event 
has occurred (that is, the task logic). The task class has six attributes. These attributes consist 
of: the task name, which is used for different task identification purposes; the standard 
duration, which is an expected duration of the task; the actual duration that initially is 
equivalent to a standard duration, but can be changed depending on the results of the 
execution of the previous tasks and on the process attributes used to set the time at which the 
event of completing this task must happen; the parent, which is an object responsible for the 
task execution and that can be a role or a component; the status, which refers to the status of 
the task execution and can be a success, failure, or not defined; the next nodes attribute, which 
is a set of possible next tasks to be executed after this task is completed; and the previous 
nodes attribute, which is a set of tasks that can lead to the execution of this task. 
 Each task has a method called taskactions which represents the task logic. This 
method includes a number of execution control structures such as conditions and cycles, and 
three types of operations: 
1. Send message: during this step, the component executing the task sends a message to 
another component.  
2. Update attributes: the component’s actions can update attributes, which can be associated 
with a task, a process, or the system for which AC is provided. For example, the component 
can set a task status (one of the task attributes) to failed when an error that cannot be corrected 
within this task has been encountered. Another example occurs when the component acting 
on behalf of a software developer creates a new database. The database activity needs to be 




process attributes, where the component would populate the database after the creation in the 
same process, and in the attributes of the system, where other components can also query this 
database.  
3. Perform action: the component can perform an action such as creating a new record or 
storing information about a new computer that has been added to the system dynamically. 
An example in a software development application of a record is when a server creates a new 
user account when there is a need to record information about a new user to allow him or her 
access to the system. In a patient-privacy application, when a document is being printed, the 
database that is tracking the state of all printed documents creates a new record that specifies 
details about this procedure. 
 The simulation results in the timeline (15) of utility (that is, the level of risks and 
benefits) and critical risks. Risks have a probability of occurrence and an impact associated 
with them. The impact of a risk is a negative consequence that will occur if the risk occurs. 
For example, if there is a risk of code being stolen in a software development application, if 
the code happens to be stolen there is a consequence that is in this case a financial loss. The 
utility of a risk is defined as the risk impact multiplied by the risk probability. In general, 
risks can be divided into common risks and critical risks. Common risks have an impact that 
can be dealt with using the existing system reserves, meaning that in the case of a financial 
penalty there are enough financial reserves accumulated in a system to cover the financial 
loss. Critical risks have an impact that is prohibitively high and exceeds the accumulated 
reserves. In this case, it does not make sense to calculate a risk utility, because the impact is 
too high. Instead, only a probability is used to characterize these critical risks. For example, 
if a company goes bankrupt, individual productivity cannot not be taken into consideration 
anymore, and therefore the risk analysis that involves risk dimensions such as productivity 
can no longer be applied.  
 The forecasting core model design consists of a set of classes. These classes are 
presented in the UML diagram depicted in Figure 10. That is a simplified UML diagram, 
presenting only the data and selected relationships among the classes. A detailed diagram is 




 The UML diagram displays classes using boxes with three sections for general UML 
and two sections for data only diagrams. The top section states whether it is a class or an 
interface, and the class and an interface name and its package. The middle section contains 
the class members except where the class members are represented by an association link. 
The links are represented by a solid line and a non-triangle arrow, e.g., from recordscollection 
class to record class, where the type and name of the class member is represented in the text, 
the public access type is shown as circles and the protected access type is shown as triangles. 
The final class members are depicted with the F letter modifier and static members are 
represented with S letters. The bottom section (not present for data diagram) contains 
signatures for class methods. Please note that the class called actions queue represents events 
queue. 
 The class signatures consist of the method name, method parameters, the value 
returned by this method, and method access level, where a circle represents the public 
method, an up arrow represents the protected method, a C character next to an access type 
represents the constructor method(s) for this class, and a underscored method name with an 
S symbol next to the access type is a static method. In Figure 10, the class dependencies are 









 After having described the forecasting core model, the details about the simulation 
process are provided. First, the description of the concept of scenario is introduced, which 
specifies a domain-specific situation, which includes the components (such as doctors, 
software developers, computers) and their behaviour. After this, the concept of focus of 
components, which was previously introduced as a pointer to a currently executing task, is 
described in more detail. Then, an in-depth description of the routines for task execution and 
for the next task to be executed. The explanation about how events are processed continues 
in this subsection, providing details on how events are scheduled, stored and executed. Notice 
that depending on the events that occur the risks may increase or decrease. Finally, an 
overview of the FM behaviour is provided. The discussion starts by describing how to 
represent domain-specific situations as a scenario.  
Scenario 
Scenarios are represented using the following elements: components both internal and 
external to the system for which AC is provided, the processes that the components go 
through (sequences of tasks), and resources that are needed by the components to perform 
their processes. For example, in a patient-privacy domain, a description of a scenario can 
represent a situation, for example, when a doctor performs an emergency procedure with the 
help of two assistants to save the life of a patient who suffered a trauma in a traffic accident. 
In order to perform the required medical procedures properly the doctor in this situation needs 
to know a set of medical attributes, which may include the patient’s blood type required to 
perform a transfusion. This description is complemented by many risk-related details, 
including the level of experience of the doctor and the list of previous accesses to this patient 
medical records. These details are used to instantiate a FM because they contain the necessary 
domain-specific information required to project the system into the future. 
 A scenario can be associated with a number of risks. For example, in a patient-privacy 
domain, two risks are considered, namely risk of unauthorized medical record dissemination 
and the risk of poor treatment quality. Because of the specified risks, risk mitigation tasks 
are also represented in a scenario. For example, based on the same domain, risk mitigation 
tasks need to be specified to (i) provide the doctor with a required set of medical records, 




medical records to enforce the patient’s privacy; and (iii) shred the printed medical records. 
A refusal of access to the patient’s medical record (ii) can happen in case the AC believes 
that the security of the doctor’s credentials has been compromised and, instead of a genuine 
emergency, the AC is dealing with an AC request possibly created by a malicious entity 
attempting to gain access to the patient’s medical records. As it was previously mentioned, 






The focus can be activated either when a scenario is initialized at the beginning of the FM 
simulation or by another focus within its task logic execution. The activated focus must 
follow the specified process graph. Once the focus is activated, it selects one of the process 
graph entry points, either the task switching construct is used or, if there is only one entry 
point, this entry point is selected. The selected entry point is set to be the next task to be 
executed in an event scheduled for a nearest available time. That selection starts the event 
lifetime, which keeps the focus in a loop until the last task of this process graph is not 
completed, the last task is defined as a task that is in the list of a process graph endpoints. 
One this last task was executed and the selection of next task routine identifies that it has 
executed a task present in a list of process graph endpoints the focus is deactivated and the 
process is considered complete.  
The behaviour related to the concept of focus that is described in the previous paragraph 
is represented in Figure 11.  
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As previously mentioned, the process graph is a directed task graph. Each node of the graph 
represents a possible task that can be executed. Each task consists of two parts, the task logic 
that is presented in Figure 12, which contains the execution logic of the particular task, and 
task switching, which defines which task should be selected for execution after the current 
task is completed.  
The task logic is represented by a method called taskactions mentioned in task 
definition. Figure 12 represents the flow of execution of a task. The diagram uses control 
structures that are represented in the form of predicates. A predicate is a logical function that 
takes into account predefined attributes. Control structures are used to alter task execution 
control flow (modifying J and K in Figure 12) or, depending on certain predicates, execute a 








(Task, Process or 
System)
Perform Action 















Task switching  
Task switching is used to select the next task that will be executed after the current task has 
been completed. The task switching flow of execution is represented in Figure 13. The result 
of the task switching execution is another task to be executed after the current task is 
completed. As previously mentioned, the focus is a pointer to a process graph node and it 
traverses over a process graph containing the tasks that can be executed in a process. Task 
switching defines a way the graph is traversed. For example, in the case of a developer trying 
to download source code (e.g., which is a represented by a task) and failing (e.g., which is 
represented by a task attribute, known as status) once (which is derived from the history of 
previous task calls), repeating the same task can lead to a success. Therefore, task switching 
would set the next task to be executed to be the same task, but when the second attempt fails, 
the component representing the developer assumes that it is not possible to obtain the source 
code. This component then can try to download the code from an alternative location.  























Two event types are supported: task events, which are responsible for the execution of each 
task, and infrastructure events, responsible for messages related to the software infrastructure 
(e.g., events that send TCP packets). Once an event is scheduled to be executed, it is stored 
in the events queue. When the task event happens, the task associated with that event is 
executed according to the task logic. If the task execution is paused in case a message is sent 
out and reply for the message needs to be received, the task execution waits for the reply to 
be received or a timeout to be reached. Once the task execution is complete, task switching 
selects the next task to be executed.  
 Regarding infrastructure events, the path of a message is built at the time whenthe  
message is created. However, for each message that is travelling in the network, there is a 
need to update its location and store the location of the records associated with it. As a 
message is travelling from machine to machine, the location of the message is stored and the 
risks are updated based on the risks associated with each specific machine. For example, in 
a software development setting, a message containing critical source code can be intercepted 
by a malicious listener in a specific machine, and therefore the security risks has be updated. 
A message can be sent in two ways: in a non-blocking mode, where a component sends a 
message and continues its execution, or in a blocking mode, in which a component sends a 





Events queue  
As it was previously explained, the FM is event-based. All scheduled events are stored in the 
events queue. The flow of behaviour that represents how events are scheduled and executed 
is shown in Figure 14. Each event placed in the events queue has a planned execution time. 
While adding events in the events queue, it is possible to schedule only events with a planned 
time greater than the current simulation time, which is an attribute of the events queue.  
When an event is scheduled, this does not guarantee the event will be executed 
because the FM simulation can be interrupted or the event can be cancelled. For example, 
when the message is sent in a blocking mode, a component waits for the reply or a timeout. 
However, if a reply for the message is received by the component, the timeout event is 
cancelled. 
The events queue stores the scheduled events. When the processing of all the events 
that have started to be processed is complete or paused, the events queue starts processing 
the next set of events. The events that have started to be processed are those scheduled for a 
time that is the closest to the current simulation time. There are two conditions that cause the 
events queue to stop the simulation: either the queue becomes empty, which means that all 
the component processes are finished and the simulation is complete or the attribute called 
terminated is set to true which means that the processing of all events that are currently being 
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Forecasting model behaviour 
When initializing the system projection, the FM creates a focus for each component that has 
a focus defined for it. The activation of foci schedules a set of first events at time zero in the 
events queue. After this, the events queue is activated. Once activated, the events queue 
retrieves the set of all events scheduled for a time that is the closest to the current simulation 
time. All retrieved events are processed and removed from the events queue. During the 
processing of each event, first the task logic is invoked and then task switching is executed 
to determine which task should be executed next. While events are being processed, the 
events queue remains in an inactive state. Once all retrieved events are processed, the events 
queue updates the current simulation time to the time of the closest scheduled event it is 
holding. Then, the process repeats itself and this loop continues until the events queue is 
stopped by the policy decision point or the events queue has no events scheduled for 
execution. The event execution time is not always the time from the event being scheduled 
to the time it is being executed, because the event can go into a waiting state.  
 Figure 15 presents the behaviour of the FM. The behaviour starts with the 
instantiation of a scenario, and then proceeds with the creation of a focus, which points to 
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3.1.4 Domain Models 
Domain models (box 13 in Figure 7) are used to extend the core FM with domain-specific 
information. This information includes specifics about risks, events, components, processes 
and scenarios. For example, in a patient privacy setting, when a doctor is notified that the 
requested medical record has been printed or is displayed, the domain model describing 
medical aspects of handling  a medical emergency increases the probability of a successful 
patient treatment, since the required information, for example, a list of the patient’s allergies 
is available to the doctor in charge of the emergency procedure. 
 There can be various domain models representing different aspects of the 
functionality of a system for which AC is provided. In contrast with the existing approaches, 
there is no need to integrate different domain models into a whole system manually. Risk 
dimensions are defined in a modular way so that each of these dimensions encapsulates its 
own events and risks. It means that if a new risk dimension is defined, the new events and 
risks associated with it, will not interfere with the events and risks that belong to the other 
risk dimensions. As a result, the approach is extensible in the sense that new risk dimensions 
can be added to the system in a modular way. 
3.1.5 Reserves  
Reserves (box 14 in Figure 7) are associated with all interacting components and used to 
quantify the previously stored risks and benefits (QRMs) as resources that can be used to 
mitigate future risks. For example, in a software development setting if a software 
development company was completing projects on time and has accumulated some benefits 
as reserves, these reserves can be used in case risks need to be incurred. In this case, because 
of the accumulated reserves, for example, if a risk needs to be taken related to 
underestimating the project duration, the reserves can be used to pay for the impact value of 
this risk. However, if the reserves are not enough to pay for this impact, the risk associated 
with the underestimation of the project duration becomes critical because the reserves are not 
sufficient to pay for the impact. Therefore, the sum of the interacting components reserves 
compared to the impact of the risks can be used to assess which risks can be paid using these 




The proposed approach uses an array of QRMs, which belong to each individual 
component to offer incentives for cooperation. Each QRM refers to a specific risk dimension 
and by design decision each QRM can be changed into QRM belonging to any other 
dimension according to the current level of exchange set for appropriate QRM types. QRM 
can also be set not to be exchangeable. Depending on the implementation of components’ 
storage, each type of stored QRM also known as reserves can be anonymous, pseudonymous 
or strongly identifiable. Methods for operation with QRMs include simple or conditional 
transferring QRMs from one component to another component, storing QRM as reserves for 
future usage, checking for a sufficient level of reserves in a component, generating a new 
QRM as a reward for certain conditions being met, or destroying some reserves for the 
violation of some conditions. 
 
3.1.6 Strategies 
As it was mentioned previously, the output of the FM is a set of timelines of risk utility in a 
form of utility graphs and critical risks for each RMP and for each risk dimension. 
Consequently, there is a need to assess these timelines and choose the best applicable RMP 
candidates. The assessment of a risk timeline can be done, for example, by adding the risk 
utilities present in the timeline to produce a number that can be seen as a risk assessment 
measure. This is a function of the strategies (box 16 in Figure 7). Each strategy evaluates 
each timeline and selects the best applicable one. For example, a safe strategy is created to 
reduce the possible critical risks. This strategy will select RMP candidates with the lowest 
probability of critical risks. Another example of strategies is a greedy strategy that will try to 
get benefits by reducing the overall level of risk and maximizing the benefits. This strategy 
will choose RMP candidates with a higher probability of critical risks than in the case of a 
safe strategy if these RMP candidates offer less risks and more benefits. The use of this 
strategy helps to accumulate reserves that can be used to deal with these critical risks in the 
present and in the future. Thus, strategies are assessing the timelines of risk utility and critical 




When constructing the RMPs there may be cases in which a task with a negative 
utility has to preceed a task with a positive utility with a greater magnitude. For example, it 
might be necessary to perform a task with a high risk before a task with an even higher benefit 
is available. In a patient privacy setting, it is possible that a large number of medical records 
must be made available to a doctor during an emergency without formal permission from the 
patients, but if  the records are made available, a patient’s life can be saved. In a software 
development setting, a number of costly source code elements must be made available to the 
developer before he or she can fix a critical bug.  
Existing AC approaches often deny access as a default option, and do not take into 
account alternative actions that minimize the risks and maximize the benefits. For example, 
in the health domain, when a doctor is handling an emergency situation and time is of essence, 
refusing access to a patient medical record can result in the patient’s death. By evaluating all 
possible RMP candidates (that is, the alternative actions), the strategies proposed in this 
approach can choose the best alternative course of action, which may tolerate high risk levels 
in order to deal with situations that are even riskier, namely life threatening. 
Strategies can also be classified as general or domain-specific. General strategies can 
compare timelines of risk utility and critical risks independently of a domain. Domain-
specific strategies compare timelines of risk utility and critical risks based on domain-specific 
information. For example, in the healthcare area, domain-specific strategies can be used to 
avoid loss of human life as described in the previous paragraph.  
Behaviour of the improved design model 
According to the Figure 16, the AC decision making process starts with a risk analysis. After 
performing the risk analysis, the list of all possible mutually exclusive tasks is created. Each 
possible mutually exclusive task is used to construct an RMP, producing an initial set of 
RMPs. These RMPs are then simulated to produce a set of risk timelines in a form of utility 
graphs. After this, each mutually non-exclusive task is incrementally added to each initial 
RMP to produce a new set of utility graphs. The new set of utility graphs is then compared 
to the previous set of utility graphs and, if a strategy produces a risk assessment measure (that 
is, a number) that is higher for a new utility graph than for a previous utility graph, the RMP 




graph. After all mutually non-exclusive tasks have been evaluated and their utility graphs 
have been compared using their risk assessment measures, the final set of RMPs is presented 
to a component. Therefore, if a component represents a human system user that requires 
access to a specific resource, the AC is not restricted to provide a yes/no answer, as in the 
case of traditional approaches, but will present a set of possible alternatives in the form of 
sequences of tasks that the user can execute to obtain access to the resource. 
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3.2 Details about the Application of the Approach 
In this subsection, details about how the proposed approach can be applied are provided. 
First, a high-level overview is presented about how the system state is projected using 
simulation to produce the best RMPs. Second, an example illustrating how the approach can 
be applied is described. 
 A high-level overview that illustrates how the approach can be applied is presented 
in Figure 17. The proposed approach constructs a set of RMPs in which each RMP includes 
a set of risk mitigation tasks (M) and then the approach evaluates these RMP by projecting a 
state of a system for which AC is provided into the future for each of the constructed RMP 
through the series of intermediate system states System`1(T0+∆T1) to 
System`1(T0+∆T1+...+∆Tn). The operator ` denotes possible branches in future, given that 
certain events happen or given that AC decides to apply certain M. The approach relies on 
events to describe changes in the system, there are initial events in the scenario and there are 
events that are generated as system progresses its projection into the future. During this 
projection, the events lead to a realization or an occurrence of various risks and benefits 
belonging to the set of predefined risk dimensions. A realized risk or benefit is added to an 
appropriate risk timeline of the corresponding risk dimension. The end result of each 
simulation is a timeline of risks and benefits (also referred as timeline of risks or timeline for 
simplicity purposes). After the simulation is finished, the approach chooses the best risk 
mitigation task by comparing resulting timelines of risk utility in a form of utility graphs. 
Once all relevant RMPs are constructed, they are presented as a solution to a user or a 
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3.2.1 Example of an Application of the Approach 
Consider a software development application involving several types of risks, including 
security and productivity. Assume that the analysis and design stages of development are 
finished, and a software developer needs to write code to deliver a product. In addition, we 
can assume that the software development occurs in a network environment, since various 
code elements must be retrieved remotely. The task of the approach application is to provide 
a model that can automatically forecast the consequences of possible AC decisions, taking 
into account the risks and benefits and allowing the construction of risk-mitigation processes 
based on a set of obligations that were generated at runtime. Table 1 presents the data required 
by the FM of the approach.  
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 The data presented in Table 1 in conjunction with the data from Figure 18 can be used 
according to the approach to relate attributes, assets, and risks, and transform all events that 
occur in the system into a combined utility describing how risky the process is. This utility 
value allows the approach to compare different RMPs and select the ones that are less risky 
than the others.  Figure 19  describes how, through event generation, a system for which AC 
is provided evolves from time T0 to some future time. Note that the system can be represented 
as a collection of components and processes,  S(T0) is a state of S at time T0, and Δ(S(T3), 
S(T2)) is the difference between  different states of the system at different times that can be 







Figure 18. Deriving the utility from risks and benefits 
 






Figure 20 demonstrates that the timeline of the evolution of the system is not linear, 
since the system can evolve to different states when different events happen, and each of 
these events has a different probability. Therefore, it is possible to have different future states 
of the system at the same time, and these states are labelled by “`i” (i is an integer). Moreover, 
it is possible to say that certain states of the system (e.g., S(T2)`3, S(T3)`2) are more preferable 
than the others  (e.g. S(T2)`1, S(T2)`2, S(T3)`1). As these states are preferable, therefore, the 
events that lead them to these states are also desired. In the scope of the proposed approach 
these events are called risk mitigation tasks and they are introduced to lower risks while 













Figure 21 represents the possible choices of results a user of the system. As  the 
approach constructs different processes, the outcomes of these processes can be different 
forms of a resource granted to the user. In a software development scenario, when a developer 
requests the source code, it is not always known to AC what is the form of the source code 
the developer needs.  For example, if a developer is currently compiling, then the source code 
might not be needed, but the compiled version of the source code will be sufficient. If a 
developer wants to make sure that the code is compilable or wants to change a single line of 
code, e.g., when fixing a common mistake with the help of debugging information, the 
developer might be satisfied with the obfuscated version of the source code. The risk of 
sharing the obfuscated version of the source code is typically higher than the risk of sharing 
the binary code version. If significant changes are required, the developer might need the 
complete source code and sharing this code leads to a higher risk than the risk of sharing an 
obfuscated version of code. 
As the risks are different for the various forms of a requested resource, the proposed 
approach is capable of constructing risk-mitigation processes that grant access to each form 
of the resource. Therefore, when developers submit an AC request, they do not get an “yes” 
or “no” answer, but they rather get a selection of results and the processes to obtain these 
results. It is up to developer to select which form of the resource they need and he or she can 












3.2.2 Discussion  
The approach was designed to work in a distributed decentralized environment in which 
traditional architectures are not applicable. For example, in the case of a distributed 
application when any number of users can join and leave as desired, it is not possible to 
enforce most of the centralized approaches decisions because a malicious user can report a 
different identity on each connection, posing as a new user or even as a large set of users. 
There is however, a need for orchestrated array of common tasks within such a system. Even 
though this situation brings lack of trust, however, any component (or users represented by 
these components) can choose to trust other specific components to perform mutually tasks 
they need. The proposed approach is designed to function in these circumstances, the 
approach assumes that any component can deviate from a set of constructed RMPs.  
An obligation service of AC approaches can be used to extend the AC analysis 
beyond the simple allow or deny AC request resolution. However, the obligation service is 
neither capable of constructing a new RMP custom-tailored for a specific situation the system 
is currently in nor of evaluating the impact of the predefined RMP in detail. Further, RMP 
construction includes obligations represented in existing approaches as a part of the RMP 
functionality. In summary, the proposed approach is capable of providing access options in 
case any existing approach would deny access due to being unable to construct RMPs 
dynamically in response to resource or service request. 
Note that it is possible in principle to translate existing traditional RBAC, ABAC, 
MAC or DAC policies into a set of domain models and components reserves such that access 
will be granted only if the traditional AC policies grant the access. However, if the traditional 
AC policies deny access, then the proposed approach might be able to construct RMPs to 
mitigate the risks to acceptable levels. In this sense, RMPs are used to provide an alternative 
that solves the problem when access is denied. 
3.3 Formal Definitions 
This section provides a formal definition of the main concepts used in this thesis, explains 




collection includes definitions of attribute, resource, component, task, process graph, process, 
event, projection, risk and risk dimensions among others. 
 Before providing the formal definitions, a high-level description of some of these 
concepts is presented. Attributes are associated with specific objects and commonly used for 
quantitative risk analysis. An example of an attribute is the number of medical records a 
doctor has requested. Resources are physical and logical objects that are needed to complete 
a task. An example of a resource is the cash dispensed to customers in an ATM. A process 
graph is a model of the business processes represented in the form of a directed graph with 
tasks used as its nodes. Examples of process graphs are the process graphs specific to the 
health and software development domains that are provided in chapter 4. A process is a 
representation of the actual business process used in forecasting. Typically, many processes 
are created before an AC decision is made and the actual process starts. A process includes 
a reference to a process graph, the executing component(s) and the process context, which 
can be, for example, the process duration.  
Further, events are used to represent occurrences in the FM, which processes the 
scheduled events to create new events and is used to project the modelled system into the 
future. A projection is the operation of taking an entity at specific point of time and 
transforming by simulating the changes it goes through over time. For example, while a 
doctor treats a patient in an emergency department it is possible to project that with a certain 
probability that in two hours a new patient will come to this department in need of some form 
of medical treatment. Risks have a probability associated with them. For example, when 
doctor is treating an emergency, there is a risk and an associated probability that treatment 
will be not effective and the patient might not survive. A risk dimension is a set of risks that 
can be grouped together in a specific application domain. For example, in a software 
development setting possible risk dimensions are security and productivity.  
The detailed formal definitions of the main concepts used in this thesis are provided 
next.  
Definition 1: Attribute Atr∈ A; A is a set of attributes; Atr = {V, N}; V is the value 




 An attribute defined as a risk-related quantified parameter associated with any entity 
described in the approach. Changes are generally specified as attribute(s) change(s) or 
change(s) of sets of attributes. Sets are changed by adding or removing its members. An 
example of an attribute is the time to be updated, which can be associated with a specific 
document. 
Definition 2: Record Rec ∈ RC; RC is a set of records; Rec = {Arec, N}; Arec⊂ A is a 
subset of attributes associated with Rec, and N is the name of the record.  
A record is the risk-related attribute that can be copied to and moved from one 
component to other components. Each record can exist only as one instance, but can be 
referenced by many objects. For example, in a patient privacy setting a printed document and 
entry in a database are objects that can reference a medical record of a patient. 
Definition 3: Resource Res ∈ R; R is a set of resources; Res = {Ar, Fr(Ai, Ae)}; Ar⊂ 
A is a subset of attributes associated with Res; Fr is a set of functions F associated with Res, 
each F has a predefined set of attributes as arguments, where Ai⊂ Ar is a subset of attributes 
associated with the resource (internal to resource), Ae⊂ A is a set of attributes (external to 
resource), where Ae ∩ Ar=∅.  
A resource is something required to perform a business process, and its types vary 
depending on the application domain. For example, in the health domain, a medical record 
can be a resource necessary for doctor to perform a surgery. The return value F is not 
restricted and can have side effects that result in changes to other objects states. For example, 
in a patient privacy setting, a printer can be seen as a resource. However, if the printer is not 
available or responsive another resource can be utilized, that is, the doctor can either print a 
requested document using another printer or look through the document on a computer 
screen.   
Definition 4: Component Com ∈ C; C is a set of components; Com = {Rc, PGc, 
PGNc}; Rc⊂ R is a subset of resources associated with the Com. A component can use these 
resources without the need of an explicit permission from other components; PGc∈ PG, is a 




PGNc∈ PGN, is a current process graph node executed by Com, where PGN is a set of process 
graph nodes.  
A component is an entity executing a process. An example in the health domain of a 
component is a doctor treating a patient. The pair of {PGc, PGNc} is contained in the focus 
element of the improved design model. An example of the component in a patient privacy 
example is a database holding all medical records. In a software development application, an 
example of a component is a firewall: the component designed to analyze the network traffic 
and allow packets to pass through according to specific firewall policies. 
Definition 5: Task Ta ∈ T;T is a set of Tasks; Ta = {At, Ct, Rt, {CNti(Ai, Ae)->Bool, 
Frti(Artii, Artie)}t }; At⊂ A is a subset of attributes associated with Ta; Ct⊂ C is a set of 
components executing Ta; Rt⊂ R is a set of resources needed to execute Ta; {CNti(Ai, Ae)-
>Bool, Rti.F()}t is a set of pairs of functions associated with this task; CNt is a set of condition 
functions associated with this task; CNti∈ CNt is a condition function that takes a predefined 
set of attributes as arguments and produces a boolean value, where Ai⊂ At is a subset of 
attributes associated with the task (internal to the task), Ae⊂ A is a set of attributes (external 
to the Task), where Ae ∩ At=∅; Frti∈ F associated with resource Rti; Rti∈ Rt.  
A task is a set of simple actions with context. Tasks are designed to execute the self-
contained logic of the components; they also contain a routine to choose the next task when 
the current task is completed. When the task is completed, there is a mandatory set of 
attributes known as the result of the task that is used to select the next task included in process 
description to be executed. 
Definition 6: process graph PGr∈ PG; PG is a set of process graphs; PGr= PGNi, 
where PGNi is a set of process graph nodes associated with the process graph.  
A process graph is a graph of tasks used to model process execution. In a patient 
privacy setting an example of process graph can be represented when a doctor tries to save a 
patient’s life during an emergency and  performs sequence of tasks that can be described as 
process graph nodes. 
Definition 7: The process graph node PGNo ∈ PGN; PGN is a set of process graph 




associated with PGNo; {CNptnoi(Ai,Ae)->Bool, Tptnoi}ptno is a set of pairs of functions 
associated with this process graph node; CNptno is also a set of condition functions associated 
with this process graph node;  CNptnoi∈ CNptno is a condition function that takes a predefined 
set of attributes as arguments and produces a boolean value, where Ai⊂ Aptn is a subset of 
attributes associated with the process graph node (internal to process graph node), Ae⊂ A is 
a set of attributes (external to process graph node), where Ae ∩ Aptn=∅.; Tptno is a set of 
tasks associated with the process graph; Tptnoi∈ Tptno.  
Examples of process graph nodes are the nodes included in a graph consisting of three 
process graph nodes, A, B, C, where A is the starting task and B is executed if the execution 
result of A is a success, while C is executed if such execution is a failure. Then, the condition 
for A is that the task A was not executed previously; the condition for B is that task B was 
not executed previously and the last executed task executed was A, and the last task execution 
was a success; while the condition for C is that the task C was not executed previously and 
the last task execution was a failure. In summary, a task T can be executed when Cn is 
evaluated to be true. When a task is initially defined as a template, actual tasks can be 
instantiated using this template and executed.   
Definition 8: Process Pr ∈ P; P is a set of processes; Pr = {Ap, Cp, {CNp(Ai, Ae)-
>Bool, Tpi}p}; Ap⊂ A is a subset of attributes associated with Pr; Cp⊂ C is a subset of 
components executing Pr; {CNpi(Ai,Ae)->Bool, Tpi}p is a set of pairs of functions associated 
with this process; CNp is a set of condition functions also associated with this process; CNpi∈ 
CNp; CNpi is a condition function that takes a predefined set of attributes as arguments and 
produces a Boolean value, where Ai⊂ Ap is a subset of attributes associated with the process 
(internal to the process), Ae⊂ A is a set of attributes (external to the process), and where Ae 
∩ Ap=∅.; Tp is a set of tasks associated with this process; Tpi∈ Tp; by definition, Pr ≡ {PTr, 
Cp}. 
A process is a set of tasks that have to resolve a problem in a specific situation. Each 
process has its own process graph, which is a graph of interconnected tasks. The components 
that execute a process perform tasks from the process graph and navigate the process graph 




Definition 9: System S = {Cs, Rs, Ps, Os}; Cs⊂ C is a set of components that are part 
of the system; Rs⊂ R is a set of resources that are part of the system (i.e., they belong to the 
system components and/or are controlled by the AC system); Ps⊂ P is a set of currently 
ongoing processes in a system executed by system components; and Os is a set of outside 
(not internal) components, tasks, resources, attributes and processes, Os∩Cs=∅, Os∩Rs=∅, 
Os∩Ps=∅. 
The system is a collection of components, processes and resources work together to 
perform one or more functions. 
Definition 10: Event Ev ∈ E; E is a set of events; Ev denotes an event that happens at 
T1, S (t) =S (t0) when t∈ [t0, t1), S (t1) S (t0).  
An event is something that occurs at a specific time. In the software development 
setting, the completion of a task named ProblemSpecification can be seen as an event that 
occurs at a time equal to 3140 seconds. Before the 3140 second mark, there has to be an 
interval in which nothing changes the system state. At the same time that this event happens, 
the system state would be changed by the impact of this event (and possibly also by the 
impact of other events if they happen at the same time). In a patient privacy setting, for 
example, the deadline for shredding a document can be 120 minutes after the doctor has 
requested the document for printing. Assuming an event is this deadline, it may imply that if 
in 120 minutes this document is not yet shredded a doctor and later a privacy analyst would 
be informed that the deadline for shredding the printed document has expired. 
Definition 11: Operator ∆ (A, B) is a change that can be applied to object A to get 
object B. This change involves altering the attribute values and adjusting sets by removing 
and adding their elements. 
In general, this operator is used to capture what changes need to be made to transform 
an object A into an object B. In the case of a software development application: 
∆([{“C:\”,”driveName”}, {6000,”driveSpeed”}], [{“C:\”,”driveName”}, 
{5000,”driveSpeed”}]) = [1000,”driveSpeed”] assuming that the drive speed is an additive 
attribute.  





timeToShred”}]) = [10,” timeToShred”], assuming that timeToShred is an additive attribute. 
 Definition 12: Operator -: A - B ≡ ∆ (A, B). 
 Definition 13: Operator +:  A + B ≡ A - (∅ - B).  
Definition 14: Operator Diff (A, B) =Diff (∆ (A, B), ∅) is an analyst defined function 
(difference, distance) of similarity.  
If applied to strings, the operator Diff driven by the analyst-defined function 
eliminates the values that are equal, subtracts similar values, and returns the distance between 
two strings. In a software development setting:  
[{“C:\”,”driveName”}, {6000,”driveSpeed”}] - [{“C:\”,”driveName”} , 
{5000,”driveSpeed”}] = {6000,”driveSpeed”} - {5000,”driveSpeed”}] = 
{1000,”driveSpeed”} = 1000, given driveSpeed value is 1. 
[{“120”,”timeToShred”}, {1105,”documentID”}] - [{“130”,”timeToShred”}, 
{1105,”documentID”}] = {120,”timeToShred”} - {“130”, ”timeToShred”}] = 
{10,”timeToShred”} = 600 seconds, given timeToShred is measured in minutes and 
calculated value is in seconds. 
Definition 15: Operator x for objects  S(T0)xE(T1)=S(T0)+( lim
T→T1
(S(T))-S(T0)), 
defined for the system, E1(T1)xE2(T1): (S(T0)xE1(T1))xE2(T1) ≡ (S(T0)xE2(T1))xE1(T1) ≡ 
S(T0)x(E1(T1)xE2(T1)), SxTa: Ta∈T; assume Ta = {Eta1(Teta1)xEta2(Teta2)x…x Etak(Tetak)}; 
Etai∈ E; Tetai∈ T; Etai = (CNti(Ai, Ae)->Bool) ∧ (Frti(Artii, Artie)).  
Operator x for events - E1(T1)xE2(T1) ≡E3(T1): (S(T0)xE1(T1))xE2(T1)= S(T0)xE3(T1). 
The operator x changes the state of an object, it is applied to by executing an event 
(E (T1)) at a specified time. The operator x applied to multiple events combines the 
application of the operator to each of the events. 
Definition 16: Operator Ω: S(T1) Ω Ex ≡ S(T1) : (S(T1) = S(T0)x[Ei(T(Ei))] ∧ 




The operator Ω indicates that the system state at time T1 is such that the event E has 
happened some time previously. For example, if we observed that at time 120 minutes a 
specific medical record was printed 10 times and at time 130 minutes it was printed 11 times, 
it means that between time 120 and 130 minutes there was an event that made this record to 
be printed. 
Definition 17: Operator A (T) ≡ state of object A in time T. 
With respect to operator A(T), S(T) = {Cs(T), Rs(T), Ps(T), Os(T)}, while C, R and P 
are part of the system and can be monitored, O only refers to 
interactions/observations/projections regarding outside elements, and therefore, assumptions 
about it can be inaccurate. In a software development setting, an attribute representing a hard 
drive can be [“C:\”,”driveName”] at time 2500 seconds and, after manipulations, it can 
become [“D:\”,”driveName”] at time 2600 seconds. In a patient privacy setting, when an 
attribute {“120”,”timeToShred”} becomes {“130”,”timeToShred”} at time 7200 seconds it 
means that a deadline for shredding was extended by ten minutes and it is not yet time to 
resolve the problem by notifying a privacy analyst. 
Definition 18: Operator `: A(T1)`≡{A(T1)`1|…|A(T1)`n}, where A(T1)`i is a possible 
state number i of A at time T1 and A has a total number n of possible states at time T1.  
The operator ` refers to possible outcomes. From T0 to T1 some events can happen 
and the ̀  Operator denotes possible object states at time T1. Assume there are n possible event 
sets. These events will result in n different states of the object A (T1) `= {A (T1) `1|…|A (T1) 
`n}, where A (T1)`i is the i-th possible state of A at time T1 and A has a total number n of 
possible states at time T1. For example, in a patient privacy setting, depending on the 
outcomes of the medical procedures as well as on the provided information, an emergency 
can be resolved or can persist. In a software development setting, considering a previously 
listed piece of code, depending on the results of a Random.getNext call, the variable 
partOneProblemDone can be set to true or not. Figure 22 presents a set of possible states of 
an object A at times T0, T0.3, T0.4, T0.5 and at T1. It also shows the events that are leading to 
these states. Based on this diagram, at T1, n equals 6 as there are six possible states at T1.  
Definition 19: Projection Operator Pr(A,T1,T2) ≡ Pr(A(T1),T1,T2) ≡ [A(T2)`i, 




is a projected likelihood of A(T2)= A(T2)`i, with 0 ≤ likelihood ≤ 1 and ∑ L(A(𝑇2)`𝑖)
𝑖=1
𝐾  = 1. 
T1 is a time when state of object A is known and T2 is a time for which the operator projects 
the state of the object A to be. 
 Projections are built to forecast future events and produce outcomes which are set of 
states and a probability associated with each of them. However, this set of states can be 
incomplete and their probabilities may not be accurate. This is caused by invalid projection 
assumptions or missing data. For example, if a coin in a coin toss is biased and has 0.2 
probability of landing on its head and 0.8 probability of landing on its tail, assuming an 
analyst was not aware of the bias, the analysis would predict equaly probable results. 
However, the real outcome would likely be different, and the mean of the difference between 
the forecasted values and the actual values should be, for example, (0.8-0.5)*n, where n is a 


























 Definition 20:  Inaccuracy of Projection is: 
∑ (Diff (E (T2), E (T2)`i))*(1- Probability (E(T2))`i). 
The inaccuracy of a projection is the weighted difference between the projected state of the 
object at a certain time and the actual observed state. The actual observed state has probability 
of 1, hence the difference is 1- Probability (ET2)`i. The weights include the projected 
probabilities. For example, in  a patient privacy setting, assume that at time T=0 a document 
was printed with a privacy risk impact of 1.1 and the projection for T=120 was calculated at 
T=110 (the time in which the projection is calculated) as Pr({“documentShredded”}, 110, 
120) = [{{“documentShredded”, true}, 70%}, {{“documentShredded”, false}, 30%}] and 
given that at time T=120 a document has not yet been shredded, the inaccuracy of the 
projection is 0.7*1.1, where 0.7 is the accuracy of prediction and 1.1 is a risk impact of the 
document being unauthorizedly disseminated.   
Definition 21: Events queue is {Tcurrent, Ei (Ti)}; Ei⊂ E; Ti>Tcurrent. 
The proposed approach includes an events queue responsible for keeping all 
scheduled events and executing them on time. For example, in case of a patient privacy 
scenario, the contents of the events queue can be [{Notify Privacy Analyst: {“ timeToShred” 
≥ “currentTime”},720 s},{Extend Deadline: {“timeToShred” = “currentTime”+100},700 
s}], where the deadline for shredding a document is extended. in case of a software 
development setting, the contents of the events queue can be [{Update File Size Event: 
{“fileSize” = “fileSize”+10kb},12 ms}, {Check File Size: { if “fileSize” >100kb create new 
event (Transfer Data) },15 ms}], which means that when time reaches 12 milliseconds, the 
attribute file size is increased by 10kb and when time reaches 15 milliseconds, a component 
checks the file size attribute and, if it exceeds 100kb, the component creates a new event to 
transfer the excess data. 
Definition 22: Simulation(A,T1,Tn) ≡ Projection( Projection ( … Projection(  
Projection(A, T1, T2), T2, T3),…),Tn-1,Tn), where simulation steps are [∆(Ti,Ti-1)] and T1…Tn 
are the times when events occur. The simulation takes three parameters, A, which is an object 
to be projected into the future, T1 is a start of the simulation and Tn is time when simulation 




The simulation is a consecutive set of projections.  
Definition 23: Risk Evaluation RE (T) ≡ [F(S(T)) -> numeric], where F is an 
evaluation function that assesses the state of the system for which AC is provided.  
In a patient privacy setting, at a time equal to 120 minutes, the simulation could 
project that the following risks are present: [{“Unauthorized Dissemination Risk”, 5}, {“Poor 
Quality Treatment Risk”, 0.1}] and given current ratio of these risks is 30:1 then RE(120 
min)=5/30+0.1=0.266. In a software development setting, for a time equal to 20 minutes, the 
simulation projects that there could be two risks present, [{“Security Risk”, 10}, 
{“Productivity Risk”, -2}], and assuming that the current ratio of risks, security to 
productivity, is 0.5, then RE (20 min) =10*0.5+ (-2) =3. 
Definition 24: Risk Impact of event Rim(Er, T) ≡ Diff (RE(S (T)), RE(S (T) × Er 
(T))), defined by Risk event Er and possible time of occurrence T. 
Risk Impact is a change in risk attributes, which an event creates in a system. In a 
patient privacy setting, for example, when a request for printing a patient file is granted, the 
risk impact of this event would be 1 in units of an Unauthorized Dissemination risk 
dimension. In a software development example, when a component is reading a sensitive file, 
the security risk increases, and thus, the risk impact of the event is positive. If, during an 
event, the risk attributes do not change, the risk impact is equal to zero. 
Definition 25: Risk Likelihood of event Rli(Er, Pr(S, T1, T2)) ≡ 
∑ 𝐿(𝑆(𝑇2))`𝑖:
𝑖=1
𝐾 𝑆(𝑇2)Ω𝐸𝑟. Risk likelihood of an event associated with a risk is the 
likelihood of this event happening. In a software development setting:  
The projection at time 1 hour:  
[{Task Solved Event`1: {“productivity risk” = “productivity risk”-2}, 30%, 1 hour},  
{Task Not Solved Event`2: { create new event (Read More) }, 70%, 1 hour}]  
Then the risk likelihood of a developer not being able to solve the task and having to read 
additional documentation is 0.7. 
Definition 26: Risk Rs ∈ R; R is a set of risks; Rs(Er, Pr(S, T1, T2)) 
=∫ 𝑅𝑙𝑖(𝐸𝑟 , Pr (𝑆, 𝑇, 𝑇2
𝑇=𝑇1
𝑇2




the simulation takes to get from time T1 to time T2 is not predefined and can vary based on 
the probabilistic model. 
Each risk is associated with a specific risk dimension. The total productivity risk for 
the projections listed in the previous definition in case of a software development setting, for 
example, is: 0.3*(-2*1+0.2*(-1)) +0.7*(0.5*0.3+0.2*0.2+0.2*0.5) =0.093. 
Definition 27: Risk Dimension RD={RRD, RERD}; RRD ⊂ R, where R is a set of risks, 
RRD is a subset of risks associated with this RD and RERD is a risk evaluation function 
designed to capture all events and attributes related to this specific RD. 
Risk dimension is a group of risks related to a specific aspect of the system operation 
in a specific application domain. In the software development domain, examples of risk 
domains are security and productivity. In a patient privacy domain, possible risk dimensions 
can be patient privacy and the quality of the patient treatment. The risk evaluation function 
associated with RD can either be formal and capture the utility related to RD or be an informal 
description of what risks are associated with this domain. 
Definition 28: Risk Conversion RC(i, j, (S(T))=F(i, j, RDi, RDj, S(T), T) : RE(T) 
increased or not lowered by conversion (trade by two components of one RD QRM to 
another). 
Risk conversion is a function than converts the value of a specific risk type to a fair 
value of another risk type. “Fair” in this description means that the conversion does not 
deteriorate the system state, which is measured using risk levels. 
Definition 29: Risk Mitigation Method M(sEr,R(Er)) =Ta: ∃i: Diff(RE(SxTa), 
RE(S))i>0. 
A risk mitigation method is a way of introducing specific events that reduce risks. In 
a patient privacy setting, AC can refuse a requested access or can ask other medical personnel 
participating in emergency to verify the request. In a software development setting, a firewall 
is able to prevent unauthorized information dissemination. However, to properly configure a 
firewall, firewall policies must be altered. Thus, an event that properly alters the firewall 




model is event-based, and the events represent an asynchronous execution of routines 
associated with tasks and infrastructure events.  
The function of the approach is to find the set of Mb⊂M:  
∀ set Mb’ Mb, where Mb’⊂M, where two inequalities are true, and the first one relates to 
the utility, RE(∆(Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏 , 𝑇1, 𝑇2) , Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏′, 𝑇1, 𝑇2)))>0, where 
Pr(𝑆(𝑇)Ω𝑀𝑏 , 𝑇1, 𝑇2) is a projected state of the system for which AC is provided at time T, 
such that the risk mitigation task Mb is applied during this projection. 
 ∆(Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏 , 𝑇1, 𝑇2) , Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏
′, 𝑇1, 𝑇2)) is a difference between two states of the 
system projections that are the result of the application of two different risk mitigation tasks. 
The simulation produces ∆(Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏, 𝑇1, 𝑇2) , 𝑆(𝑇1)). However, as per definition, 
∆(Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏 , 𝑇1, 𝑇2) , Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏
′, 𝑇1, 𝑇2))=
∆(∆(Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏 , 𝑇1, 𝑇2) , 𝑆(𝑇1)), ∆(Pr(𝑆(𝑇1)Ω𝑀𝑏′, 𝑇1, 𝑇2) , S(𝑇1)). 
 This means that the difference between the results of the application of Mb and Mb’ 
is the same as difference of the difference between the result of the application of Mb and the 
initial system state and the difference between the result of the application of Mb’ and the 
initial system state. The difference between the two projections is calculated, and then the 
total utility is computed to determine the resulting risks as a numeric value. One way to 
determine the resulting risk value is to convert the risks to a single dimension. The second 
inequality relates to the likelihood of the critical risks. 
(∫ 𝑅𝑙𝑖(𝐸𝑟 , 𝑇, 𝑑𝑇)
𝑇1
𝑇2
𝑑𝑇, 𝐸𝑟: ∑ 𝑅𝐶(1, 𝑖, Pr (𝑆(𝑇)Ω𝑀𝑏Ω𝐸𝑟, 𝑇1, T))) < 0
𝑖=1
𝑁 )≤  
(∫ 𝑅𝑙𝑖(𝐸𝑟 , 𝑇, 𝑑𝑇)
𝑇1
𝑇2
𝑑𝑇, 𝐸𝑟: ∑ 𝑅𝐶(1, 𝑖, Pr (𝑆(𝑇)Ω𝑀𝑏′Ω𝐸𝑟, 𝑇1, T))) < 0
𝑖=1
𝑁 ) 
 Critical risks are risks that move the system (represented by the FM) from a state with 
positive reserves to a state with negative reserves. Assuming that all risks can be converted 
to some dimension (in this case, first dimension was chosen), then critical risks can be 
computed as a projection of the state of the system when it is converted to single dimension 
and its value drops below zero. The positive value of the sum of risks converted to a single 
dimension represents the reserves of the system or the ability of the system to withstand a 
certain amount of negatively impacting events. This formula takes into account that reserves 




system to attempt to survive severe negatively impacting events. For example, if a risk 
analysis is performed for a company in which productivity and financial aspects are 
important, then the failure condition could be a company declaring bankruptcy. However, if 
the company approaches bankruptcy, then certain reserves in productivity dimension (such 
as stockpiled products) can be turned into finances through sales, which is the conversion of 
the reserves in productivity dimension into reserves in finance dimension with reduced 
effectiveness or price. The critical risks are the risks that the chosen approach cannot 
alleviate. However, there is always some uncertainty about the accuracy of forecasting since 
the approach projects into an unknown future.  
 Once a simulation run of the FM is complete, a log is constructed that contains all the 
detailed information necessary to understand what the FM projection has predicted. The 
timeline of risks is a set of risk timelines for each risk dimension which plots the utility of 
each risk dimension versus time. As mentioned previously the utility is a number that 















This chapter illustrates the applicability of the proposed approach through two case studies. 
The first case study describes a patient-privacy scenario and the second one relates to 
software development.  
 The first case study describes how the proposed approach can be used to handle 
medical emergencies when a doctor needs to retrieve medical records of some patients, while 
maintaining their privacy. The privacy is maintained by prohibiting transfer of private patient 
information in a digital form outside of a hospital and by enhancing all printed documents 
with a printed unique identifier. All shredders at the hospital are equipped with scanners 
identifying which documents are shredded. The approach considers two possible scenarios. 
The first scenario assumes that a doctor’s credentials were stolen and that  the emergency is 
falsified to obtain a large set of medical records. This scenario considers RMP 1 in which the 
AC approach allows access initially because initial data does not indicate that the credentials 
were stolen. However, if the initial data had indicated that the doctor’s credentials were 
stolen, then the approach would have refused access. The second scenario considers a 
genuine emergency and two possible RMPs. The first of these RMPs (RMP 2) assumes that 




second RMP (RMP 3) assumes that the access is denied. The risk analysis and forecasting 
were calculated manually following the approach to create three utility graphs, one for each 
of the three RMPs previously described in this paragraph. The utility graphs are provided and 
used to assess risks and benefits. The selection of the best RMP requires the probability that 
a doctor’s credentials are stolen. For example, if the probability is low, then RMP 2 and RMP 
3 are applicable, only but RMP 2 is selected because its utility is higher.  
 The second case study describes how the proposed approach can be used when a 
software developer needs to access a source code remotely. To construct the RMPs, the 
approach needs to configure a firewall between the developer, who uses an insecure network, 
and the secure corporate network to minimize risks associated with a possible source code 
leak. The source code contains a number of elements, each associated with two attributes: a 
monetary penalty and relevancy to a task. The penalty is applied if the element is stolen 
during transit in an insecure network. The relevancy to a software development task is 
estimated based on a source code dependency graph. The risk analysis and forecasting were 
automatically computed for 871 RMPs, where each RMP represents the allowed and denied 
combinations of code elements. 870 of these RMPs were elliminated based on the specific 
strategy that was used to assess all of them and choose the best RMP. The utility graphs that 
are provided show the utility for the best RMP. The best RMP represents the optimal balance 
between the penalty loss associated with the risk of leaking source code and the benefits 
gained because the developer completes the task using the relevant elements of the source 
code that are provided. Even though 871 RMPs is a large set, they can be forecasted in 
parallel, which can lower the computational time. 
 
4.1 Patient-Privacy Case Study 
Consider a scenario where the AC has to provide risk mitigation tasks that consider the risks 
related to two risk dimensions: patient privacy and treatment quality. A high degree of patient 
privacy implies that the information about a patient’s condition and treatment must be 
released only to the attending doctors. However, knowledge about medical history can be 
used to improve the treatment quality of other patients with a set of similar conditions, thus 




conditions can be abused by malicious entities to gain unauthorized access to their medical 
records. 
A simplified business process of the patient treatment procedure is presented in 
Figure 23. A more detailed version of this process is presented at Appendix E -. Once a 
patient treatment starts, the attending physicians must identify themselves and either declare 
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If an emergency is declared, the treatment quality become much more important 
compared to patient privacy, and some tasks, normally performed beforehand, can be 
completed after the emergency is resolved. To limit possible unauthorized information 
dissemination, each printed document related to a patient is printed with bar-code and 
information about each document is stored in the hospital database, including the credentials 
used to print, the conditions under which the document was printed (whether it was an 
emergency or a regular visit), the deadline for shredding this document, and the identity of 
the patient whose record was printed. Each hospital shredder is equipped with a scanner that 
scans bar code before shredding it, updates the database and sets the record of the document 
as shredded. A privacy analyst assesses the usage of medical records, and resolves anomalies 
that happen, for example, when a doctor accesses many unrelated medical records in a 
suspicious way. Staff and visitor identification cards in combination with facial recognition 
and computer vision provide location-based authorization for access to medical records. 
Patients and other people assigned as permanent owners of their information can either grant 
temporary access to or temporary ownership of the data. Temporary data ownership allows 
a person to grant temporary access to the data by other people and can be used, for example, 
by an attending physician to update other medical personal participating in treatment about 
specific details. 
Permissions and ownerships are granted by filling out paper or electronic forms (even 
remotely with email notification) or by giving express permission. For example, AC, using 
the computer screen, notifies that a specific part of (or whole) medical record is requested to 
be accessed by specific medical personnel for a specified purpose and duration. During a 
regular visit, AC resolves access requests for medical records and additional requests based 
on the medical personnel needs, who then can receive information in a printed or displayed 
version. The computer vision, facial recognition and location based authorizations allows AC 
to grant access to displayed information only in the presence of authorized individuals while 
displayed. Printed information has to be shredded before shredding timeout expires, thus 
limiting possible information dissemination. Assuming that the hospital implements other 
security policies, such as restricting medical record transfer, prohibiting personal devices to 




comprehensive system to prevent possible breaches in patient privacy while allowing doctors 
to obtain the required information. 
During emergencies, however, given that there is sufficient trust in the personnel 
declared emergency, assuming some correlation exists between the requested data and the 
ongoing procedure, and the restrictions are much lower, a typical utility graph of emergency 
is presented in Figure 24. Initially, the utility of the procedure is set to value representing the 
AC confidence in the doctor authorizing an emergency, which is later verified with other 
participating personnel. However, once the personnel start accessing the medical records, 
some of them are not obviously related to the particular emergency, which causes utility of 
the process to drop below zero. However, after the emergency is resolved, all displayed 
relevant information is closed and the utility starts to increase since the AC is able to provide 
the required information and the treatment quality with respect to information provisioning 
is as high as it could have been, the quality of the treatment is high, which gives a 
considerable boost to the utility. Finally, when all documents are shredded and the security 
and privacy analysis are concluded, the utility grows even higher. 
 
Figure 24. Utility diagram of the regular emergency scenario 
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The utility is calculated as a sum of all utilities related to specific domains. As it was 
mentioned earlier for this scenario, two domains and related types of utility are considered: 
privacy and patient treatment quality. Three risks are being considered, the risk of 
unauthorized medical information dissemination, the risk of providing poor quality medical 
treatment, and the risk of unauthorized access. Assume that current exchange ratio between 
unauthorized dissemination and poor quality is 30 to 1, while 1 unauthorized access can result 
on average in 20 unauthorized disseminations. The utility is measured in units of treatment 
quality, where positive utility means that the risk of poor treatment quality is low and the risk 
of unauthorized medical records dissemination is low as well. 
In addition, the scenario involving an unauthorized access to medical records using 
stolen credentials is considered. Figure 25 presents a utility graph of this scenario. In this 
scenario, the utility starts with a similar value, and we assume that similar credentials were 
used in this and previously considered scenarios. After this, stolen medical credentials are 
used to verify an emergency. Then, the attackers request the printed and displayed 
information for a number of designated individuals. Later, we assume that AC was not able 
to find a proper correlation between the requested data and the declared emergency, since the 
target of attack was a number of unrelated medical records. However, because the medical 
emergency was declared and life could be lost if the information is not provided, AC allows 
access by displaying and printing the requested medical records, which significantly lowers 
the utility of the process. After a certain time, due to the lack of continued confirmation that 
an emergency is ongoing (for example, in case all doctors left the room with the patient and 
due to timeout a system believes that emergency is resolved), the displayed information is 
closed and the emergency is considered resolved. However, when the printed information 
was not shredded at a scheduled time and the security analyst discovers that the accounts 
used to declare an emergency and the requested data were falsified, the amount of the gained 
utility is low, since only risk mitigation tasks available to an AC system would be able to 
limit the negative consequences, for example by informing the victims of the attack the their 





Figure 25. Utility diagram of the falsified credentials scenario 
 Further, another scenario was considered, where an incorrectly written correlation 
detection algorithm in conjunction with severe AC policies result in the doctor being denied 
access to the required information. The utility graph of this scenario is presented in Figure 
26. The start of this scenario is similar to previous two, and the doctor declares an emergency 
and AC verifies it with the other medical personnel participating in the emergency. However, 
a poorly written correlation detection algorithm makes AC believe that this access attempt is 
some form of attack and due to severe AC policies, the access is prohibited, even though it 
is a medical emergency. At this point, the utility of the process drops sharply since the system 
for which AC is provided no longer can function properly and the doctors were denied access 
to the genuinely needed information in time. After this, the security analyst is notified of a 
potential ongoing attack and he or she discovers that the medical emergency is genuine and 
overrides the AC decision. However, as it is a medical emergency, the information is 
provided too late and is no longer relevant. Thus, AC refused to provide information in time 
and the medical emergency was not properly resolved. In some time, the printed information 
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would be shredded, but since the security analyst is participating in the situation directly and 
this is a person, the AC system puts the most trust in, the utility does not drop. However, it 
does not increase when information is shredded either. After this, when the privacy analyst 
confirms the adherence of actions to the privacy policies, a request is be submitted to correct 
the correlation detection algorithm. However, a service without sufficient information has 
already provided. 
 
Figure 26. Utility diagram of denied access during the emergency scenario 
To conclude this case, existing ACs either allow access if the credentials match a 
permissive policy, or deny access if there is a match to a prohibitive policy, or, if there is no 
match, reverts to a default policy, which is typically much simpler and still either permits or 
denies access. The second and third scenarios previously described respectively demonstrate 
that excessive permissions and prohibitions can result in undesired consequences. The 
proposed approach therefore relies on building a custom-tailored process for the specific 
situation of the system for which AC is provided. This process mitigates the risks, and, after 
comparing all possible options, the proposed approach selects the best applicable process, 
Scenario Starts, 
Doctor is Authorized 
And Declares 
Emergency




AC is Unable to Detect 
Any Correlation 
Between Requested 
Data and Declared 
Emergency, AC 
Notifies Security 




n is not 
being 
Requested 
Information is not 
being Displayed
Security Analyst 
Confirms Validity of 
Requests, Requested 
Information is 
Provided, However it 
is no Longer Relevant, 















































according to the strategies designed by developers and the risk analysts that implement the 
approach. 
 
4.2 Software Development Case Study 
4.2.1 Overview  
A software development case study was also designed to illustrate the applicability of the 
proposed approach to project risk levels into the future and to make AC decisions in an 
automated way. Table 2 presents the relationships between domains, subdomains, risks and 
dimensions that are represented in this case study. The case study is based on a scenario 
where a software developer makes the necessary changes to a product that has been 
developed for several years.  
Table 2. Domains, risks and dimensions 
Domain Subdomain Risk Dimension 
Security Access Control Risk of Code Being Stolen Security, units 
Business 
Process 




Network & Resources Risk of Poor Hardware and  
Software Performance  
N/A 
 
 Figure 27 illustrates the process graph representing the typical tasks the software 
developer performs to maintain the software. This graph consists of twelve possible tasks 
and a set of transitions from one task state to another. Initially (1), the developer must find a 
machine with appropriate hardware and software for the software development to take place. 
For this task, the developer checks his or her location (room) for a suitable machine and 
designates the suitable machine as the one where he or she will work. The developer then 
obtains the specification of the task he or she needs to perform. In order to perform this step, 
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The network diagram of the case study is presented in Figure 28. The machine the 
developer is working on is indicated as I. The record is associated with two existing records 
in this scenario. First, the record is stored in the email record form received from the project 
manager at the external email server (II), while the second record is stored on the file transfer 





External Email Server (II)








Figure 28. Network diagram of case study initial data 
According to the scenario, the developer randomly selects one of the sources for the 
required record to be retrieved. The next step of this task is to retrieve the selected record. To 
retrieve the record, the developer opens a suitable component, e.g., the browser for an email 
record at external email server (II) and the FTP client for a file at build server (III). The 
component creates a message that is routed to its destination by the operating system. Both 
possible (because of two possible record location) messages pass through the internet (IV) 
first, where their contents is observed with predefined probability of 50 percent by a 
malicious packet listener (VII), which then attempts to recover  any record associated with 
the message with predefined probability of 80 percent. All messages recovered by the 
malicious packet listener (VII) containing records that has a greater than zero security value 




messages containing the same record result in a higher probability of recovery by the 
malicious packet listener (VII). However, the risk for each record never exceeds 1, which 
means that in the worst case scenario, that record would be definitely known to the malicious 
packet listener (VII) by the end of scenario. The impact, however, depends on the sensitivity 
of the record. In this case study, the adversary only listens and does not attempt to extract 
information using any known to adversary information (e.g., account name and password for 
external email server II), which would result in dynamic security values of the records 
complicating the example and reducing its clarity. Dynamic security values of the records  If 
the developer chooses to retrieve information from the ftp server (III), then after passing the 
internet (IV) the message arrives to the firewall (V). The firewall analyzes the contents of the 
message and can choose to stop it from continuing the traversal or to allow further message 
traversal. In the case where the message is stopped, depending on its policies, the firewall 
can send a message to the originating network node or ignore the message. If such a message 
is received by the component opening the communication (given that this new message from 
firewall is delivered), then the component will not send it again and the message sending 
routine returns with a response specifying that the route is blocked by the firewall (V). 
However, if the firewall (V) policies prohibit the firewall from delivering a response, then it 
does not notify the component that has originated the communication. In the case when there 
is no response, the originating component is programmed to repeat its query. Given that the 
message has successfully passed through the firewall (V) it will be carried to router (VI) and 
then to buildserver (III). Once the message arrives at the build server (III), the operating 
system of the build server (III) matches the target components port (name) and, if there is a 
match, the message is delivered to the ftp server that is running on the build server (III). 
Most of the servers implemented in this scenario require an authorization, meaning 
that the first message from the originating component to the server is a query to authenticate. 
The server authenticates the component by locating an entry in file, database, or other data 
sources. 
Once the corresponding user record is located, the server retrieves the role from it and 
creates a new session for this user. The response contains a session number and it is used to 




authentication is completed according to the RBAC. The new AC approach is designed, not 
as a substitute for current AC approaches, but rather to alter current AC approaches. 
However, it adds the ability to estimate the impact that AC decisions have on the system for 
which AC is provided and, by comparing the set of decisions, to choose the best applicable 
decision for the current specific situation. In other words, this approach is not intended to be 
executed for each AC decision in the system. However, at the critical points, such as the 
business process start or when the AC is about to refuse access, the AC must assess the risks 
with the context. These critical points can be identified as conditions in the process that lead 
to significant utility changes. 
Once the session has been successfully created, the component begins the actual 
queries, including retrieving information and writing new information. In the case of the 
software development process, if the component representing the developer (browser or ftp 
client) is not able to retrieve (2) the task from both data sources, the process moves to the 
final state, task done (12). However, even though the task has been completed, there is no 
benefit, which means that, the system: a) wasted resources or b) increased the risk to the 
project when the delay is due to wasted time. Generally speaking, that approach is acceptable 
under the following circumstances: a) wasted resources are not critical when compared to 
risks that the AC would accept if the process had started; b) the risk utility of the project 
delay is less than the risk utility of the record being stolen; c) delaying the decision would 
create additional options for which the cumulative utility (combination of benefits and risks) 
would be higher compared to the utility of the current process (e.g., the developer moves to 
a location with higher security). 
Given that the developer has found a proper machine in which to work (1) and is able 
to obtain permission to access the task specification (2), the next step is to find a theoretical 
solution (3) of the problem the developer is trying to solve. This step includes the analysis of 
the documentation (4), including log files and project documentation and the code (6). Each 
attempt of reading a file means that the developer will spend more time in the task. However, 
of course, after reading the code, the developer’s understanding of each read piece of code 




is: NewValue = 1 - (1 - oldValue) * (0.55+Pr/10) where Pr is a probability that denotes the 
increased understanding during each reading cycle and belongs to the interval [0..1]. 
However, not all the machines that the developer can work on have the documentation 
or source code files presented in Table 3. Not having the documentation or source code leads 
to the necessity of retrieving documentation (5) and code (7) that, according to the scenario, 
is located on the build server (III). Since the developer knows the location of this information 
and has setup the accounts needed to access it, he or she can retrieve the required information. 
However, since there is a risk that this information is intercepted by a malicious packet 
listener (VII), there is a security risk associated with this action. Further, since the approach 
is building RMPs, part of behaviour of these processes is to choose which records the 
approach should prohibit from being sent out and therefore from being intercepted, there is 
also a security benefit related to these tasks (5, 7). The scenario is setup in a way that both 
the documentation and the code have four files that can be utilized for analysis. However, 
having and reading all mentioned files is not mandatory. While defining a problem 
specification (3) and writing code (8) a developer may need to read some of the file parts. 
Note that each of these tasks has two stages.  
 
Table 3. Documentation and code attributes 
  
File Part \ Attributes Problem Specification Write Code Security Risk 
Documentation, A Mandatory for stage 1 Beneficial for stage 1 0.7 
Method header, A Mandatory for stage 1 Mandatory for stage 1 0 
Method body, A Beneficial for stage 1 Mandatory for stage 1 1 
Documentation, B Beneficial for stage 1  0.5 
Method header, B Beneficial for stage 1  0 
Method body, B   2 
Documentation, C Beneficial for stage 2  0.1 
Method header, C Beneficial for stage 2  0 
Method body, C   0.05 
Documentation, D Mandatory for stage 2 Beneficial for stage 2 0 
Method header, D Mandatory for stage 2 Mandatory for stage 2 0 
Method body, D  Mandatory for stage 2 0 
Development task 
descriptiption 
Mandatory for process 
to start 
Mandatory for process 





Although each of the tasks previously mentioned, namely problem specification and 
writing code, has two stages, for a developer to start the task of writing code he or she needs 
to complete the problem specification task. The problem specification task does not have 
productivity benefits associated with it. However, there are productivity benefits associated 
with completing the task of writing code (8), because, even if the code was not submitted to 
the repository (9) as a next task in the software development process (Figure 27), the code 
has already been produced and, for this reason, the productivity benefits can be taken into 
account.  
 Each of these two stages stage of both tasks (that is, problem specification and writing 
code) has different mandatory and optional file parts needed to solve this task (Table 3). If 
the developer does not read any file part that is mandatory for the task, the probability of 
solving this task is 0. However, as the developer reads optional file parts, the probability of 
solving this task increases. Each probability depends on the previously specified value of the 
level of understanding of the required and optional code and documentation. In summary, 
the formula used in the software development domain model results in 0, if any mandatory 
piece of code or documentation was not read at all, and (Sum of read & understood file parts) 
/ (number of required records), otherwise. 
While a typical developer retrieves all the eight files that are relevant to the process, 
some of these files present a higher security risk and, taking source code analysis into 
account, the approach makes it possible for the AC to detect which files are more likely to 
be needed. In other words, it is not necessary to transfer the entire source code and the 
documentation. In fact, it is possible to split existing files into different pieces of information. 
For example, source code is structured in classes that typically include the documentation for 
the class, documentation for each method with references to input and output parameters, 
their classes and acceptable values, documentation for class attributes, class attributes, their 
default values, and method headers and bodies. In addition, each piece of information can 
exist in different forms. For instance, the source code can exist in plaintext, obfuscated, and 
compiled (binary) versions.  
Each piece of information for the scenario can have a different usage. For example, 




productivity standpoint between supplying the compiled version of file and the plaintext 
source file. However, from the security standpoint, the risk of transferring a plaintext source 
file is much greater than the risk of transferring the binary version of the same file. 
Traditionally, such a problem would be solved by grouping files into certain types (e.g., a set 
of classes responsible for processing a customer order and a set of files responsible for writing 
information to a hard drive). Since developers tend to specialize on a specific set of 
technologies, this grouping and assigning certain developers as responsible for these groups 
does make sense. However, specialization makes an approach with finer granularity that 
separate method headers from method bodies inapplicable.  
Given that it was possible to complete at least one stage of writing the code, the 
developer can submit it (9) to the buildserver. This process obviously results in certain 
productivity benefits, and given that both stages were solved, it is also possible to run tests 
automatically (10), given that the buildserver is working properly, or run tests locally (11), 
given that the buildserver is not responding. Testing the solution also results in productivity 
benefits, since it brings the development to a conclusion (12) that creates a fully usable 
product. However, it also should be noted that there are costs associated with the 
development, which increase productivity risks linearly depending on the time the developer 
spent working on the solution to the problem. 
The goal of the case study is to find automatically the optimal composition of files 
that should be transferred to the developer machine with a different context (location). As 
previously stated, different strategies and different states of a system for which AC is 
provided lead to different results. For example, if a strategy favours utility, then the file 
generally is transferred to the developer machine when needed unless there is an explicitly 
high security risk associated with this file and the utility of it to the developer is not 
particularly high. However, when the same strategy constrained by a closing deadline to 
avoid deadline penalties, the approach allows the developer to transfer files associated with 
an even higher security risk. When the goal of the strategy is to minimize critical risks, it 
might elect to restrict transfer even when the file is optionally needed but is not a mandatory 
requirement. For mandatory required files with a high security risk, the approach can choose 




maintaining the file. As these strategies are changed at runtime, it is possible to have a highly 
dynamic reaction to certain events. For example, normally, components operate with a 
maximum utility strategy. However, if the risks associated with a certain dimension become 
critical, e.g., the approach detects that a successful attempt to gain unauthorized access to 
information would result in a security becoming a dimension with critical risks, or an 
approaching deadline would result in productivity becoming such a dimension. The 
components operating with this dimension (e.g., firewall for security or task management 
software for productivity) switch to a strategy with minimal critical risks. The switch allows 
components to adapt to changes seamlessly in the state of a system for which AC is provided. 
Current approaches to this problem focus all efforts on dealing with critical risks. In other 
words, if a security breach is detected, all communications can be severed until the situation 
is resolved. This risk mitigation task, however, does not work if two dimensions are critical 
at the same time. For example, if there is a deadline for project, severing communication to 
prevent security risk also prevents project progress. The total utility  formula used in the 
software development domain model is: utility = (security benefits - security risk) * 1000 + 
(productivity benefits - productivity risks(0.0625 * time)) * 400, where 1000 is a current 
value of each unit of security benefit or -1000 is the negative value of each unit of the security 
risk. This means that the security risk associated with one unit of security risk is estimated to 
cause a system to lose 1000 dollars. The productivity benefit units are currently considered 
to be equivalent to 400 dollars, and each millisecond, used as a time measure unit in this case 
study, is associated with gaining 0.0625 units of productivity risks. 
As previously stated, the proposed approach allows for the mutually beneficial work 
of components operating with different knowledge domains in terms of risks and benefits. 
Thus, each AC decision is custom-tailored to address specific situations for a set of 
components with different goals and strategies. It is not always possible to create a RMP that 
significantly reduces all risks, even in one dimension. To manage risks, the new approach 
uses QRMs that accumulate the risks and benefits in form of reserves, while operating with 
the maximal utility. To summarize, while there are no critical risks to mitigate, the new 
approach reduces them in a future. This future reduction of risks related to any of the risk 
dimensions, which contributes to increase the reserves, can be utilized when critical risks 




a certain dimension needs certain resources to resolve internal problems, it can borrow risks 
from other dimensions. However, once the dimension’s problems are resolved, the 
components should return the borrowed risks. With respect to the software development case 
study, the utilities of the two risk dimensions, security and productivity, are combined by a 
static conversion rate because the scenario runs for a time that is less than a day and there is 
no external sources of risks to be considered. Thus, the risks and benefits of the developer’s 
actions from both dimensions are correlated with the static ratio. 
 Given that the developer has successfully solved the first stage of the problem 
specification (3), he or she can begin to either write the first stage of the code (8) or solve the 
second stage of the problem specification (3). Both these tasks depend on whether the firewall 
permits the necessary and beneficial records listed in Table 3 to pass through. The firewall 
operates according to its policies and its policies are set by the policy decision point as a part 
of the scenario for simulation in the FM. For this scenario, the policy decision point can either 
allow all communications through the firewall or can block certain records. The goal of the 
simulation is for the policy decision point to find the optimal set of records that must be 
blocked for the optimal function of the system. The setup of the current scenario results in 
high risks associated with low utility for both security and productivity. Thus, the situation 
in which the new approach might elect to accept high risks (becoming critical) to obtain a 
higher utility or when the approach does not accept high risks at a penalty of not receiving a 
higher utility. Both situations are suitable for different strategies, which would propose a 
different course of actions. 
4.2.2 Simulation Results 
The optimal functioning for this scenario is defined by the utility of all the tasks. The highest 
utility of productivity is achieved when the developer is able to complete all the work in the 
shortest amount of time. In order to complete each of the two stages for the problem 
specification (3) and writing code (8), the developer needs all mandatory records listed in 
Table 3 to pass the firewall to his or her machine. However, access to the optional records 
listed also in Table 3 increases the probability of each attempt to complete these tasks. Thus, 
for the optimal functioning from the point of the productivity dimension, the firewall should 




The utility of the security dimension is dependent on the number of times the 
malicious packet listener is able to intercept the records with a security value that is greater 
than zero. These values are provided in Table 3. Thus, for the optimal functioning from the 
view of the security dimension, the firewall should not allow passage of any record that has 
a security risk value higher than zero. However, there are records that are both mandatory 
and beneficial and that have a security risk value higher than 0; therefore, the optimal 
behaviour for both dimensions cannot be achieved and a compromise between risks and 
benefits of both security and productivity must be found. From all existing combinations, the 
case where the firewall policy is set to prevent traversing of documentation B, method body 
B, documentation C, and method body C has the highest utility located in Table 4 and 
represents the values projected into the future security risk, productivity risk, total utility at 
a scenario when the firewall is not allowing passage of messages containing documentation 
B, method body B, documentation C, or method body C.  
 
Table 4. Simulation results for documentation B, method body B, documentation C, 
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 In Figure 29 the security risk value over time is presented. The security risk is 
increasing because the firewall is set to allow passage of messages containing sensitive data 
and these messages are intercepted by a malicious packet listener. While the actual values 
start at zero at time zero, the final level of security risk is 1.36 units.  
 
Figure 29. Security risk value over time 
 In Figure 30 the productivity risk value over time is presented. The values start at 0 
and decrease to -16 units. The value decreases because the developer executes software 
development process and the benefits of his or her productivity thereby reducing the risk of 
a project delay, which is a part of productivity dimension. Initially, productivity increases 
slowly because the developer needs a significant amount of time to prepare for future 
development, which is to download and read the required documentation and source code 
files. However, after approximately 4.9 hours, the developer has read and analyzed most of 
the required data while performing the first stage of the problem specification task (3). After 


































Figure 30. Productivity risk value over time 
 In Figure 31 the total utility value over time is presented. The value initially drops 
below 0 because of the security risk that the AC must accept to allow the developer to read 
all the required documentation and the source code. However, after 1.88 hours, the utility 
starts to slowly increase because the developer is able to solve the first stage of the problem 
specification task (3), and therefore, the benefit of productivity reduces the overall risk. After 
4.9 hours, the value starts to sharply increase, exceeds zero and reaches 4912 units. Zero in 
this case is a relative level of risk when the developer starts the task. Obviously, since some 
work was done previously, zero is not an absolute level. However, since the set of RMP 
evaluated in the case study does not depend on other processes while being executed, it is 
possible to set this level of risk to zero. If other processes were involved, then the difference 
between the final projected level of risk and initial level of risk would be the utility value. 
However, in that case, the AC would have to separate this RMP from other processes by 
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The final values of the utility for this scenario indicate that, according to the approach, 
it is generally useful to adopt this set of policies for the firewall while this process is ongoing. 
In Table 5 the simulation results are provided for the scenario in which the firewall does not 
allow the following records to pass through the unsecure network: method header B, 
documentation C, email from project manager are presented, where email from project 
manager contains the development task. This record is included because, even though it is 
not located within the secure part of network, it is a record that exists in the system for which 
AC is provided and this approach instantiation was built to verify all possible firewall 
policies. 
 
Table 5. Simulation results for method header B, documentation C, email from project 
manager 
Projected Time in 
Milliseconds 
180029 2100069 3100109 4100149 11620259 11620279 
Security Risk 0.16 0.96 2.56 2.6 3.16 3.56 
Productivity Risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Utility -161.3 -974.6 -2581.5 -2628.5 -3240.7 -3640.7 
Time, hours 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.1 3.2 3.2 
 












18720350 18840369 18840370 20940370 21060410 21120420 
Security 
Risk 
3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 
Productivity 
Risk 
-3 -3 -4 -9 -11 -16 
Total utility -2490.0 -2490.8 -2090.8 -105.4 693.7 2693.3 
Time, hours 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.8 5.9 5.9 
 
The initial configuration is not optimal because, even though this RMP was 
completed and there are 16 units of productivity benefits for the entire project, the previous 
firewall configuration had 4912 of total utility and this one has only 2693. However, the 
productivity utility is sixteen units of utility below zero because of the greater amount of time 
used by the developer for this project and the much higher security risk that occurred while 
the developer retrieved data from the buildserver. 
In Figure 32 the total utility for another RMP is presented in graphical form. Even 
though there was an initial decrease in the utility value that has occurred because the AC was 
accepting security risks and not gaining productivity benefits, it was compensated by later 
growth. As well, the bottom of this graph is much lower than bottom of the previous one, 
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The total utility of the RMP can be quite different depending on the specific scenarios. 
The simulation of the FM that adopted the policies where method body B, documentation C, 
method header C, and method header D were blocked by the firewall, resulted in the utility 
being lower than zero, which means that this approach is detrimental to the company. 
Table 7. Simulation results for method body B, documentation C, method header C, 
method header D 
Time in  
Milli- 
seconds 
180029 2100069 4100149 7800219 7800239 16100310 16220329 16220330 
Security 
Risk 
0.16 0.96 1 1.56 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 
Produc-
tivity Risk 
0 0 0 0 0 -3 -3 -4 
Total 
utility 
-161.3 -974.6 -1028.5 -1614.2 -2014.2 -871.8 -872.6 -472.6 
Time, 
hours 
0.1 0.6 1.1 2.2 2.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 
 
In Figure 33 the total utility value over time for method body B, documentation C, 
method header C, method header D is presented. The result, which is lower than zero, can be 
explained by the lack of productivity. The developer managed to achieve productivity benefit 
of 4 units, but he or she was not able to balance the security risks that the system incurred 





Figure 33. Total utility value over time for method body B, documentation C, method header C, method header D
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4.2.3 Discussion of the Results 
This case study presents a scenario in which a developer makes the necessary changes to a 
software product. The approach is required to mitigate risks by changing the firewall policies 
before the start of the process by adding one or more different policies that block specific 
records to prevent them from traversing into an insecure network. The best decision for the 
approach was to block the documentation B, the method body B, the documentation C and 
the method body C. An analysis of the material of Table 2 verifies that this RMP is the most 
logical among all possible records combinations that the firewall could block or allow 
passage. It is important to note that the risk analysis was performed automatically. Moreover, 
a software development process was adapted at runtime to take into account the risks and 
benefits incurred during the automated analysis. Furthermore, some AC policies, e.g., 
firewall rules, were generated at runtime based on the adaptation of the process. The trade-
off between security and productivity was also assessed. In case the access to the required 
information was denied, all gained security benefits were reduced by increasing the 
productivity risk, and the processes that required the access to the information to be denied 
are disregarded. All simulations had a negative utility minimum initially due to developer’s 
need to study the problem first before a solution could be found and benefits could be given 
because the developer needed to read the code and to read the code the developer needed to 
transfer information over an insecure network, and for this reason, this task increased the 
security risks. Thus, the novel approach demonstrated the ability to project the state of a 
system for which AC is provided into the future and, by analysing multiple projections, this 
approach made a logically correct decision.  
 
4.2.4 Domain Models in the Case Study 
The domain models used in this case study include the AC, software development and 
network models. These models are presented in the UML diagram in Figure 34 and Figure 
35. These are simplified UML diagrams, which present only the data and the relationships 






























The AC model includes the severlocalaccesscontrol class, which contains data about 
the passwords used on the server (e.g., mail server). The software development model is 
represented using a developer role class and the process graph that describes the sequence of 
actions that a developer typically goes through to make changes to a software product.  
Network and resources are depicted for example in the operatingsystem class, which 
represents the components of an operating system that support access to files and 
communication to specific devices such as servers and the firewall. 
 
4.3 Implementation 
The improved design model was implemented in Java language version 1.7. The forecasting 
core model contains 12 classes and domain models contains 50 classes in 59 files and 4445 
lines of code. The full listing of source code is presented in Appendix A. The main class 
starting execution is called RMS and it does not require parameters. The method main of this 
class is responsible for organizing the risk mitigation tasks before the scenario execution. 
The implementation produces logs specifying what is projected to occur in the system 
according to the FM as well as the resulting level of risks for all the dimensions, the time 











Summary and Future Work 
5.1 Summary 
The thesis presents a new approach in risk analysis and mitigation. The new approach is an 
extension of the approach proposed in [126]. The presented approach is designed to manage 
risks in dynamic conditions, in which components are not required to follow directions from 
a centralized authority. Current risk analysis and mitigation approaches rely on the AC to 
resolve risks originating in the security dimension. In addition, RAdAC lacks implementation 
support. Both existing and emerging AC approaches (e.g., RAdAC) were shown to have 
limitations in their expressiveness and in their lack of specific features. 
Each of these approaches uses predefined reactions to certain risks, which can be 
anticipated and countered. Existing AC methods also follow a predefined AC process. If this 
approach is observed by malicious entities, tasks that AC takes to mitigate risks can be 
anticipated and prevented. Furthermore, an existing AC fails to consider explicitly different 
dimensions in which current AC’s work. This failure can result in unbalanced tasks where 
one dimension is favoured over others, and thus, risks increase. 
Additionally, current AC approaches ignore risks that are considered negligible. 





ignored. Finally, existing risk analyses are based on only human analysis and cannot 
dynamically adapt to a changing environment. 
 The presented approach is capable of performing the risk analysis simultaneously for 
a set of a predefined risk dimensions and is able to respond to risks by dynamically creating 
a set of RMPs for components to follow. The approach does not require components to follow 
constructed RMP. However, in case there is no centralized authority, tasks that need the 
combined efforts of a set of components would become possible only if all interacting 
components participate in a mutually beneficial RMP. The risk analysis in the proposed 
approach is performed by projecting the state of a system into the future via the simulation 
of the FM. The state of the system is updated and the FM can also be updated as the AC 
approach monitors events occurring in the system, and thus, the analysis is no longer 
predefined. All the risks, including the least significant, that the AC system encounters, 
accumulate in components gaining or loosing QRMs, which are required to motivate the 
cooperation of other components. A balance among different dimension risk needs is 
obtained by adjusting the exchange ratio of QRMs for different dimensions. Depending on 
probabilistic model, the simulation can depend on multiple runs and result in average values 
(e.g., averaging utility over multiple runs resulting in different outcomes) or can specify the 
potential deviation for the projected values.  
The activities of the approach start when a component originates a resource or service 
request and ends when the AC request resolution finished with the creating a set of RMPs. 
RMPs are created by applying various relevant risk mitigation measures and projecting the 
state of the system into the future in which these decisions have been applied. After the 
projection of the state of the system into the future in which these measures are applied, the 
timeline of risks are compared and user-defined strategies select the best possible RMP. Once 
every strategy has constructed its required RMP, the set of RMP is returned to the component 
in the form of an AC decision. Upon receiving these RMP, and depending on intelligence of 
the particular component, the component can determine which one of proposed RMP suits 
its needs. The example for the approach offered in the thesis also demonstrates the 
calculations necessary to conduct risk analysis manually. Based on different relevant sets of 





collect data required for the risk analysis. Moreover, the example presents an algorithm for 
utility calculation for scenarios using risk analysis and the function that converts utilities to 
the utility chosen as a common basis. 
Disclosing this information typically results in the danger of releasing sensitive 
information to a component that requests an AC decision. However, if no disclosure is 
possible, then a limited set of tasks (if any) is performed cooperatively by the components. 
Additionally, as the FM does not require the input of all the information possessed by the 
component and is able to project the component’s state into the future with a limited set of 
historical and present data, the components can select which information to share with a third 
party component. Furthermore, existing approaches by restricting access disclose 
information about the access attempt. For example, if an attack attempt is identified by the 
AC, the AC can respond by allowing access in a virtualized replica of the system for which 
AC is provided with scrambled information, which results in identifying the attacker’s targets 
and methods. While this technique is known as honeypots, current AC approaches are unable 
to initiate a honeypot dynamically. By granting or denying access to the requested resource, 
existing AC’s reveal information about the beliefs of AC regarding component requesting 
access, which can be used to assess internal variables of AC and consequently modify attack. 
 This thesis also presents two case studies that were constructed to illustrate the 
applicability of the approach. A software development case study was designed to 
demonstrate the feasibility of automating the approach. In this case study, the AC is required 
to make a decision about the software development process that is about to start. The risk 
analysis is performed by projecting the state of the system into the future and comparing the 
risk timelines of possible decisions and the arguments for them. By comparing the decisions 
and arguments, the implementation of the approach resulted in an AC decision that was 
correct for the given data compared to a manual evaluation. Thus, the approach demonstrates 







The proposed approach assumes that in the paths of the process graphs, the precondition of 
a previous task matches the postcondition of the subsequent task. This assumption is made 
because preconditions and postconditions were analyzed by the designers of the processes at 
design time. However, when the approach constructs RMPs, restrictions related to mutually 
and non-mutually exclusive tasks are taken into consideration. Therefore, these restrictions 
can be seen as simplified conditions that the sequences of tasks need to satisfy. In addition, 
for simplicity purposes, the approach assumes a normal distribution of the calculated 
probabilities. However, other probability distributions can, in principle, be used to represent 
other types of risk assessment. 
 
5.3 Future work 
Future work includes publishing scientific articles about the proposed approach, additional 
case studies, explicit trading measures, context-aware approaches, software agents, and 
anomaly discovery methods. The evaluation of the approach can be done by implementing 
the approach with industrial data and comparing projections and proposed RMPs to actual 
observations and tasks executed by an existing AC system. Additional case studies would 
further explain specific details of the approach design necessary to implement it correctly in 
other domains of knowledge. As well, additional case studies must provide data required to 
compare proposed approach with existing AC approaches. The sequence of task execution is 
predefined and enhancement of the approach would be to instead of providing graph of tasks 
to provide tasks and their pre and post conditions evaluation. 
 
5.3.1 Additional Case Studies 
The approach would benefit from having additional case studies. These case studies must 
include more complex models and scenarios, exist in different knowledge domains, be based 





5.3.2 Explicit Risk Trading Measures 
Introducing explicit risk trading measures would benefit the RMP construction for both risk 
analysis and risk mitigation. Although the current FM operates with various QRMs from 
different risk dimensions and it considers both supply and demand, explicit trading was not 
implemented with the dynamic ratio of QRM conversion and other tools from both micro- 
and macroeconomics that could be applied to improve the projections built by the approach. 
 
5.3.3 Context-Aware Models 
The approach would benefit from having an explicit context-aware FM that takes into 
account various attributes of components, processes and the system for which AC is provided 
such as spatial and temporal. In addition, to improve the projection performed by the FM, the 
approach needs to monitor the state of the system and compare this state with the projection. 
If this projection at some point starts to differentiate significantly from the state of the system, 
the approach should be able to reevaluate the ongoing risks based on context and adjust some 
risk-related values or even select different algorithms for risk evaluation.  
 
5.3.4 Introducing Software Agents and Anomaly Discovery Methods 
The approach could benefit from introducing software agents, including a goal-oriented FM 
that would allow components to make more rational decisions about what type of strategy to 
use and how to modify and evaluate the provided decisions. Additionally, introducing these 
agents to the approach would allow the approach to become compliant with predefined goals, 
simplify the analysis of its performance and make real-time adjustments that would benefit 
different aspects of the AC system functionality, including manageability and reliability. 
Finally, the approach would benefit from an anomaly discovery [127] that could be integrated 
into it. This anomaly discovery would allow the approach to detect components that are 
harmful earlier in the RMP. The anomalies can include statistical anomalies preventing 
accurate projection, anomalies in components behavior and other types of anomalies 
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Appendix A - Source Code of the Classes 
Implementing the Approach 
This appendix consists of the source code developed to automate the proposed approach for 























 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Main { 
 
private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger(Main.class); 
 
public static Location internet; 
public static Location serverRoom; 
public static Location officeRoom; 
public static Location roomOutsideOffice; 
public static CompUnit userComputer; 
public static CompUnit internetCU; 








public static CompUnit hardwareFirewall; 
public static CompUnit hardwareRouter; 
public static CompUnit webServer; 
 
public static CompUnit devMachine1; 
public static CompUnit devMachine2; 
public static CompUnit buildServer; 
public static CompUnit databaseServer; 
public static CompUnit externalMailServer; 
public static WebServer logicalWebServer; 
public static Browser logicalUserBrowser; 
public static Firewall logicalFirewall; 
public static MailServer logicalExternalMailServer; 
public static FileWithRecords externalMailServerPasswordFile; 
public static FileWithRecords sourceCodeServerPasswordFile; 
public static Record projectTask; 
public static FTPServer ftpServerOnBuildServer; 
public static SourceCodeServer sourceCodeServer; 
public static FileWithRecords projectSourceCodeFileA; 
public static FileWithRecords projectSourceCodeFileB; 
public static FileWithRecords projectSourceCodeFileC; 
public static FileWithRecords projectSourceCodeFileD; 
public static StringRecord docA; 
public static StringRecord headerA; 
public static StringRecord methodA; 
public static StringRecord docB; 
public static StringRecord headerB; 
public static StringRecord methodB; 
public static StringRecord docC; 
public static StringRecord headerC; 
public static StringRecord methodC; 
public static StringRecord docD; 
public static StringRecord headerD; 
public static StringRecord methodD; 
 
public static StringRecord methodANew; 
public static StringRecord headerDNew; 
public static StringRecord methodDNew; 
 
public static Focus developerFocus; 
 
public DeveloperRole dr; 
 
public void prepareEnvironment(){ 
 
        Record.globalList.clear(); 
docA = new StringRecord("This method is responsible for creating database 
structure","docA"); 
headerA = new StringRecord("CREATE PROCEDURE createTables @City 
varchar(30)","headerA"); 
methodA = new StringRecord("CREATE TABLE new_tbl SELECT * FROM 
orig_tbl","methodA"); 
docB = new StringRecord("This method is responsible for populating database 
structure","docB"); 
headerB = new StringRecord("CREATE PROCEDURE createTables @City 
varchar(30)","headerB"); 
methodB = new StringRecord("CREATE TABLE new_tbl SELECT * FROM 
orig_tbl","methodB"); 








headerC = new StringRecord("int main()","headerC"); 
methodC = new StringRecord("cout <<\"Hello World!\"<<  endl;","methodC"); 
docD = new StringRecord("This method is responsible for starting client 
application","docD"); 
headerD = new StringRecord("public static void main(String[] args)","headerD"); 
methodD = new StringRecord("System.exit(0)","methodD"); 
 
methodANew = null; 
headerDNew = null; 





internet = new Location("Internet"); 
serverRoom = new Location("ServerRoom"); 
officeRoom = new Location("OfficeRoom"); 
roomOutsideOffice = new Location("HotelRoom"); 
 
userComputer = new CompUnit("UserComputer"); 
internetCU = new CompUnit("Internet",internet); 
notebookInExternalLocation = new 
CompUnit("NotebookOfDeveloper",roomOutsideOffice); 
 
        Listener listener = new Listener(internetCU.getOs()) { 
public void processMessage(Message m){ 
                LinkedList<Record> records = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(String s:m.getMessageParameters().getKeySet()){ 
                    Object obj = m.getParameter(s); 
if (obj instanceof Record) 
                        records.add((Record) obj); 
if (obj instanceof RecordsCollection){ 
                        RecordsCollection rc = (RecordsCollection) obj; 
for(String n:rc.getRecordNames()){ 
                            records.add(rc.getRecord(n)); 
                        } 
                    } 
 
                } 
for(Record r:records){ 
if (r==null) continue; 
if (r.getSecurityValue()==0) continue; 
                    
RiskCollection.addSecurityRisk(0.4d,ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime(),r)
; 
                } 
 
} 





hardwareFirewall = new CompUnit("HardwareFirewall",serverRoom); 
hardwareRouter = new CompUnit("HardwareRouter",serverRoom); 
webServer = new CompUnit("WebServer",serverRoom); 
 
devMachine1 = new CompUnit("DevMachine1",officeRoom); 







buildServer = new CompUnit("BuildServer",serverRoom); 
databaseServer = new CompUnit("DatabaseServer",serverRoom); 
externalMailServer = new CompUnit("ExternalMailServer"); 
logicalWebServer = null; 
logicalUserBrowser = new Browser(userComputer.getOs()); 
logicalFirewall = new Firewall(hardwareFirewall.getOs()); 








logicalWebServer = new 
WebServer(webServer.getOs(),externalMailServerPasswordFile); 
logicalExternalMailServer = new 
MailServer(externalMailServer.getOs(),externalMailServerPasswordFile); 
 

















































        EmailRecord emailRecord = new EmailRecord("emailFromProjectManager"); 
        emailRecord.addAttachment(projectTask); 
 
        FileWithRecords fwr = new FileWithRecords("c:\\task.txt",buildServer); 
        fwr.addRecord(projectTask,"Project task"); 





//        DeveloperRole dr = new DeveloperRole(officeRoom); 
dr = new DeveloperRole(roomOutsideOffice); 
        UserRecord ur = new UserRecord("John Doe","mypassword","user"); 
        ur = new UserRecord("John Doe","mypassword","user"); 








        UserRecord userRecord = new UserRecord("Developer1", "newpassword", 
"developer"); 









    } 
 
 
public void startScenario(){ 
developerFocus = new Focus(dr.processTree); 
        ActionsQueue.currentQueue.start(developerFocus); 
        ActionsQueue.currentQueue.progress(); 
    } 
 

































import static CA.lib.Lib.*; 
 
/** 
 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class ActionsQueue { 
 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(ActionsQueue.class); 
public static ActionsQueue currentQueue = new ActionsQueue(); 
 
public boolean terminated = false; 
    Long currentTime = 0l;//1 tick=1ms 
public Map<Long, LinkedList<ExecutorService>>schedule; 
 
public ActionsQueue() { 
schedule = Collections.synchronizedSortedMap(new TreeMap<Long, 
LinkedList<ExecutorService>>()); 
    } 
 
public Future<?> start(Runnable r) { 
        ExecutorService executor = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor(); 
final Future f = executor.submit(r); 
        Thread t = new Thread("error watching thread"){ 
public void run(){ 
try { 
f.get(); 
                } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 
                } catch (ExecutionException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 
                } 
            } 
        }; 





     * 
     * @param scheduledTime time at which even is scheduled 
     * @param monitor procedure will put in this list executor responsible for 
processing request, 
     *                it is waiting for notification. If any object is added to 
it, i.e. Message then executor 







     */ 
public void addNewEventWithInterruptionAtFirstSchedule(long scheduledTime, 
LinkedList<Object> monitor) { 
        ExecutorService executor = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor(); 
 
        LinkedList<ExecutorService> scheduled = schedule.get(scheduledTime); 
if (scheduled == null) { 
            scheduled = new LinkedList<ExecutorService>(); 
            scheduled.add(executor); 
schedule.put(scheduledTime, scheduled); 
        } else 
scheduled.add(executor); 
 
        monitor.add(executor);//monitor holds executor 
 
while (getCurrentTime() != scheduledTime && monitor.size() <= 1)//waiting to be 
either on time  if no 
            // interruptions occurred or to be interrupted 
synchronized (executor) { 
try { 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "waiting on :" + executor); 
                    executor.wait(); 
                } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 
                } 
            } 
if (monitor.size()>1){ 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "waiting on :" + executor); 
            removeEvent(scheduledTime,executor); 
synchronized (monitor){ 
                monitor.notifyAll(); 
            } 
        } 




     * 
     * @param scheduledTime time at which even is scheduled 
     * @param monitor procedure will put in this list executor responsible for 
processing request, 
     *                it is waiting for notification. If any object is added to 
it, i.e. Message then executor 
     *                will not be invoked 
     */ 
public void addNewEventWithInterruption(long scheduledTime, LinkedList<Object> 
monitor) { 
        ExecutorService executor = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor(); 
 
        LinkedList<ExecutorService> scheduled = schedule.get(scheduledTime); 
if (scheduled == null) { 
            scheduled = new LinkedList<ExecutorService>(); 
            scheduled.add(executor); 
schedule.put(scheduledTime, scheduled); 
        } else 
scheduled.add(executor); 
 
        monitor.add(executor);//monitor holds executor 
 







either on time  if no 
                                                                        // 
interruptions occurred or to be interrupted 
synchronized (executor) { 
try { 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "waiting on :" + executor); 
                    executor.wait(); 
                } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 
                } 
            } 
if (monitor.size()>1){ 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "waiting on :" + executor); 
            removeEvent(scheduledTime,executor); 
synchronized (monitor){ 
                monitor.notifyAll(); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
public boolean removeEvent(Long scheduledTime, ExecutorService executor){ 
if (!schedule.containsKey(scheduledTime)) return false; 
        LinkedList<ExecutorService> list = schedule.get(scheduledTime); 
        list.remove(executor); 
synchronized (executor){ 
            executor.notify();//is it needed? 
} 
if (list.size()==0) schedule.remove(scheduledTime); 
return true; 
    } 
 
public void addNewEvent(long scheduledTime) { 
 
        ExecutorService executor = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor(); 
 
        LinkedList<ExecutorService> scheduled = schedule.get(scheduledTime); 
if (scheduled == null) { 
            scheduled = new LinkedList<ExecutorService>(); 
            scheduled.add(executor); 
schedule.put(scheduledTime, scheduled); 
logger.log(VERBOSE,this+":no"); 
        } else { 
            scheduled.add(executor); 
logger.log(VERBOSE, ":yes"); 
        } 
 
boolean waiting = false; 
while (getCurrentTime() != scheduledTime) 
synchronized (executor) { 
try { 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "waiting on :" + executor); 
                    waiting = true; 
                    executor.wait(); 
 
                } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 
                } 
            } 
if (waiting) 







    } 
 
 
public void progress() { 
 
try { 
            Thread.sleep(40); 
        } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
 
        Set<Long> timeScheduled = schedule.keySet(); 
 
        Iterator<Long> it = timeScheduled.iterator(); 
long time = 0; 
 
if (it.hasNext()) { 
do { 
                time = it.next(); 
if (time >= currentTime) break; 
logger.error("skipping events, they were scheduled in the past"); 
            } while (it.hasNext()); 
 
 
            LinkedList<ExecutorService> threadsToActivate = 
schedule.remove(time); 
currentTime = time; 
logger.debug("New time:" + currentTime); 
for (ExecutorService t : threadsToActivate) { 
synchronized (t) { 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "notifying waiting on :" + t); 
                    t.notify(); 
                } 






            } 
        } 
try { 
            Thread.sleep(5); 
        } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 




            progress(); 
    } 
 
public long getCurrentTime() { 
return currentTime; 
    } 
 
 
public void printEventQueue(){ 
        Set<Long> timeScheduled = schedule.keySet(); 









        } 
        String log = "Events we have:"; 
for (Long l : timeScheduled) 
            log+=":" + l+"\n"; 
 
logger.info(log); 















 * Created by root on 12/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Random { 
static Random defaultInstance = new Random(); 
 
//    SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom("12.04.2015:2:37".getBytes());//working 
case 
SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom("12.04.2015:2:379".getBytes()); 
 
public static float getNext(){ 
return defaultInstance.sr.nextFloat(); 
    } 
 
public static int getNext(int val){ 
return defaultInstance.sr.nextInt(val); 
    } 
 
public static String getNewID(){ 
        String s = ""; 
for(int i=0;i<24;i++) 
        s+=defaultInstance.sr.nextInt(10); 
return s; 
    } 
 
public static void reInit(){ 
defaultInstance = new Random(); 











 * Created by root on 11/06/2015. 
 */ 
public interface AccessControlDecisionMaker { 

















 * Created by root on 11/06/2015. 
 */ 
public class FirewallDecisionMakerimplements AccessControlDecisionMaker { 
 
    LinkedList<FirewallPolicy>policies = new LinkedList<>(); 
@Override 
public Boolean allowAccess(Message m) { 
        LinkedList<Boolean> result = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(FirewallPolicy fp:policies) 
            result.add(fp.allowAccess(m)); 
return makeDecision(result); 
    } 
 
public void addPolicy(FirewallPolicy fp){ 
policies.add(fp); 
    } 
 
public boolean makeDecision(LinkedList<Boolean> result){ 
return makeDecisionOneReject(result); 
    } 
 
public boolean makeDecisionOneReject(LinkedList<Boolean> result){ 
for(Boolean b:result) 
if (b!=null&&!b) return false; 
return true; 
    } 
 
public boolean makeDecisionOneAccept(LinkedList<Boolean> result){ 
for(Boolean b:result) 
if (b!=null&&b) return true; 
return false; 


















 * Created by root on 11/06/2015. 
 */ 
public abstract class FirewallPolicyimplements AccessControlDecisionMaker{ 
 
@Override 
















 * Created by root on 26/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class ServerLocalAccessControl implements AccessControlDecisionMaker{ 
boolean allowNotAuthorizedAccess = false; 
    Server parent; 
    DataSource passwordData; 
 
public ServerLocalAccessControl(String passwordFileName, Server parent){ 
this.parent = parent; 
passwordData = new DataSource(parent.getParent().getFile(passwordFileName)); 
    } 
 
public ServerLocalAccessControl(FileWithRecords passwordFile, Server parent){ 
this.parent = parent; 
if (passwordFile==null) { 
allowNotAuthorizedAccess = true; 
return; 
        } 
passwordData = new DataSource(passwordFile); 
    } 
 
public ServerLocalAccessControl(boolean allowAccessWithoutAuthorization){ 
allowNotAuthorizedAccess = allowAccessWithoutAuthorization; 
    } 
 
public Boolean allowAccess(Message m){ 
if (allowNotAuthorizedAccess) return true; 














public boolean passwordsMatch(String account, String passwordToTest){ 
if (passwordData==null){ 
return false; 
        } 
        Pair pair = passwordData.getRecord(account, 
parent.getParent().getRunningOn()); 
if (pair.a==null) return false; 
UserRecord rr = ((UserRecordClass) pair.a).getValue(); 
        String recordPassword = rr.getPassword(); 
return recordPassword.equals(passwordToTest); 
    } 
 
public String getAccountRole(String account){ 
        Pair pair = passwordData.getRecord(account, 
parent.getParent().getRunningOn()); 
if (pair==null||pair.a==null) return null; 
        UserRecord rr = ((UserRecordClass) pair.a).getValue(); 
return rr.getRoleName(); 
    } 
 
public boolean isAllowNotAuthorizedAccess() { 
return allowNotAuthorizedAccess; 
















 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class WorkStationextends CompUnit { 
    OperatingSystem os = new OperatingSystem(this); 
 
public WorkStation(String name) { 
super(name); 














 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class CompUnit extends HardwareEntity implements Entity { 
    CPU cpu = new CPU(); 
    LinkedList<HardDrive>hardDrives = new LinkedList<HardDrive>(); 
 
    Location location = null; 
 
public OperatingSystem getOs() { 
return os; 
    } 
 
    OperatingSystem os; 
 
public LinkedList<HardDrive> getHardDrives() { 
return hardDrives; 
    } 
 





tItConnectsTo.toLowerCase())) return ni; 
return null; 












    } 
 
    LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>networkConnections = new 
LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>(); 
 
public void connect(CompUnit newConnection){ 
        NetworkingInterface ni = new NetworkingInterface(this); 
        NetworkingInterface ni2 = new NetworkingInterface(newConnection); 
        ni.connectTo(ni2); 
    } 
 
public CompUnit(String name,Location location){ 
this(name); 
        setLocation(location); 
    } 
 
public CompUnit(String name) { 
this.name = name; 
os = new OperatingSystem(this); 
        setLocation(new Location("Room of:"+name)); 
        HardDrive hd = new HardDrive("c:",this); 
this.addHardDrive(hd); 
    } 
 
public String toString(){ 
return name; 
    } 
 
public Location getLocation() { 
return location; 
    } 
 
public void setLocation(Location location) { 
if (this.location!=null){ 
this.location.removeObjectFromLocation(this); 
        } 
this.location = location; 
        location.addObjectToLocation(this); 
    } 
 
public void addHardDrive(HardDrive hd){ 
hardDrives.add(hd); 
    } 
 
public void createFile(String name, RecordsCollection infoToPutInFile){ 
        FileWithRecords fwr = new FileWithRecords(name, this); 
for(String n:infoToPutInFile.getRecordNames()){ 
            fwr.addRecord(infoToPutInFile.getRecord(n),n); 
        } 














 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class CPU extends HardwareEntity implements Entity { 
public float capacity=100; 













 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class HardDriveextends HardwareEntity implements Entity { 
    String driveName; 
    CompUnit parent; 
    HashMap<String, FileWithRecords>files = new HashMap<String, 
FileWithRecords>(); 
 
public HardDrive(String driveName,CompUnit parent) { 
this.driveName = driveName; 
this.parent = parent; 
    } 
 
public FileWithRecords getRecords(String fullName){ 
return files.get(fullName.substring(3)); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(RecordsCollection r, String name){ 
        FileWithRecords fileWithRecords = null; 
if (!(r instanceof FileWithRecords)) { 
             fileWithRecords = new FileWithRecords(name, parent); 
        } else{ 
            fileWithRecords = (FileWithRecords) r; 
        } 
files.put(name,fileWithRecords); 
    } 
 
public FileWithRecords removeFile(String name) { 
return files.remove(name); 
    } 
 
public boolean removeReference(String name, RecordsCollection r) { 
        RecordsCollection o = files.remove(name); 
if (o == null) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, FileWithRecords> e : files.entrySet()) { 
if (r == e.getValue()) { 
files.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
                } 








        } else { 
return true; 
        } 
    } 
 
public boolean removeReference(RecordsCollection r) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, FileWithRecords> e : files.entrySet()) { 
if (r == e.getValue()) { 
files.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
public String getDriveName() { 
return driveName; 
    } 
 
public void setDriveName(String driveName) { 
this.driveName = driveName; 








 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class HardwareEntity implements Entity{ 
boolean enabled = true; 











 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class NetworkingInterface extends HardwareEntity implements Entity { 
    NetworkingInterface connectedTo; 
    CompUnit installedOn; 
 
public void connectTo(NetworkingInterface ni){ 
connectedTo = ni; 
        ni.connectedTo=this; 
    } 
 
public NetworkingInterface(CompUnit installedOn) { 







        installedOn.networkConnections.add(this); 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> buildPath(CompUnit origin, CompUnit 
target){ 
        LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> l  = new 
LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>(); 
return recursiveBuildPath(origin,target, l); 
    } 
 
private LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> recursiveBuildPath(CompUnit origin, 
CompUnit target, LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> pathSoFar){ 
 
if (enabled) { 
if (connectedTo.installedOn.equals(target)) { 
                pathSoFar.add(this); 
return pathSoFar; 
            } 
 
for(NetworkingInterface ni:pathSoFar){//we just circled back, this path is no 
good 
if (ni.installedOn.equals(connectedTo.installedOn)) return null; 
            } 
            LinkedList<LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>> res = new 
LinkedList<LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>>(); 
 
            LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> newPath= new 
LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>(pathSoFar); 
            newPath.add(this); 
 
for(NetworkingInterface ni:connectedTo.installedOn.networkConnections){ 
                LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> tmp = 
ni.recursiveBuildPath(origin, target, newPath); 
if (tmp!=null&&tmp.size()!=0) res.add(tmp); 
            } 
if (res.size()==0) return null; else 
            return res.getFirst();//we actually can choose better path 
} else return null; 
    } 
 
public String toString(){ 
return installedOn+" to "+connectedTo.installedOn; 
    } 
 
public NetworkingInterface getConnectedTo() { 
return connectedTo; 
    } 
 
public CompUnit getInstalledOn() { 
return installedOn; 














 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class RAM extends HardwareEntity implements Entity { 
public float capacity; 




















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class DataSource<T extends Record> { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(DataSource.class); 
public static final int TYPE_FILE = 0; 
public static final int TYPE_DATABASE = 1; 
public static final int TYPE_EMAIL_SERVER = 2; 
public static final int TYPE_WEB_SERVER = 3; 
public static final int TYPE_VERSION_CONTROL_SERVER = 4; 
 
public static final int SUCCESS = 6; 
public static final int ACCESS_DENIED = 1; 
public static final int PASSWORD_WRONG = 2; 
public static final int COULD_NOT_REACH = 3; 
public static final int TIMEOUT = 4; 
public static final int GENERAL_FAILURE = 5; 
public static final int NOT_STARTED = 0; 
public static final int STARTED = 7; 
public static final int RETRYING = 8; 




    String name; 
    Component target = null;//this is for updating records locations only 
CompUnit location = null; 
 
    StringRecord userName = null; 
    StringRecord password = null; 
 
int status = NOT_STARTED; 







    String usernameStatic = null; 
    String passwordStatic = null; 
 
public String getUsername() { 
if (record == null) return usernameStatic; 
return record.getUsername(); 
    } 
 
public String getPassword() { 
if (record == null) return passwordStatic; 
return record.getPassword(); 
    } 
 
public DataSource(int type, String name, CompUnit location, UserRecord record) { 
 
this.type = type; 
this.name = name; 
this.location = location; 
this.record = record; 
    } 
 
public DataSource(int type, String name, CompUnit location, String userName, 
String password) { 
 
this.type = type; 
this.name = name; 
this.location = location; 
this.passwordStatic = password; 
this.usernameStatic = userName; 
    } 
 
public DataSource(FileWithRecords file) { 
type = TYPE_FILE; 
name = file.getFilename(); 
location = file.getLocation(); 
    } 
 




    } 
 
public DataSourceGetResult getRecord(String recordName, CompUnit 




    } 
 
public DataSourceGetResult writeRecord(String recordName, CompUnit 




    } 
 
public Pair<Record, Integer> getRecordP(String recordName, CompUnit 
queryOriginLocation, Record recordToWrite, String subrecordName){ 







        Pair<RecordsCollection,Integer> res =  
getRecordCollection(recordName,queryOriginLocation,recordToWrite,subrecordName); 
        result.b = res.b; 
if (res.a==null) return result; 
        result.a=res.a.getRecord(recordName); 
if (result.a==null&&subrecordName!=null){ 
            result.a = res.a.getFirstRecord(); 
        } 
return result; 
    } 
 
public static DataSourceGetResults getRecordWithErrorHandling(Role role, CompUnit 
queryOriginLocation, Record record){ 
        LinkedList<Locator> shuffledLocators = 
Locator.getShuffledRecordsLocations(role, record); 
return getRecordWithErrorHandling(queryOriginLocation,shuffledLocators); 
    } 
 
 
public static DataSourceGetResults getRecordWithErrorHandling(CompUnit 
queryOriginLocation, LinkedList<Locator> shuffledLocators){ 
        DataSourceGetResults result = new DataSourceGetResults(); 
 
for(Locator l:shuffledLocators){ 
            DataSource ds = l.getSource(); 
            Pair<Record, Integer> p = null; 
if (ds.type==TYPE_FILE) 
                p = ds.getRecord(l.getTargetRecordName(), 
queryOriginLocation,l.getTargetRecordName()); 
else p = ds.getRecord(l.getTargetRecordName(), queryOriginLocation); 
if (p.b==DataSource.ACCESS_DENIED){ 
                result.add(p); 
continue;//that was bad attempt, try next locator 
} 
if (p.b==DataSource.SUCCESS){ 
                result.add(p); 
return result; 
            } 
//if no response yet, repeat once more 
p  = ds.getRecord(l.getTargetRecordName(), queryOriginLocation); 
if (p.b==DataSource.ACCESS_DENIED){ 
                result.add(p); 





            } 
        } 
        result.add(new Pair<>(null,GENERAL_FAILURE)); 
return result; 
    } 
 
public Pair<RecordsCollection, Integer> getRecordCollection(String recordName, 
CompUnit queryOriginLocation, Record recordToWrite, String subrecordName) { 
        RecordsCollection resultingRecordCollection = null; 
        Pair<RecordsCollection, Integer> result = new Pair<RecordsCollection, 
Integer>(); 
if (type == TYPE_FILE) { 







if (recordToWrite==null) { 
if (!location.getOs().getAccessControlDecision(OperatingSystem.READ_FILE, name)) 
{ 
                        result.b = ACCESS_DENIED; 
return result; 
                    } 
                    resultingRecordCollection = 
location.getOs().getFile(name);//access control is asked inside this function 
call 
result.a = resultingRecordCollection; 
                    result.b = SUCCESS; 
return result; 
                } else { 
if (!location.getOs().getAccessControlDecision(OperatingSystem.WRITE_FILE, name)) 
{ 
                        result.b = ACCESS_DENIED; 
return result; 
                    } 
 
                    resultingRecordCollection = 
location.getOs().getFile(name);//access control is asked inside this function 
call 
if (resultingRecordCollection==null){ 
                        FileWithRecords fwr = 
location.getOs().createNewFile(name); 
                        resultingRecordCollection = fwr; 
                    } 
                    resultingRecordCollection.addRecord(recordToWrite); 
                    result.a = resultingRecordCollection; 
                    result.b = SUCCESS; 
return result; 
                } 
            } else { 
                Message m = new Message(location, Message.FTP, Server.authorize, 
FTPServer.name); 
                m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamUsername, getUsername()); 
                m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamPassword, getPassword()); 
                queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                Message response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("FTPClient"); 
if (response == null) { 
                    result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                } 
                String responseCommand = response.getCommand(); 
if (responseCommand.equals(Server.authorizeSuccess)) { 
if (recordToWrite==null) { 
                        m = new Message(location, Message.FTP, 
FTPServer.listCommand, FTPServer.name); 
                        m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                        m.setParameter(FTPServer.listParameter, name); 
if (subrecordName!=null) 
                            
m.setParameter(FTPServer.listParameterRecord,subrecordName); 
                        queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                        response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("FTPClient"); 
if (response == null) { 








                        } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(FTPServer.listResponse)) { 
if (subrecordName!=null) { 
                                result.a = new RecordsCollection(); 
                                
result.a.addRecord(response.getParameterRecord(FTPServer.listParameter)); 
                            } 
else 
result.a = response.getParameterRecordCollection(FTPServer.listParameter); 
                            result.b = SUCCESS; 
                        } else { 
                            result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                        } 
                    } else{ 
                        m = new Message(location, Message.FTP, 
FTPServer.saveCommand, FTPServer.name); 
                        m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                        m.setParameter(FTPServer.saveParameter, name); 
                        m.setParameter(FTPServer.saveParameterRecord, 
recordToWrite); 
                        queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                        response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("FTPClient"); 
if (response == null) { 
                            result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                        } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(FTPServer.saveResponse)) { 
                            result.a = 
response.getParameterRecordCollection(FTPServer.saveParameter); 
                            result.b = SUCCESS; 
                        } else { 
                            result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                        } 
                    } 
                } else { 
                    result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
 
                } 
return result; 
            } 
//return result; 
} 
if (type == TYPE_DATABASE) { 
            Message m = new Message(location, Message.SMTP, Server.authorize, 
DatabaseServer.name); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamUsername, getUsername()); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamPassword, getPassword()); 
            queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
            Message response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("DatabaseQueryOriginator"); 
if (response == null) { 
                result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
            } 
            String responseCommand = response.getCommand(); 
if (responseCommand.equals(Server.authorizeSuccess)) { 
if (recordToWrite!=null) { 








                    m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                    m.setParameter(DatabaseServer.listParameter, recordName); 
                    queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                    response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("DatabaseQueryOriginator"); 
if (response == null) { 
                        result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                    } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(DatabaseServer.listResponse)) { 
                        result.a = 
response.getParameterRecordCollection(DatabaseServer.listParameter); 
                        result.b = SUCCESS; 
                    } else { 
                        result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                    } 
                } else{ 
                    m = new Message(location, Message.SMTP, 
DatabaseServer.saveCommand, DatabaseServer.name); 
                    m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                    m.setParameter(DatabaseServer.saveParameter, recordName); 
                    m.setParameter(DatabaseServer.saveParameterRecord, 
recordToWrite); 
                    queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                    response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("DatabaseQueryOriginator"); 
if (response == null) { 
                        result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                    } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(DatabaseServer.saveResponse)) { 
                        result.a = 
response.getParameterRecordCollection(DatabaseServer.saveParameter); 
                        result.b = SUCCESS; 
                    } else { 
                        result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                    } 
                } 
            } else { 
                result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
 
            } 
return result; 
        } 
if (type == TYPE_EMAIL_SERVER) { 
 
Message m = new Message(location, Message.SMTP, Server.authorize, 
MailServer.name); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamUsername, getUsername()); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamPassword, getPassword()); 
            queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
            Message response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("EmailClient"); 
if (response == null) { 
                result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
            } 
            String responseCommand = response.getCommand(); 
if (responseCommand.equals(Server.authorizeSuccess)) { 








                m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                m.setParameter(MailServer.listParameter, recordName); 
                queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("EmailClient"); 
if (response == null) { 
                    result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(MailServer.listResponse)) { 
 
                    RecordsCollection rc = new RecordsCollection(); 
                    
rc.addRecord(response.getParameterRecord(MailServer.listParameter),recordName); 
                    result.a = rc; 
//response.getParameterRecordCollection(MailServer.listParameter); 
result.b = SUCCESS; 
                } else { 
                    result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                } 
            } else { 
                result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
 
            } 
return result; 
        } 
 
if (type == TYPE_WEB_SERVER) { 
            Message m = new Message(location, Message.HTTP, WebServer.authorize, 
WebServer.name); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamUsername, getUsername()); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamPassword, getPassword()); 
            queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
            Message response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("Browser"); 
if (response == null) { 
                result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
            } 
            String responseCommand = response.getCommand(); 
if (responseCommand.equals(Server.authorizeSuccess)) { 
if (recordToWrite==null) { 
                    m = new Message(location, Message.HTTP, 
WebServer.listCommand, WebServer.name); 
                    m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                    m.setParameter(MailServer.listParameter, recordName); 
                    queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                    response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("Browser"); 
if (response == null) { 
                        result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                    } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(MailServer.listResponse)) { 
                        result.a = 
response.getParameterRecordCollection(WebServer.listParameter); 
                        result.b = SUCCESS; 
                    } else { 







                    } 
                } else{ 
 
                    m = new Message(location, Message.HTTP, 
WebServer.saveCommand, WebServer.name); 
                    m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                    m.setParameter(WebServer.saveParameter, recordName); 
                    m.setParameter(WebServer.saveParameterRecord, recordName); 
                    queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                    response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("Browser"); 
if (response == null) { 
                        result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                    } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(WebServer.saveResponse)) { 
                        result.a = 
response.getParameterRecordCollection(WebServer.saveParameter); 
                        result.b = SUCCESS; 
                    } else { 
                        result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                    } 
                } 
            } else { 
                result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
 
            } 
return result; 
 
        } 
 
if (type == TYPE_VERSION_CONTROL_SERVER) { 
            Message m = new Message(location, Message.HTTP, Server.authorize, 
SourceCodeServer.name); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamUsername, getUsername()); 
            m.setParameter(Server.authorizeParamPassword, getPassword()); 
            queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
            Message response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("CVS client"); 
if (response == null) { 
                result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
            } 
            String responseCommand = response.getCommand(); 
if (responseCommand.equals(Server.authorizeSuccess)) { 
if (recordToWrite==null) { 
                    m = new Message(location, Message.HTTP, 
SourceCodeServer.listCommand, SourceCodeServer.name); 
                    m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                    m.setParameter(MailServer.listParameter, recordName); 
                    queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                    response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("CVS client"); 
if (response == null) { 
                        result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                    } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(MailServer.listResponse)) { 








                        result.b = SUCCESS; 
                    } else { 
                        result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                    } 
                } else{ 
 
                    m = new Message(location, Message.HTTP, 
SourceCodeServer.saveCommand, SourceCodeServer.name); 
                    m.setSessionID(response.getSessionID()); 
                    
m.setParameter(SourceCodeServer.saveParameterRecordName,subrecordName); 
                    m.setParameter(SourceCodeServer.saveParameterFileName, 
recordName); 
                    m.setParameter(SourceCodeServer.saveParameterRecord, 
recordToWrite); 
                    queryOriginLocation.getOs().sendMessage(m, false); 
                    response = 
queryOriginLocation.getOs().listenAtSpecificPort("CVS client"); 
if (response == null) { 
                        result.b = TIMEOUT; 
return result; 
                    } 
if (response.getCommand().equals(SourceCodeServer.saveResponse)) { 
                        result.a = 
response.getParameterRecordCollection(SourceCodeServer.saveParameterRecord); 
                        result.b = SUCCESS; 
                    } else { 
                        result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
                    } 
                } 
            } else { 
                result.b = GENERAL_FAILURE; 
 
            } 
return result; 
 
        } 
 
return new Pair(null, GENERAL_FAILURE); 
    } 
 
public CompUnit getLocation() { 
return location; 
    } 
 
public int getType() { 
return type; 

















public class DataSourceGetResult extends Pair<Record,Integer> { 
 
public DataSourceGetResult(Pair<Record,Integer> copy){ 
if (copy!=null) { 
a = copy.a; 
b = copy.b; 
        }   else throw new NullPointerException(); 
    } 
 
public Record getRecord(){ 
return this.a; 
    } 
 
public Integer getStatus(){ 
return this.b; 











 * Created by root on 14/06/2015. 
 */ 
public class DataSourceGetResults  { 
 
    LinkedList<DataSourceGetResult>results = null; 
 
public DataSourceGetResults(){ 
results = new LinkedList<>(); 
    }; 
 
public DataSourceGetResults(LinkedList<DataSourceGetResult> copy){ 
results = copy; 
    } 
 
public boolean wasCallSuccess(){ 
if (results==null) return false; 
if (results.size()==0) { 
throw new NullPointerException();//not supposed to happen 
//            return false; 
} 
        DataSourceGetResult dataSourceGetResult = results.getLast(); 
if (dataSourceGetResult==null) { 
throw new NullPointerException();//not supposed to happen 
//            return false; 
} 
return dataSourceGetResult.getStatus()==DataSource.SUCCESS; 
    } 
 
public void add(DataSourceGetResult result){ 
results.add(result); 








public void add(Pair<Record, Integer> p){ 
results.add(new DataSourceGetResult(p)); 
    } 
 
public Record getLastRecord(){ 
if (results!=null&&results.size()>0) return results.getLast().a; 
return null; 








 * Created by root on 26/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class FileWithRecordsextends RecordsCollection{ 
    String filename; 
    CompUnit location; 
 
public String getFilename() { 
return filename; 
    } 
 
public CompUnit getLocation() { 
return location; 
    } 
 
public FileWithRecords(String filename,CompUnit location) { 
super(); 
this.filename = filename; 
this.location = location; 
        location.getOs().createNewFile(this); 



















 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 








private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Message.class); 
 
    CompUnit from; 
    CompUnit to; 
    String fromPort; 
    NetworkingInterface currentLocation; 
int messageType; 
    String stringContent; 
    LinkedList<NetworkingInterface>path; 
    Iterator<NetworkingInterface>traversing; 
    NamedEnvironment<Object>messageParameters = new NamedEnvironment<Object>(); 
public boolean failedToBeDelivered = false; 
public boolean noRouteForMessage = false; 
public boolean encrypted = false; 
    String command; 
    String targetName; 
    String name = ((Float)(Random.getNext())).toString(); 
    String sessionID = null; 
    Record primaryParam = null; 
 
public static final int HTTP = 1; 
public static final int HTTPS = 2; 
public static final int FTP = 3; 
public static final int SFTP = 4; 
public static final int ICMP = 5; 
public static final int SSH = 6; 
public static final int SMTP = 7; 
 
 
public boolean traverse(){ 
if (currentLocation==null) { 
traversing = path.iterator(); 
        } 
if (!traversing.hasNext()) { 
return false; 
        } 
 
 
currentLocation = traversing.next(); 
 
logger.trace("current message location:"+currentLocation); 
return true; 
    } 
 
public CompUnit getFrom() { 
return from; 
    } 
 
public void setFrom(CompUnit from) { 
this.from = from; 
    } 
 
public CompUnit getTo() { 
return to; 
    } 
 
public void setTo(CompUnit to) { 
this.to = to; 








public int getMessageType() { 
return messageType; 
    } 
 
public void setMessageType(int messageType) { 









            } 
        } 
    } 
 
public Message() { 
    } 
 
public Message(CompUnit to) { 
        setTo(to); 
    } 
 
public Message(CompUnit to, int messageType) { 
this(to); 
        setMessageType(messageType); 
    } 
 
public Message(CompUnit to, int messageType, String command) { 
this(to, messageType); 
        setCommand(command); 
    } 
 
public Message(CompUnit to, int messageType, String command, String targetName) { 
this(to, messageType, command); 
        setTargetName(targetName); 
    } 
 
public Message(CompUnit to, int messageType, String command, String targetName, 
String fromPort) { 
this(to, messageType, command, targetName); 
        setFromPort(fromPort); 
    } 
 
public NetworkingInterface getCurrentLocation() { 
return currentLocation; 
    } 
 
public void setCurrentLocation(NetworkingInterface currentLocation) { 
this.currentLocation = currentLocation; 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> getPath() { 
return path; 
    } 
 







this.path = path; 
traversing = path.iterator(); 
currentLocation = path.getFirst(); 
    } 
 
public Iterator<NetworkingInterface> getTraversing() { 
return traversing; 
    } 
 
public void setTraversing(Iterator<NetworkingInterface> traversing) { 
this.traversing = traversing; 
    } 
 
public String getStringContent() { 
return stringContent; 
    } 
 
public void setStringContent(String stringContent) { 
this.stringContent = stringContent; 
    } 
 
public String getCommand() { 
return command; 
    } 
 
public void setCommand(String command) { 
this.command = command; 
    } 
 
public String getTargetName() { 
return targetName; 
    } 
 
public void setTargetName(String targetName) { 
this.targetName = targetName; 
    } 
 
public boolean isParameterPresent(String name){ 
return messageParameters.isObjectPresent(name); 
    } 
 
public String getParameterString(String name){ 
return (String) messageParameters.getObject(name); 
    } 
 
public Record getParameterRecord(String name){ 
return (Record) messageParameters.getObject(name); 
    } 
 
public RecordsCollection getParameterRecordCollection(String name){ 
return (RecordsCollection) messageParameters.getObject(name); 
    } 
 
public void setParameter(String name, String value){ 
messageParameters.addObject(value, name); 
    } 
 
public void setParameter(String name, StringRecord value){ 
messageParameters.addObject(value.getValue(), name); 







    } 
 
public void setParameter(String name, Record value){ 
messageParameters.addObject(value, name); 
        value.addReference("Message:"+name,this); 
//        int a=0; 
//        a++; 
} 
 
public void setParameter(String name, RecordsCollection value){ 
messageParameters.addObject(value, name); 
        value.addReferences("Message:"+name,this); 
    } 
 
public NamedEnvironment<Object> getMessageParameters() { 
return messageParameters; 
    } 
 
public Object getParameter(String name){ 
return messageParameters.getObject(name); 
    } 
 
public boolean removeParameter(String name){ 
return messageParameters.removeObject(name); 
    } 
 
public String getFromPort() { 
return fromPort; 
    } 
 
public void setFromPort(String fromPort) { 
this.fromPort = fromPort; 
    } 
 
public String getSessionID() { 
return sessionID; 
    } 
 
public void setSessionID(String sessionID) { 
this.sessionID = sessionID; 













 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class RecordsCollection { 








public Record getRecord(String recordName){ 
return records.get(recordName); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(Record r, String name){ 
records.put(name,r); 
        r.addReferenceWithRandomizedName(this); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(Record r){ 
        String name = Random.getNewID(); 
        addRecord(r,name); 
    } 
 
public void addReferences(String prename, Object referringObject){ 
for(String s:records.keySet()) 
records.get(s).addReference(prename+Random.getNewID(),referringObject); 
    } 
 
public boolean removeReference(String name, Record r) { 
        Record o = records.remove(name); 
if (o == null) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, Record> e : records.entrySet()) { 
if (r == e.getValue()) { 
records.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
return false; 
        } else { 
return true; 
        } 
    } 
 
public boolean removeReference(Record r) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, Record> e : records.entrySet()) { 
if (r == e.getValue()) { 
records.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
public String getNameOfRecord(Record r){ 
for(String s:records.keySet()){ 
if (records.get(s)==r) return s; 
        } 
return null; 
    } 
 
public Set<String> getRecordNames(){ 
return records.keySet(); 
    } 
 
public Record getFirstRecord(){ 
















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class DoubleRecord extends Record<Double> { 
public DoubleRecord(Double newData,String recordName) { 
super(newData, recordName); 










 * Created by root on 27/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class EmailRecord extends Record { 
    String from; 
    String to; 
    String body; 
    EmailRecord copyOf = null; 
    MailServer stored; 






boolean deleted = false; 
boolean spamChecked = false; 
boolean antivirusChecked = false; 
boolean dataLossPreventionChecked = false; 
    LinkedList<Record>attachments = null; 
 
public EmailRecord(String recordName) { 
super(null,recordName); 
    } 
 
public String getFrom() { 
return from; 
    } 
 
public void setFrom(String from) { 
this.from = from; 
    } 
 
public String getTo() { 
return to; 








public void setTo(String to) { 
this.to = to; 
    } 
 
public String getBody() { 
return body; 
    } 
 
public void setBody(String body) { 
this.body = body; 
    } 
 
public EmailRecord getCopyOf() { 
return copyOf; 
    } 
 
public void setCopyOf(EmailRecord copyOf) { 
this.copyOf = copyOf; 
        copyOf.incorporateRecord(this); 
    } 
 
public MailServer getStored() { 
return stored; 
    } 
 
public void setStored(MailServer stored) { 
this.stored = stored; 
    } 
 
public MailServer getSent() { 
return sent; 
    } 
 
public void setSent(MailServer sent) { 
this.sent = sent; 
    } 
 
public long getTimeReceived() { 
return timeReceived; 
    } 
 
public void setTimeReceived(long timeReceived) { 
this.timeReceived = timeReceived; 
    } 
 
public long getTimeSent() { 
return timeSent; 
    } 
 
public void setTimeSent(long timeSent) { 
this.timeSent = timeSent; 
    } 
 
public boolean isSpamChecked() { 
return spamChecked; 
    } 
 
public void setSpamChecked(boolean spamChecked) { 
this.spamChecked = spamChecked; 








public boolean isAntivirusChecked() { 
return antivirusChecked; 
    } 
 
public void setAntivirusChecked(boolean antivirusChecked) { 
this.antivirusChecked = antivirusChecked; 
    } 
 
public boolean isDataLossPreventionChecked() { 
return dataLossPreventionChecked; 
    } 
 
public void setDataLossPreventionChecked(boolean dataLossPreventionChecked) { 
this.dataLossPreventionChecked = dataLossPreventionChecked; 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<Record> getAttachments() { 
return attachments; 
    } 
 
public void addAttachment(Record attachment) { 
if (attachments==null) attachments = new LinkedList<>(); 
this.attachments.add(attachment); 
this.incorporateRecord(attachment); 
        attachment.addReferenceWithRandomizedName(this); 
    } 
 
public void addReference(String name, Object reference) { 
if (references.containsValue(reference)) return;//infinite recursion prevention 
if attaching email record to itself at some point 
super.addReference(name,reference); 
for(Record r: attachments) 
            r.addReference(name,reference); 








 * Created by root on 27/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class EmailRecordClass extends Record<EmailRecord> { 
public EmailRecordClass(EmailRecord er,String recordName){ 
super(er,recordName); 






 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class IntegerRecord extends Record<Integer> { 





















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Record<T> { 
public static LinkedList<Record>globalList = new LinkedList<>(); 
public String recordName; 
T data; 
/** 
     * Existing references to this record 
     */ 
public HashMap<String, Object>references = new HashMap<String, Object>(); 
 
/** 
     * Damage to security if stolen 
     */ 
Double securityValue = 0d; 
 
    LinkedList<Record>recordsIncorporatedIntoThisRecord = new LinkedList<>(); 
 
public void addReference(String name, Object reference) { 
if (references.containsValue(reference)) return;//infinite recursion prevention 
if record incorporates itself 
references.put(name, reference); 
for(Record r: recordsIncorporatedIntoThisRecord) 
            r.addReference(name,reference); 
    } 
 
public HashMap<String, Object> getReferences() { 
return references; 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<Record> getRecordsIncorporatedIntoThisRecord() { 
return recordsIncorporatedIntoThisRecord; 
    } 
 
public void addReferenceWithRandomizedName(String prename,Object reference){ 
        addReference(prename+ Random.getNewID(),reference); 
    } 
 
public void addReferenceWithRandomizedName(Object reference){ 
        addReferenceWithRandomizedName("",reference); 
    } 
 
public Record(T newData, String recordName){ 







this.recordName = recordName; 
globalList.add(this); 
    } 
 
public boolean removeReference(String name, Object reference) { 
        Object o = references.remove(name); 
if (o == null) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, Object> e : references.entrySet()) { 
if (reference == e.getValue()) { 
references.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
return false; 
        } else { 
return true; 
        } 
    } 
 
public boolean removeReference(Object reference) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, Object> e : references.entrySet()) { 
if (reference == e.getValue()) { 
references.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
public T getValue(){ 
return data; 
    } 
 
public void incorporateRecord(Record r){ 
this.recordsIncorporatedIntoThisRecord.add(r); 
        r.addReference("Incorporated at:"+ 
ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime(),this); 
    } 
 
public boolean hasReference(Object obj){ 
for(Map.Entry<String,Object> en:references.entrySet()){ 
if (en.getValue()==obj) return true; 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
 
public Double getSecurityValue() { 
return securityValue; 
    } 
 
public void setSecurityValue(Double securityValue) { 
this.securityValue = securityValue*2;//2 is a current "price" 
} 
 
public String toString(){ 
if (recordName!=null) return recordName; 














 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class StringRecord extends Record<String> { 
public StringRecord(String value,String recordName){ 
super(value,recordName); 








 * Created by root on 26/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class UserRecord { 
    String username; 
    String password; 
    String roleName; 
 
public String getUsername() { 
return username; 
    } 
 
public void setUsername(String username) { 
this.username = username; 
    } 
 
public String getPassword() { 
return password; 
    } 
 
public void setPassword(String password) { 
this.password = password; 
    } 
 
public String getRoleName() { 
return roleName; 
    } 
 
public void setRoleName(String roleName) {   
this.roleName = roleName; 
    } 
 
public UserRecord(String username, String password, String roleName) { 
this.username = username; 
this.password = password; 
this.roleName = roleName; 














 * Created by root on 26/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class UserRecordClass extends Record<UserRecord>{ 
public UserRecordClass(UserRecord record,String recordName){ 
super(record,recordName); 










 * Created by root on 19/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Locationimplements Entity { 
    String name; 
    LinkedList<Object>objectsItHolds = new LinkedList<Object>(); 
    LinkedList<Location>nearbyLocations = new LinkedList<Location>(); 
 
public Location(String name) { 
this.name = name; 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<Object> getObjectsItHolds() { 
return objectsItHolds; 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<Location> getNearbyLocations() { 
return nearbyLocations; 
    } 
 
public void addObjectToLocation(Object object){ 
objectsItHolds.add(object); 
    } 
 
public boolean removeObjectFromLocation(Object object){ 
return objectsItHolds.remove(object); 















 * Created by root on 09/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class CustomerRole extends Role { 
 
static ProcessTree processTree; 
static{ 
processTree = new ProcessTree("CustomerProcessTree"); 
 
    } 
 
public CustomerRole(Location location) { 
super(location); 
























import static CA.Processes.TaskResult.TASK_STATUS_FAILURE; 
import static CA.Processes.TaskResult.TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS; 
 
/** 
 * Created by root on 09/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class DeveloperRole extends Role { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(DeveloperRole.class); 
public ProcessTree processTree; 
 
static int a = 0; 
 
 
public void setEnvironmentVariables(Focus f) { 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseOneMandatoryProblem = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseOneMandatoryProblem.addRecord(Main.docA, "docA"); 
        phaseOneMandatoryProblem.addRecord(Main.headerA, "headerA"); 








        RecordsCollection phaseOneBeneficialProblem = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseOneBeneficialProblem.addRecord(Main.methodA, "methodA"); 
        phaseOneBeneficialProblem.addRecord(Main.docB, "docB"); 
        phaseOneBeneficialProblem.addRecord(Main.headerB, "headerB"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseOneBeneficialProblem", phaseOneBeneficialProblem); 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseTwoMandatoryProblem = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseTwoMandatoryProblem.addRecord(Main.docD, "docD"); 
        phaseTwoMandatoryProblem.addRecord(Main.headerD, "headerD"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseTwoMandatoryProblem", phaseTwoMandatoryProblem); 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseTwoBeneficialProblem = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseTwoBeneficialProblem.addRecord(Main.docC, "docC"); 
        phaseTwoBeneficialProblem.addRecord(Main.headerC, "headerC"); 
        phaseTwoBeneficialProblem.addRecord(Main.methodD, "methodD"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseTwoBeneficialProblem", phaseTwoBeneficialProblem); 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseOneMandatoryWrite = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseOneMandatoryWrite.addRecord(Main.headerA, "headerA"); 
        phaseOneMandatoryWrite.addRecord(Main.methodA, "methodA"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseOneMandatoryWrite", phaseOneMandatoryWrite); 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseOneBeneficialWrite = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseOneBeneficialWrite.addRecord(Main.docA, "docA"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseOneBeneficialWrite", phaseOneBeneficialWrite); 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseTwoMandatoryWrite = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseTwoMandatoryWrite.addRecord(Main.headerD, "headerD"); 
        phaseTwoMandatoryWrite.addRecord(Main.methodD, "methodD"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseTwoMandatoryWrite", phaseTwoMandatoryWrite); 
 
        RecordsCollection phaseTwoBeneficialWrite = new RecordsCollection(); 
        phaseTwoBeneficialWrite.addRecord(Main.docD, "docD"); 
        f.setVariable("phaseTwoBeneficialWrite", phaseTwoBeneficialWrite); 
 
        Double docARead = 0d; 
        Double headerARead = 0d; 
        Double methodARead = 0d; 
        Double docBRead = 0d; 
        Double headerBRead = 0d; 
        Double methodBRead = 0d; 
        Double docCRead = 0d; 
        Double headerCRead = 0d; 
        Double methodCRead = 0d; 
        Double docDRead = 0d; 
        Double headerDRead = 0d; 
        Double methodDRead = 0d; 
 
        f.setVariable("docA", docARead); 
        f.setVariable("headerA", headerARead); 
        f.setVariable("methodA", methodARead); 
        f.setVariable("docB", docBRead); 
        f.setVariable("headerB", headerBRead); 
        f.setVariable("methodB", methodBRead); 
        f.setVariable("docC", docCRead); 
        f.setVariable("headerC", headerCRead); 
        f.setVariable("methodC", methodCRead); 
        f.setVariable("docD", docDRead); 
        f.setVariable("headerD", headerDRead); 








        f.setVariable("docARecord", Main.docA); 
        f.setVariable("headerARecord", Main.headerA); 
        f.setVariable("methodARecord", Main.methodA); 
        f.setVariable("docBRecord", Main.docB); 
        f.setVariable("headerBRecord", Main.headerB); 
        f.setVariable("methodBRecord", Main.methodB); 
        f.setVariable("docCRecord", Main.docC); 
        f.setVariable("headerCRecord", Main.headerC); 
        f.setVariable("methodCRecord", Main.methodC); 
        f.setVariable("docDRecord", Main.docD); 
        f.setVariable("headerDRecord", Main.headerD); 
        f.setVariable("methodDRecord", Main.methodD); 
 
        f.setVariable("partOneProblemDone", false); 
        f.setVariable("partTwoProblemDone", false); 
        f.setVariable("partOneCodeDone", false); 
        f.setVariable("partTwoCodeDone", false); 
    } 
 
public double calculateProblemSolutionProbabilityPhaseOne(Focus f, CompUnit 
location, Task t, String mandatoryRecordCollectionName, String 
optionalRecordCollectionName) { 
double count = 0; 
double res = 0; 
        RecordsCollection rcM = (RecordsCollection) 
f.getVariable(mandatoryRecordCollectionName); 
for (String s : rcM.getRecordNames()) { 
            DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) t.getParent(); 
            Record r = rcM.getRecord(s); 
            Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, location); 
            Double d = (Double) f.getVariable(s); 
if (d != null) { 
if (d <0) d = 0d; 
if (d >1) d = 1d; 
                res += d; 
if (d == 0) return 0; 
            } 
            count++; 
        } 
 
        RecordsCollection rcB = (RecordsCollection) 
f.getVariable(optionalRecordCollectionName); 
for (String s : rcB.getRecordNames()) { 
            DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) t.getParent(); 
            Record r = rcB.getRecord(s); 
            Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, location); 
            Double d = (Double) f.getVariable(s); 
if (d != null) { 
if (d <0) d = 0d; 
if (d >1) d = 1d; 
                res += d; 
            } 
            count++; 
        } 
return res / count; 
    } 
 
/** 







     * 
     * @param f 
* @param location 
* @param t 
* @param recordName 
* @return 
*/ 
public boolean updateReadRecord(Focus f, CompUnit location, Task t, String 
recordName) { 
        DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) t.getParent(); 
        Record r = (Record) f.getVariable(recordName + "Record"); 
boolean recordIsThere = Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, location); 
if (recordIsThere) { 
            Double d = (Double) f.getVariable(recordName); 
if (d <0) d = 0d; 
if (d >1) d = 1d; 
if (d == null || d == 0) { 
                d = 0.45d; 
                d += Random.getNext() / 10;//0.5+-0.05 
} else { 
double mul = 0.55d; 
                mul += Random.getNext() / 10;//1-(1-d)*(0.6+-0.05) 
d = 1 - (1 - d) * mul; 
            } 
            f.setVariable(recordName, d); 
        } 
return recordIsThere; 
    } 
 
public DeveloperRole(Location location) { 
super(location); 
 
processTree = new ProcessTree("DeveloperProcessTree"); 
 
        Task setEnvironment = new Task("SetEnvironment", 10, this) {//done 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
 
                setEnvironmentVariables(f); 
 
if (role.unitForWork == null) { 
for (Object o : role.location.getObjectsItHolds()) { 
if (o instanceof CompUnit) { 
unitForWork = (CompUnit) o;//use the random one 
setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
return; 
                        } 
                    } 
                } 
if (unitForWork == null) //first find any nearby CompUnit 
setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess()) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "getTask"); 
                } 
return findTask(nextNodes, "TaskDone"); 








            ; 
        }; 
 
        Task getTask = new Task("GetTask", 1000 * 60 * 3, this) {//done 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
 
                DataSourceGetResults results = 
DataSource.getRecordWithErrorHandling(role, role.unitForWork, Main.projectTask); 
if (results.wasCallSuccess()) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
                    FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp\\ProjectTask"); 
                    fwr.addRecord(results.getLastRecord(), "ProjectTask"); 
return; 
                } else { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
                } 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess()) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ProblemSpecification"); 
                } 
if (taskList.count() >2 && 
                        !taskList.wasCallSuccess(0) && 
taskList.wasLastTaskNamed("getTask", 0) && 
                        !taskList.wasCallSuccess(1) && 
taskList.wasLastTaskNamed("getTask", 1)) 
return findTask(nextNodes, "taskDone"); 
 
return findTask(nextNodes, "getTask");//otherwise just repeat 
} 
        };//done 
 
Task problemSpecification = new Task("ProblemSpecification", 15 * 60 * 1000, 
this) {//done 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
//task consists of two parts, 
                // first one needs docA, headerA beneficial: methodA, docB, 
headerB 
                // second one needs docD, headerD beneficial:docC, headerC, 
methodD 
DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
                Boolean b1 = (Boolean) f.getVariable("partOneProblemDone"); 
                Boolean b2 = (Boolean) f.getVariable("partTwoProblemDone"); 
if (!b1) {//if part one was not done 
double d = calculateProblemSolutionProbabilityPhaseOne(f, role.unitForWork, this, 
"phaseOneMandatoryProblem", "phaseOneBeneficialProblem"); 
if (d >0) { 
double r = Random.getNext(); 
if (d > r) { 
logger.info("first problem solved"); 
                            f.setVariable("partOneProblemDone", true); 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem just got 
solved 
return; 







logger.info("solving problem failed with probability:"+d); 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem was not 
solved, but there is a chance that it would 
return; 
                        } 
                    } else { 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE);//no chance problem was 
solved 
return; 
                    } 
                } else {//if part one was done 
if (!b2) {//if part two was done 
double d = calculateProblemSolutionProbabilityPhaseOne(f, role.unitForWork, this, 
"phaseTwoMandatoryProblem", "phaseTwoBeneficialProblem"); 
if (d >0) { 
double r = Random.getNext(); 
if (d > r) { 
logger.info("second problem solved"); 
                                f.setVariable("partTwoProblemDone", true); 
                                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem just got 
solved 
return; 
                            } else { 
logger.info("solving problem failed with probability:"+d); 
                                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem was not 
solved, but there is a chance that it would 
return; 
                            } 
                        } else { 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE);//no chance problem 
was solved 
return; 
                        } 
                    } else { 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//part one and two 
analysis are done, we dont need to do anything 
return; 
                    } 
                } 
 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
if 
(taskList.wasCallSuccess()&&f.getBooleanVariable("partOneProblemDone")&&!f.getBoo
leanVariable("partOneCodeDone")) {//if we can continue to writing code - go there 
return findTask(nextNodes, "WriteCode"); 
                } 
if 
(taskList.wasCallSuccess()&&f.getBooleanVariable("partTwoProblemDone")&&!f.getBoo
leanVariable("partTwoCodeDone")) {//if we can continue to writing code - go there 
return findTask(nextNodes, "WriteCode"); 












return findTask(nextNodes, "WriteCode"); 
                } 
 
double d = Random.getNext(); 
if (d >0.4) 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ReadDocumentation"); 
else 
                    return findTask(nextNodes, "ReadCode"); 
            } 
        }; 
 
        Task writeCode = new Task("WriteCode", 10 * 60 * 1000, this) { 
 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
//task consists of two parts, 
                // first one needs headerA,methodA beneficial: docA 
                // second one needs headerD, methodD beneficial: docD 
 
DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
                Boolean b1 = (Boolean) f.getVariable("partOneCodeDone"); 
                Boolean b2 = (Boolean) f.getVariable("partTwoCodeDone"); 
if (!b1) {//if part one was not done 
if (!f.getBooleanVariable("partOneProblemDone")){ 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE);//no chance this piece of 
code could be written before the solution is created 
return; 
                    } 
double d = calculateProblemSolutionProbabilityPhaseOne(f, role.unitForWork, this, 
"phaseOneMandatoryWrite", "phaseOneBeneficialWrite"); 
if (d >0) { 
double r = Random.getNext(); 
if (d > r) { 
                            Main.methodANew = new StringRecord("CREATE TABLE 
new_tbl SELECT * FROM orig_tbl where id > 100","methodANew"); 
                            f.setVariable("methodANew", Main.methodANew); 
                            FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp1.tmp"); 
                            fwr.addRecord(Main.methodANew); 
                            RiskCollection.addProductivityRisk(-3); 
logger.info("first piece of code written"); 
                            f.setVariable("partOneCodeDone", true); 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem just got 
solved 
return; 
                        } else { 
logger.info("writing code failed with probability:"+d); 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem was not 
solved, but there is a chance that it would 
return; 
                        } 
                    } else { 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE);//no chance problem was 
solved 
return; 
                    } 
                } else {//if part one was done 
if (!b2) {//if part two was done 
if (!f.getBooleanVariable("partTwoProblemDone")){ 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE);//no chance this piece 








                        } 
double d = calculateProblemSolutionProbabilityPhaseOne(f, role.unitForWork, this, 
"phaseTwoMandatoryWrite", "phaseTwoBeneficialWrite"); 
if (d >0) { 
double r = Random.getNext(); 
if (d > r) { 
                                Main.headerDNew = new StringRecord("public static 
void main(String[] args, String name)","headerDNew"); 
                                f.setVariable("headerDNew", Main.headerDNew); 
                                FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp2.tmp"); 
                                fwr.addRecord(Main.headerDNew); 
 
                                Main.methodDNew = new 
StringRecord("System.out.println(\"test\");System.exit(0)","methodDNew"); 
                                f.setVariable("methodDNew", Main.methodDNew); 
                                fwr.addRecord(Main.methodDNew); 
                                RiskCollection.addProductivityRisk(-5); 
logger.info("second piece of code written"); 
                                f.setVariable("partTwoCodeDone", true); 
                                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem just got 
solved 
return; 
                            } else { 
logger.info("writing code failed with probability:"+d); 
                                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//problem was not 
solved, but there is a chance that it would 
return; 
                            } 
                        } else { 
                            setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE);//no chance problem 
was solved 
return; 
                        } 
                    } else { 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS);//part one and two 
analysis are done, we dont need to do anything 
return; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess() && 
f.getBooleanVariable("partOneCodeDone")&&!f.getBooleanVariable("partOneCodeSubmit
ted")) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "SubmitCode"); 
                } 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess() && 
f.getBooleanVariable("partTwoCodeDone")&&!f.getBooleanVariable("partTwoCodeSubmit
ted")) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "SubmitCode"); 
                } 
if (f.getBooleanVariable("partTwoCodeDone")) {//should be covered by previous if 
statement 







                } 
 
if (!f.getBooleanVariable("partTwoProblemDone")){ 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ProblemSpecification"); 
                } 
 
if (!taskList.wasCallSuccess()){ 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ProblemSpecification"); 
                } 
 
double d = Random.getNext(); 
if (d >0.7) 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ReadDocumentation"); 
else 
                    return findTask(nextNodes, "ReadCode"); 
//  return findTask(nextNodes, "ProblemSpecification"); 
} 
        }; 
 
 
        Task submitCode = new Task("SubmitCode", 2 * 60 * 1000, this) { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
boolean stageOneDone = (boolean) f.getVariable("partOneCodeDone"); 
boolean stageTwoDone = (boolean) f.getVariable("partTwoCodeDone"); 
 




Record r = null; 
 
 
if (stageOneDone && !stageTwoDone) { 
                    LinkedList<Locator> loc = Locator.getRecordsLocations(role, 
Main.methodA,Main.buildServer); 
                    DataSource ds = loc.getFirst().getSource(); 
                    Pair<Record, Integer> p = 
ds.getRecordP("c:\\create_database.sql", role.unitForWork, (Record) 
f.getVariable("methodANew"), "MethodA1"); 
if (p.b == DataSource.SUCCESS) { 
                        f.setVariable("partOneCodeSubmitted",true); 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
                        RiskCollection.addProductivityRisk(-1); 
                    } else 
setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
 
if (stageOneDone && stageTwoDone) { 
                    LinkedList<Locator> loc = Locator.getRecordsLocations(role, 
Main.methodD,Main.buildServer); 
                    DataSource ds = loc.getFirst().getSource(); 
                    Pair<Record, Integer> p1 = 
ds.getRecordP("c:\\mobile_application.java", role.unitForWork, (Record) 
f.getVariable("headerDNew"), "HeaderD1"); 
                    Pair<Record, Integer> p2 = 
ds.getRecordP("c:\\mobile_application.java", role.unitForWork, (Record) 
f.getVariable("methodDNew"), "MethodD1"); 
 







                        f.setVariable("partTwoCodeSubmitted",true); 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
                        RiskCollection.addProductivityRisk(-2); 
                    } else 
setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
boolean stageTwoDone = (boolean) f.getVariable("partTwoCodeDone"); 
 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess()&&stageTwoDone) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "TestCodeAutomatically");} 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess()&&!stageTwoDone) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "WriteCode"); 
} 
 
return findTask(nextNodes, "TestCodeLocally"); 
            } 
        }; 
 
 
        Task testCodeAutomatically = new Task("TestCodeAutomatically", 60 * 1000, 
this) { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
if (Main.methodANew == null || !Locator.isRecordHere(((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()), Main.methodA, Main.buildServer)) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
if (Main.methodDNew == null || !Locator.isRecordHere(((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()), Main.methodDNew, Main.buildServer)) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
if (Main.headerDNew == null || !Locator.isRecordHere(((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()), Main.headerDNew, Main.buildServer)) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess()) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "TaskDone"); 
                } 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ProblemSpecification"); 
} 
        }; 
 
        Task testCodeLocally = new Task("TestCodeLocally", 60 * 1000, this) { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
if (Main.methodANew == null || !Locator.isRecordHere(((DeveloperRole) 








                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
if (Main.methodDNew == null || !Locator.isRecordHere(((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()), Main.methodDNew, ((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()).unitForWork)) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
if (Main.headerDNew == null || !Locator.isRecordHere(((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()), Main.headerDNew, ((DeveloperRole) 
this.getParent()).unitForWork)) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
return; 
                } 
                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
if (taskList.wasCallSuccess()) {//if ok, then continue 
return findTask(nextNodes, "TaskDone"); 
                } 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ProblemSpecification"); 
} 









        Task getCode = new Task("GetCode", 2 * 60 * 1000, this) { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
 
boolean gotSomethingNew = false; 
 
int recordsCount = 0; 
 
                Record[] recordsToGet = {Main.headerA, Main.methodA, 
Main.headerB, Main.methodB, Main.headerC, Main.methodC, Main.headerD, 
Main.methodD}; 
for (Record r : recordsToGet) 
if (!Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, role.unitForWork)) { 
                        DataSourceGetResults results = 
DataSource.getRecordWithErrorHandling(role, role.unitForWork, r); 
if (results.wasCallSuccess()) { 
                            String name = r.toString(); 
                            FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp\\" + name); 
                            fwr.addRecord(results.getLastRecord(), name); 
                            gotSomethingNew = true; 
                        } 
                    } else recordsCount++; 
 
 







                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
return; 
                } else { 
if (recordsCount == recordsToGet.length) 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
else 
setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
                } 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ReadCode");//default return point 
} 
        }; 
 
        Task readCode = new Task("ReadCode", 15 * 60 * 1000, this) { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 






                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
for (String s : args) 
                    updateReadRecord(f, role.unitForWork, this, s); 
                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
 
if (taskList.wasLastTaskNamed("GetCode", 1))//if we actually got something new 
and we were called from Read documentation we can return 
return findTask(nextNodes, callStack.getLastTask(2).getTaskName()); 
else 
                    return findTask(nextNodes, "GetCode"); 
            } 
        }; 
 
        Task getDocumentation = new Task("GetDocumentation", 10, this) { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
 
boolean gotSomethingNew = false; 
 
                Record r; 
int recordsCount = 0; 
 
                r = Main.docA; 
if (!Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, role.unitForWork)) { 
                    DataSourceGetResults resultsB1 = 
DataSource.getRecordWithErrorHandling(role, role.unitForWork, r); 
if (resultsB1.wasCallSuccess()) { 
                        String name = "DocA1"; 
                        FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp\\" + name); 
                        fwr.addRecord(resultsB1.getLastRecord(), name); 







                    } 
                } else recordsCount++; 
 
                r = Main.docB; 
if (!Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, role.unitForWork)) { 
                    DataSourceGetResults resultsB1 = 
DataSource.getRecordWithErrorHandling(role, role.unitForWork, r); 
if (resultsB1.wasCallSuccess()) { 
                        String name = "DocB1"; 
                        FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp\\" + name); 
                        fwr.addRecord(resultsB1.getLastRecord(), name); 
                        gotSomethingNew = true; 
                    } 
                } else recordsCount++; 
 
                r = Main.docC; 
if (!Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, role.unitForWork)) { 
                    DataSourceGetResults resultsB1 = 
DataSource.getRecordWithErrorHandling(role, role.unitForWork, r); 
if (resultsB1.wasCallSuccess()) { 
                        String name = "DocC1"; 
                        FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp\\" + name); 
                        fwr.addRecord(resultsB1.getLastRecord(), name); 
                        gotSomethingNew = true; 
                    } 
                } else recordsCount++; 
 
                r = Main.docD; 
if (!Locator.isRecordHere(role, r, role.unitForWork)) { 
                    DataSourceGetResults resultsB1 = 
DataSource.getRecordWithErrorHandling(role, role.unitForWork, r); 
if (resultsB1.wasCallSuccess()) { 
                        String name = "DocD1"; 
                        FileWithRecords fwr = 
role.unitForWork.getOs().createNewFile("c:\\temp\\" + name); 
                        fwr.addRecord(resultsB1.getLastRecord(), name); 
                        gotSomethingNew = true; 
                    } 
                } else recordsCount++; 
 
if (gotSomethingNew) { 
                    setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
return; 
                } else { 
if (recordsCount == 4) 
                        setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
else 
setStatus(TASK_STATUS_FAILURE); 
                } 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
return findTask(nextNodes, "ReadDocumentation"); 
            } 
        }; 
 








public void taskActions(Focus f) { 






                DeveloperRole role = (DeveloperRole) getParent(); 
for (String s : args) 
                    updateReadRecord(f, role.unitForWork, this, s); 
                setStatus(TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
if (taskList.wasLastTaskNamed("GetDocumentation", 1))//if we actually got 
something new and we were called from Read documentation we can return 
return findTask(nextNodes, callStack.getLastTask(2).getTaskName()); 
else 
                    return findTask(nextNodes, "GetDocumentation"); 
            } 
        }; 
 
 
Task taskDone = new Task("TaskDone") { 
public void taskActions(Focus f) { 
                RMS.modellingIsCompleted(); 
            } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults callStack, 
LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f) { 
for (TaskResult trP : taskList.getList()) 
logger.info(trP); 
                TaskResult tr = taskList.getLastTaskResult(1); 
if (tr.getStatus() == TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS && 
tr.getTask().isTaskNamed("TestCodeLocally")) { 
                    RiskCollection.addProductivityRisk(-2); 
                } 
 
if (tr.getStatus() == TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS && 
tr.getTask().isTaskNamed("TestCodeAutomatically")) { 
                    RiskCollection.addProductivityRisk(-5); 
                } 
return null; 
            } 
        }; 
 
 





        setEnvironment.addNextNode(getTask); 
 
        getTask.addNextNode(getTask); 
        getTask.addNextNode(taskDone); 








        problemSpecification.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        problemSpecification.addNextNode(readDocumentation); 
        problemSpecification.addNextNode(readCode); 
        problemSpecification.addNextNode(writeCode); 
 
        writeCode.addNextNode(submitCode); 
        writeCode.addNextNode(testCodeLocally); 
        writeCode.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        writeCode.addNextNode(writeCode); 
        writeCode.addNextNode(readCode); 
        writeCode.addNextNode(readDocumentation); 
 
        submitCode.addNextNode(testCodeLocally); 
        submitCode.addNextNode(testCodeAutomatically); 
        submitCode.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        submitCode.addNextNode(writeCode); 
 
        testCodeLocally.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        testCodeLocally.addNextNode(taskDone);//test was success, however code 
was not submitted and properly tested, developer needs to submit code manually 
and verify its consistency 
 
testCodeAutomatically.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        testCodeAutomatically.addNextNode(taskDone);//test was success 
 
getDocumentation.addNextNode(readDocumentation); 
        getCode.addNextNode(readCode); 
 
        readDocumentation.addNextNode(getDocumentation); 
        readDocumentation.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        readDocumentation.addNextNode(writeCode); 
 
        readCode.addNextNode(getCode); 
        readCode.addNextNode(problemSpecification); 
        readCode.addNextNode(writeCode); 


















 * Created by root on 09/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Role { 
    Location location; 







    CompUnit unitForWork = null; 
    HashMap<String, DataSource>dataSources = new HashMap<String, DataSource>(); 
 
 
public Role(Location location) { 
this.location = location; 
    } 
 
public Role(Location location, String roleName) { 
this(location); 
RoleName = roleName; 
    } 
 
public Location getLocation() { 
return location; 
    } 
 
public void setLocation(Location location) { 
this.location = location; 
    } 
 
public String getRoleName() { 
return RoleName; 
    } 
 
public void setRoleName(String roleName) { 
RoleName = roleName; 
    } 
 
public DataSource getDataSource(String name){ 
return dataSources.get(name); 
    } 
 
public void addDataSource(DataSource ds, String name){ 
dataSources.put(name,ds); 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<DataSource> getDataSourceWithCompUnit(CompUnit cu){ 
        LinkedList<DataSource> result = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(String s:dataSources.keySet()) 
if (dataSources.get(s).getLocation()==cu) result.add(dataSources.get(s)); 
return result; 
    } 
 
    LinkedList<Task>tasks = new LinkedList<>(); 
 
public LinkedList<Task> getTasks() { 
return tasks; 
    } 
 
public void addTask(Task task) { 
this.tasks.add(task); 
















 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Browserextends Component { 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Browser.class); 
 
public Browser(OperatingSystem systemComponentIsInstalledOn) { 
super(systemComponentIsInstalledOn); 
parent.addChild(this,"Browser"); 
    } 
 
@Override 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
logger.info("message has arrived to browser:"+m); 
return true; 
    } 
 
public void sendMessage(Message m) { 
parent.sendMessage(m,true); 
    } 
 
public void sendMessage(CompUnit target, int messageType, String command, String 
targetName){ 
        Message m = new Message(target,messageType,command,targetName); 
        sendMessage(m); 











 * Created by root on 12/04/2015. 
 */ 
public abstract class Component implements Entity { 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Component.class); 
    OperatingSystem parent; 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m){ 
logger.info("message has arrived to component:"+m); 
return false; 
    } 
 
public Component(OperatingSystem parent) { 
this.parent = parent; 
    } 
 





















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class DatabaseServer extends Server { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(DatabaseServer.class); 
static int t = 0; 
 
    HashMap<String, HashMap<String, Record>>data = new HashMap<String, 
HashMap<String, Record>>(); 
public static String name = "DatabaseServer"; 
 
public static String listCommand = "list"; 
public static String listParameter = "value"; 
public static String listResponse = "response"; 
public static String listFail = "not found"; 
 
public static String saveCommand = "save"; 
public static String saveParameter = "value"; 
public static String saveParameterRecord = "record"; 
public static String saveResponse = "saved"; 
public static String saveFail = "failed"; 
 
public DatabaseServer(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) { 
super(parent, passwordFile); 
        parent.addChild(this, name); 
    } 
 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
boolean bool = super.messageArrived(m); 
if (bool) return bool; 
if (sessions.containsKey(m.getSessionID())) { 
if (m.getCommand().equals(listCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                Record r = getRecord(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(listParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to locate requested record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 









logger.warn("located record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
if (m.getCommand().equals(saveCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
 
 




                Record r = getRecord(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(saveParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
saveFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to  save requested record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
saveResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
m.setParameter(saveResponse, r); 
logger.warn("saved record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
return false; 
    } 
 
    Record getRecord(String username, String recordName) { 
        HashMap<String, Record> records = data.get(username); 
if (records == null) return null; 
return records.get(recordName); 
    } 
 
    HashMap<String, Record> getRecords(String userName){ 
return  data.get(userName); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(String username, String recordName, Record r){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)){ 
data.put(username, new HashMap<>()); 
        } 
        HashMap<String, Record> records = data.get(username); 
        records.put(recordName,r); 
    } 
 
public Record removeRecord(String username, String recordName){ 




















 * Created by root on 12/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Firewall extends Component { 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Firewall.class); 
public static final String name = "Firewall"; 
private FirewallDecisionMaker dm = new FirewallDecisionMaker(); 
 
//    static int a=0; 
 
public Firewall(OperatingSystem parent) { 
super(parent); 
        parent.addChild(this,name); 
    } 
 
public void addNewPolicy(FirewallPolicy fp){ 
dm.addPolicy(fp); 
    } 
 
public boolean isAllowedToPass(Message m){ 
logger.debug("Firewall making decision"); 
boolean result = dm.allowAccess(m); 
if (result) 
logger.debug("Firewall granted access"); 
else 















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class FTPServer extends Server { 
 








static int t = 0; 
 
public static String name = "FTPServer"; 
public static String listCommand = "list"; 
public static String listParameter = "value"; 
public static String listParameterRecord = "recordToRead"; 
public static String listResponse = "response"; 
public static String listFail = "not found"; 
 
public static String saveCommand = "save"; 
public static String saveParameter = "value"; 
public static String saveParameterRecord = "recordToSave"; 
public static String saveFail = "not saved"; 
 




public FTPServer(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) { 
super(parent, passwordFile); 
dm = new ServerLocalAccessControl(true); 
        parent.addChild(this, name); 
    } 
 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
boolean bool = super.messageArrived(m); 
if (bool) return bool; 
if (sessions.containsKey(m.getSessionID())) { 
if (m.getCommand().equals(listCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                FileWithRecords fwr = getFile(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(listParameter)); 
 
if (fwr == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to locate requested record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
if (m.getParameter(listParameterRecord)!=null) { 
                        
response.setParameter(listParameter,fwr.getRecord((String) 
m.getParameter(listParameterRecord))); 
                    } else 
response.setParameter(listParameter, fwr); 
logger.info("located record for:" + m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
if (m.getCommand().equals(saveCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
 









                    fwr = 
parent.createNewFile(m.getParameterString(saveParameter)); 
                } 
                fwr.addRecord(m.getParameterRecord(saveParameterRecord)); 
 
if (fwr == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(),  responseType, 
saveFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to save record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
saveResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
response.setParameter(saveParameter, fwr); 
logger.info("saved record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
      } 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
    FileWithRecords getFile(String username, String recordName) { 
        HardDrive hd = getParent().getDrive(recordName); 
return hd.getRecords(recordName); 
    } 
 
public void addFile(String username, String recordName, FileWithRecords fwr){ 
        HardDrive hd = getParent().getDrive(recordName); 
        hd.addRecord(fwr,recordName); 
    } 
 
public FileWithRecords removeFile(String username, String recordName){ 
        HardDrive hd = getParent().getDrive(recordName); 
return hd.removeFile(recordName); 









 * Created by root on 11/06/2015. 
 */ 
public abstract class Listener extends Component{ 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Listener.class); 
 
public Listener(OperatingSystem parent) { 
super(parent); 
    } 
 







logger.debug("message has arrived to listener:"+m); 
        processMessage(m); 
return false; 
    } 
 
public void processMessage(Message m){ 
 














 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class MailServer extends Server { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(MailServer.class); 
static int t = 0; 
 




public static String name = "MailServer"; 
public static String listCommand = "list"; 
public static String listParameter = "value"; 
public static String listResponse = "response"; 
public static String listFail = "not found"; 
 
public MailServer(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) { 
super(parent, passwordFile); 
        parent.addChild(this, name); 
    } 
 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
boolean bool = super.messageArrived(m); 
if (bool) return bool; 
if (sessions.containsKey(m.getSessionID())) { 
if (m.getCommand().equals(listCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                Record r = getRecord(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(listParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listFail, m.getFromPort()); 









                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
response.setParameter(listParameter, r); 
logger.info("located record for:"+m+" param is:"+r+" response is:"+response); 
parent.sendMessage(response, false); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
return false; 
    } 
 
    Record getRecord(String username, String recordName) { 
        HashMap<String, EmailRecord> records = data.get(username); 
if (records == null) return null; 
return records.get(recordName); 
    } 
 
    HashMap<String, EmailRecord> getRecords(String userName){ 
return  data.get(userName); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(String username, String recordName, EmailRecord r){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)){ 
data.put(username, new HashMap<>()); 
        } 
        HashMap<String, EmailRecord> records = data.get(username); 
        records.put(recordName, r); 
        r.setStored(this); 
    } 
 
public Record removeRecord(String username, String recordName){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)) return null; 
return data.get(username).remove(recordName); 
    } 
 
public String findNameByRecord(EmailRecord er){ 
for(String userNames:data.keySet()) { 
            HashMap<String, EmailRecord> map = data.get(userNames); 
for(String s:map.keySet()) 
if (map.get(s)==er) return s; 
        } 
return null; 





























import static CA.lib.Lib.VERBOSE; 
 
/** 
 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class OperatingSystem implements Entity { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(OperatingSystem.class); 
    CompUnit runningOn; 
    HashMap<String,Component>children = new HashMap<String, Component>(); 
    HashMap<String, LinkedList<Object>>listeningThreads = new HashMap<String, 
LinkedList<Object>>(); 
public static final int READ_FILE=0; 
public static final int WRITE_FILE=1; 
public static final int EXECUTE_FILE=2; 
 
public Future<?> sendMessage(final Message m){ 
        m.setFrom(this.runningOn); 
logger.log(VERBOSE, ("sending message from:"+m.getFrom())+" to:"+m.getTo()); 
        m.setFrom(runningOn); 
        LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> nis = runningOn.getNetworkConnections(); 
for (final NetworkingInterface ni:nis) { 
final LinkedList<NetworkingInterface> path = ni.buildPath(m.getFrom(), 
m.getTo()); 
if (path!=null){ 
                m.setPath(path); 
                Runnable r = new Runnable() { 
@Override 




if (m.getCurrentLocation().getInstalledOn().getOs().canMessagePass(m)) { 
 
                                
ActionsQueue.currentQueue.addNewEvent(ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime() 
+ 1); 
logger.log(VERBOSE, "passing node:" + m.getCurrentLocation()); 
                            } else{ 
logger.warn("message was not allowed to pass:" + m); 
break; 
                            } 
}while (m.traverse()); 
if (m.getCurrentLocation().getConnectedTo().getInstalledOn().equals(m.getTo())) { 










                        } 
                    } 
                }; 
return ActionsQueue.currentQueue.start(r); 
            } else 
{ 
                m.failedToBeDelivered = true; 
                m.noRouteForMessage=true; 
            } 
 
        } 
return null; 
    } 
 
public void passToListeners(Message m){ 
for(String name:children.keySet()){ 
            Component c = children.get(name); 
if (c instanceof Listener){ 
                ((Listener) c).messageArrived(m); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
 
public Future<?> sendMessage(final Message m, boolean wait){ 
        Future<?> f = sendMessage(m); 
if (wait) 
try { 
                    f.get(); 
                } catch (InterruptedException | ExecutionException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 




public boolean canMessagePass(Message m){ 
if (children.get("Firewall")!=null){ 
            Firewall f = (Firewall)children.get("Firewall"); 
return f.isAllowedToPass(m); 
        } 
return true; 
    } 
 
public void messageArrived(Message m){ 
        passToListeners(m); 
        String componentName = m.getTargetName(); 
if (componentName==null) { 
logger.debug("component name is null, number of listening threads:" + 
listeningThreads.size() + " and number of children:" + children.size()); 
if (listeningThreads.size() == 1 &&children.size() == 0) { 




                    ((ExecutorService) 
listeningThreads.entrySet().iterator().next().getValue().get(0)).notify(); 
                } 
return; 
            } 







if (children.size() == 1) { 
logger.debug("forwarding message to the only component"); 
children.get(children.keySet().iterator().next()).messageArrived(m); 
return; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
if (children.get(componentName)!=null){ 
//message is properly delivered 
children.get(componentName).messageArrived(m); 
return; 
        } 
if (listeningThreads.containsKey(componentName)){ 
listeningThreads.get(componentName).add(m); 
            Object o = listeningThreads.get(componentName).get(0); 
synchronized (o) { 
                o.notify(); 
            } 
return; 
        } 
if (children.size()==1&&listeningThreads.size() == 0){ 
logger.debug("forwarding message to the only component"); 
children.get(children.keySet().iterator().next()).messageArrived(m); 
return; 
        } 
if (listeningThreads.size() == 1 &&children.size() == 0) { 
logger.debug("forwarding message to the only thread"); 
listeningThreads.entrySet().iterator().next().getValue().addLast(m); 
            ExecutorService es = ((ExecutorService) 
listeningThreads.entrySet().iterator().next().getValue().get(0)); 
synchronized (es){ 
                es.notify(); 
                ((ExecutorService) 
listeningThreads.entrySet().iterator().next().getValue().get(0)).notify(); 
            } 
return; 
        } 
logger.warn("could not get destination, message is ignored"); 
    } 
 
public OperatingSystem(CompUnit runningOn) { 
this.runningOn = runningOn; 
    } 
 
public void addChild(Component component, String name){ 
children.put(name,component); 
    } 
 
public FileWithRecords getFile(String fileName){ 
String driveName = fileName.substring(0,2); 




        } 
return null; 
    } 
 








    } 
 
public boolean getAccessControlDecision(int accessType, String fileName){ 
return true; 
    } 
 
public Message listenAtSpecificPort(String port){ 
 
 
LinkedList<Object> objects = new LinkedList<Object>(); 
        Object o = listeningThreads.get(port); 
if (o!=null){ 
logger.warn("busy port at:"+port); 
return null; 
        } 
logger.debug("listening at:" + port + " at " + runningOn); 
listeningThreads.put(port,objects); 
        
ActionsQueue.currentQueue.addNewEventWithInterruption(ActionsQueue.currentQueue.g
etCurrentTime() + 500 * 1000,objects); 
if (objects.size()>1){ 
            Object o1 = objects.get(0); 
synchronized (o1){ 
                o1.notify(); 
            } 
logger.debug("got message at:"+port); 
            doneListeningAtPort(port); 
return (Message) objects.get(1);//message arrived 
} 
logger.info("timeout at:"+port+" at "+runningOn); 
        doneListeningAtPort(port); 
return null; 
    } 
 
public void doneListeningAtPort(String portName){ 
listeningThreads.remove(portName); 
logger.debug("removed at:"+portName+" at "+runningOn); 
    } 
 
public void messageArrived(Message m, String threadName){ 
listeningThreads.get(threadName).add(m); 
    } 
 
public CompUnit getRunningOn() { 
return runningOn; 
    } 
 
public HardDrive getDrive(String name){ 
for(HardDrive hd:runningOn.getHardDrives()) 
if (name.toLowerCase().startsWith(hd.getDriveName().toLowerCase())) return hd; 
return null; 
    } 
 
/** 
     * 
     * @param newFile 
* @return true if file was created, false if there was an error 
     */ 
public boolean createNewFile(FileWithRecords newFile){ 








            hd = getDrive(new String(newFile.getFilename()).substring(0,2)); 
            
hd.addRecord(newFile,newFile.getFilename().substring(newFile.getFilename().indexO
f('\\')+1)); 
        }else{ 
            hd.addRecord(newFile,newFile.getFilename()); 
        } 
return true; 
    } 
 
public LinkedList<Component> getChildren(){ 
        LinkedList<Component> result = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(String s:children.keySet()) 
            result.add(children.get(s)); 
return result; 
    } 
 
public Component getChild(String name){ 
return children.get(name); 
    } 
 
public FileWithRecords createNewFile(String fullName){ 
        FileWithRecords fwr = new FileWithRecords(fullName,runningOn); 
if (!createNewFile(fwr)) fwr = null; 
return fwr; 















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class RemoteControlServer extends Server { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(RemoteControlServer.class); 
static int t = 0; 
 
    HashMap<String, HashMap<String, Record>>data = new HashMap<String, 
HashMap<String, Record>>(); 
 
public static String name = "RemoteControlServer"; 
public static String listCommand = "list"; 
public static String listParameter = "value"; 
public static String listResponse = "response"; 








public RemoteControlServer(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) 
{ 
super(parent, passwordFile); 
        parent.addChild(this, name); 
    } 
 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
boolean bool = super.messageArrived(m); 
if (bool) return bool; 
if (sessions.containsKey(m.getSessionID())) { 
if (m.getCommand().equals(listCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                Record r = getRecord(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(listParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to locate requested record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
m.setParameter(listCommand, r); 
logger.warn("located record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
      } 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
    Record getRecord(String username, String recordName) { 
        HashMap<String, Record> records = data.get(username); 
if (records == null) return null; 
return records.get(recordName); 
    } 
 
    HashMap<String, Record> getRecords(String userName){ 
return  data.get(userName); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(String username, String recordName, Record r){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)){ 
data.put(username, new HashMap<>()); 
        } 
        HashMap<String, Record> records = data.get(username); 
        records.put(recordName,r); 
    } 
 
public Record removeRecord(String username, String recordName){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)) return null; 
return data.get(username).remove(recordName); 





















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public abstract class Server extends Component{ 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Server.class); 
public static final String authorize = "auth"; 
public static final String authorizeParamUsername = "username"; 
public static final String authorizeParamPassword = "password"; 
public static final String authorizeSuccess = "ack"; 
public static final String authorizeFail = "denied"; 
 
public static final String accessControlFail = "AC denied"; 
 
    HashMap<String,Session>sessions = new HashMap<String, Session>(); 
int responseType = Message.HTTP; 
    ServerLocalAccessControl dm = null; 
 
//String DataFileName 
public Server(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) { 
super(parent); 
dm = new ServerLocalAccessControl(passwordFile,this); 
 
    } 
 
public Server(OperatingSystem parent, String passwordFileName) { 
super(parent); 
dm = new ServerLocalAccessControl(passwordFileName,this); 
    } 
 
/** 
     * Genetic message processing for servers 
     * @param m message 
     * @return true if message was processed with generic approach 
     */ 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
logger.debug("message has arrived to " + this.getClass() + ":" + m); 
if (m.getCommand()==null){ 
logger.debug("Command in Message is empty, ignoring"); 
return true; 
        } 
if (!dm.allowAccess(m)){ 
if (m.getCommand().equals(authorize)) { 
                Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
authorizeFail, m.getFromPort()); 









} else { 
                Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
accessControlFail, m.getFromPort()); 




            } 
        } 
if (m.getCommand().equals(authorize)){ 
logger.debug("Authorization request arrived to:" + this.getClass()); 
if (dm.isAllowNotAuthorizedAccess()){ 
                Message response = new 
Message(m.getFrom(),responseType,authorizeSuccess,m.getFromPort()); 
logger.debug("Authorization request resolved with " + "authorizeSuccess"); 
                Session session = new Session(Random.getNewID(), 
"No Authentication", 
                        m.getParameterString(authorizeParamUsername), 
                        ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime(), 
                        ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime()+20000); 
sessions.put(session.getSessionID(),session); 
                response.setSessionID(session.getSessionID()); 
parent.sendMessage(response); 
return true; 




                Message response = new 
Message(m.getFrom(),responseType,authorizeSuccess,m.getFromPort()); 
logger.debug("Authorization request resolved with " + "authorizeSuccess"); 
                Session session = new Session(Random.getNewID(), 
dm.getAccountRole(m.getParameterString(authorizeParamUsername)), 
                        m.getParameterString(authorizeParamUsername), 
                        ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime(), 
                        ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime()+20000); 
sessions.put(session.getSessionID(),session); 
                response.setSessionID(session.getSessionID()); 
parent.sendMessage(response); 
return true; 
            } else{ 
                Message response = new 
Message(m.getFrom(),responseType,authorizeFail,m.getFromPort());//password is 
wrong 
logger.info("Authorization request resolved with " + "authorizeFail"); 
parent.sendMessage(response); 
return true; 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
 
    } 
 
public Session getSession(String name){ 
return sessions.get(name); 
















 * Created by root on 22/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Session { 
    String sessionID; 
    String userRole; 




public Session(String sessionID, String userRole, String username, long 
timeSessionStarted, long timeSessionExpires) { 
this.sessionID = sessionID; 
this.userRole = userRole; 
this.timeSessionStarted = timeSessionStarted; 
this.timeSessionExpires = timeSessionExpires; 
this.username = username; 
    } 
 
public String getUsername() { 
return username; 
    } 
 
public String getSessionID() { 
return sessionID; 
    } 
 
public void setSessionID(String sessionID) { 
this.sessionID = sessionID; 
    } 
 
public String getUserRole() { 
return userRole; 
    } 
 
public void setUserRole(String userRole) { 
this.userRole = userRole; 
    } 
 
public long getTimeSessionStarted() { 
return timeSessionStarted; 
    } 
 
public void setTimeSessionStarted(long timeSessionStarted) { 
this.timeSessionStarted = timeSessionStarted; 
    } 
 
public long getTimeSessionExpires() { 
return timeSessionExpires; 








public void setTimeSessionExpires(long timeSessionExpires) { 
this.timeSessionExpires = timeSessionExpires; 














 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class SourceCodeServer extends Server { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(SourceCodeServer.class); 
 
    HashMap<String, FileWithRecords>data = new HashMap<String, 
FileWithRecords>(); 
 
public static String name = "SourceCodeServer"; 
 
public static String listCommand = "list"; 
public static String listParameter = "value"; 
public static String listResponse = "response"; 
public static String listFail = "not found"; 
 
public static String saveCommand = "save"; 
public static String saveParameterFileName = "filename"; 
public static String saveParameterRecordName = "recordname"; 
public static String saveParameterRecord = "record"; 
public static String saveResponse = "saved"; 
public static String saveFail = "not found"; 
 
public SourceCodeServer(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) { 
super(parent, passwordFile); 
        parent.addChild(this, name); 
    } 
 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
boolean bool = super.messageArrived(m); 
if (bool) return bool; 
if (sessions.containsKey(m.getSessionID())) { 
if (m.getCommand().equals(listCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                FileWithRecords r = 
getRecords(m.getParameterString(listParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 









logger.warn("failed to locate requested record for:" + m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
m.setParameter(listCommand, r); 
logger.warn("located record for:" + m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
if (m.getCommand().equals(saveCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                String fileName = m.getParameterString(saveParameterFileName); 
                String recordName = 
m.getParameterString(saveParameterRecordName); 
 
                FileWithRecords fwr = getRecords(fileName); 
if (fwr==null){ 
                    fwr = new 
FileWithRecords("c:\\CVS\\"+fileName,parent.getRunningOn()); 
data.put(fwr.getFilename(),fwr); 
                } 
                
fwr.addRecord(m.getParameterRecord(saveParameterRecord),recordName); 
 
                Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
saveResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
m.setParameter(saveCommand, fwr); 
logger.warn("saved record for:" + m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
    FileWithRecords getRecords(String fileName) { 
return data.get(fileName); 
    } 
 
public void addRecords(String fileName, FileWithRecords r) { 
data.put(fileName,r); 
    } 
 
public void addRecords(FileWithRecords r) { 
data.put(r.getFilename(),r); 
    } 
 
 
public FileWithRecords removeRecord(String fileName) { 
return data.remove(fileName); 






















 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class WebServer extends Server { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(WebServer.class); 
 
    HashMap<String, HashMap<String, Record>>data = new HashMap<String, 
HashMap<String, Record>>(); 
 
public static String name = "WebServer"; 
 
public static String listCommand = "list"; 
public static String listParameter = "value"; 
public static String listResponse = "response"; 
public static String listFail = "not found"; 
 
public static String saveCommand = "save"; 
public static String saveParameter = "value"; 
public static String saveParameterRecord = "record"; 
public static String saveResponse = "response"; 
public static String saveFail = "failed"; 
 
public WebServer(OperatingSystem parent, FileWithRecords passwordFile) { 
super(parent, passwordFile); 
        parent.addChild(this, name); 
    } 
 
public boolean messageArrived(Message m) { 
boolean bool = super.messageArrived(m); 
if (bool) return bool; 
if (sessions.containsKey(m.getSessionID())) { 
if (m.getCommand().equals(listCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                Record r = getRecord(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(listParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to locate requested record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
listResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
m.setParameter(listCommand, r); 









                } 
            } 
if (m.getCommand().equals(saveCommand)) { 
                Session s = getSession(m.getSessionID()); 
                addRecord(s.getUsername(), m.getParameterString(saveParameter), 
m.getParameterRecord(saveParameterRecord)); 
                Record r = getRecord(s.getUsername(), 
m.getParameterString(saveParameter)); 
 
if (r == null) { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
saveFail, m.getFromPort()); 
logger.warn("failed to save record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } else { 
                    Message response = new Message(m.getFrom(), responseType, 
saveResponse, m.getFromPort()); 
m.setParameter(saveParameter, r); 
logger.warn("saved record for:"+m); 
parent.sendMessage(response, true); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
return false; 
    } 
 
    Record getRecord(String username, String recordName) { 
        HashMap<String, Record> records = data.get(username); 
if (records == null) return null; 
return records.get(recordName); 
    } 
 
    HashMap<String, Record> getRecords(String userName){ 
return  data.get(userName); 
    } 
 
public void addRecord(String username, String recordName, Record r){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)){ 
data.put(username, new HashMap<>()); 
        } 
        HashMap<String, Record> records = data.get(username); 
        records.put(recordName,r); 
    } 
 
public Record removeRecord(String username, String recordName){ 
if (!data.containsKey(username)) return null; 
return data.get(username).remove(recordName); 














 * Created by root on 08/04/2015. 
 */ 









 * Created by root on 28/06/2015. 
 */ 
public class FileNameCleaner { 
final static int[] illegalChars = {34, 60, 62, 124, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, 58, 42, 63, 92, 47}; 
static { 
        Arrays.sort(illegalChars); 
    } 
public static String cleanFileName(String badFileName) { 
        StringBuilder cleanName = new StringBuilder(); 
for (int i = 0; i < badFileName.length(); i++) { 
int c = (int)badFileName.charAt(i); 
if (Arrays.binarySearch(illegalChars, c) <0) { 
                cleanName.append((char)c); 
            } 
        } 
return cleanName.toString(); 








 * Created by root on 27/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Lib { 
public static final Level VERBOSE = Level.forName("VERBOSE", 650); 
public static final Level TRACE = Level.TRACE; 
public static final Level DEBUG = Level.DEBUG; 
public static final Level INFO = Level.INFO; 
public static final Level WARN = Level.WARN; 
public static final Level ERROR = Level.ERROR; 




















 * Created by root on 16/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class NamedEnvironment<T> { 
    HashMap<String,T>records = new HashMap<String, T>(); 
 
public T getObject(String recordName){ 
return records.get(recordName); 
    } 
 
public void addObject(T r, String name){ 
records.put(name,r); 
    } 
 
public boolean removeObject(String name, T r) { 
T o = records.remove(name); 
if (o == null) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, T> e : records.entrySet()) { 
if (r == e.getValue()) { 
records.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
                } 
            } 
return false; 
        } else { 
return true; 
        } 
    } 
 
public boolean removeObject(T r) { 
for (Map.Entry<String, T> e : records.entrySet()) { 
if (r == e.getValue()) { 
records.remove(e.getKey()); 
return true; 
            } 
        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
public Set<String> getKeySet(){ 
return records.keySet(); 
    } 
 
public boolean isObjectPresent(String name){ 
return records.containsKey(name); 












 * Created by root on 15/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Pair<V1,V2> { 
public V1 a = null; 




    } 
 
public Pair(V1 a, V2 b) { 
this.a = a; 
this.b = b; 






















 * Created by root on 30/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Locator { 
public DataSource source; 
    String targetRecordName; 
    String targetRecordCollectionName; 
 
 
public static LinkedList<Locator> getShuffledRecordsLocations(Role role, Record 
targetRecord){ 
        LinkedList<Locator> locators = 
Locator.getRecordsLocations(role,targetRecord); 
        LinkedList<Locator> shuffledLocators = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(int i=0;i<locators.size()-1;i++){ 
            
shuffledLocators.add(locators.remove(Random.getNext(locators.size()))); 
        } 








    } 
 
public static boolean isRecordHere(Role role, Record targetRecord, CompUnit cu){ 




        } 
return false; 
    } 
 
public static LinkedList<Locator> getRecordsLocations(Role role, Record 
targetRecord, CompUnit dataSourceConnectToLocation){ 
        LinkedList<Locator> loc = getRecordsLocations(role,targetRecord); 
        LinkedList<Locator> result = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(Locator l:loc){ 
if (l.source.getLocation()==dataSourceConnectToLocation) 
                result.add(l); 
        } 
return result; 
    } 
 
public static LinkedList<Locator> getRecordsLocations(Role role, Record 
targetRecord){ 
        LinkedList<Object> records = getRelatedRecords(targetRecord,10); 
        LinkedList<Locator> result = new LinkedList<>(); 
for(Object r:records){ 
 
if (r instanceof EmailRecord){ 
                Locator l = new Locator(); 
                EmailRecord er = (EmailRecord) r; 
                LinkedList<DataSource> dataSources = 
role.getDataSourceWithCompUnit(er.getStored().getParent().getRunningOn()); 
                DataSource suitableDS = null; 
for(DataSource ds:dataSources) { 
if (ds.getType()==DataSource.TYPE_EMAIL_SERVER){ 
                        suitableDS = ds; 
                    } 
                } 
if (suitableDS==null) continue; 
                MailServer mailServer = (MailServer) 
suitableDS.getLocation().getOs().getChild(MailServer.name); 
if (mailServer==null) continue;//this is not ok, should not be 
l.targetRecordName = mailServer.findNameByRecord(er); 
                DataSource newDS = new DataSource(DataSource.TYPE_EMAIL_SERVER, 
l.targetRecordName, er.getStored().getParent().getRunningOn(), 
suitableDS.getUsername(),suitableDS.getPassword()); 
                l.source = newDS; 
                result.add(l); 
            } 
if (r instanceof FileWithRecords){ 
                Locator l = new Locator(); 
                FileWithRecords fwr = (FileWithRecords) r; 
                DataSource newDS = new 
DataSource(DataSource.TYPE_FILE,fwr.getFilename(),fwr.getLocation(),null); 
                l.source = newDS; 
                l.targetRecordCollectionName = fwr.getFilename(); 
                l.targetRecordName = fwr.getNameOfRecord(targetRecord); 
                result.add(l); 







        } 
return result; 
    } 
 
static LinkedList<Object> getRelatedRecords(Record record, int depth){ 
if (depth==0) return new LinkedList<>(); 
        LinkedList<Object> result = new LinkedList<>(); 
        HashMap<String,Object> map = record.getReferences(); 
for(String s:map.keySet()){ 
            Object r = map.get(s); 
if (!result.contains(r)) { 
                result.add(r); 
} 
        } 
return result; 
    } 
 
public DataSource getSource() { 
return source; 
    } 
 
public String getTargetRecordName() { 
return targetRecordName; 
    } 
 
public String getTargetRecordCollectionName() { 
return targetRecordCollectionName; 









 * Created by root on 30/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Risk { 
/** 
     * Value of risk 




     * Object this risk is associated with 
     */ 
Record object; 
 
    Component riskRelatedTo; 
 













long time, int type) { 
this.value = value; 
this.object = object; 
this.riskRelatedTo = riskRelatedTo; 
this.comment = comment; 
this.time = time; 
this.type = type; 
    } 
 
public Risk(double value, long time, Record object, int type) { 
this.value = value; 
this.time = time; 
this.object = object; 
this.type = type; 
    } 
 
public Risk(double value, long time, int type) { 
this.value = value; 
this.time = time; 
this.type = type; 
    } 
 
public String toString(){ 
        String res = ""; 
switch (type){ 
case RiskCollection.TYPE_PRODUCTIVITY:{ 
                res+="P Risk"; 
break; 
            } 
case RiskCollection.TYPE_SECURITY:{ 
                res+="S Risk"; 
break; 
            } 
default:{ 
                res+="Unknown Risk"; 
break; 
            } 
        } 
        res+="; Value="+value; 
if (object!=null){ 
            res+=";Related to "+object; 
        } 
return res; 





















public class RiskCollection { 
 
private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger(RiskCollection.class); 
 
public static RiskCollectioncurrentRisks = new RiskCollection(); 
public static final int TYPE_SECURITY=1; 
public static final int TYPE_PRODUCTIVITY=2; 
 
 
    List<Risk>risks; 
 
public RiskCollection(){ 
risks = Collections.synchronizedList(new LinkedList<Risk>()); 
    } 
 
//    public static RiskCollection allRisks; 
 
public static synchronized void addSecurityRisk(double value, long time, Record 
object){ 
if (value>1) 
logger.warn("Risk value is more than one,value:"+value+" time:"+ time+ " 
Object:"+object); 
        Risk r = new Risk(value,time,object,TYPE_SECURITY); 
currentRisks.risks.add(r); 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  void addSecurityRisk(double value){ 
addSecurityRisk(value, ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime()); 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  void addProductivityRisk(double value){ 
addProductivityRisk(value, ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime()); 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  void addSecurityRisk(Double value, long time){ 
addSecurityRisk(value,time,null); 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  void addProductivityRisk(Double value, long time){ 
        Risk r = new Risk(value,time,TYPE_PRODUCTIVITY); 
currentRisks.risks.add(r); 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  double getSummedRiskValue(int type){ 
return getSummedRiskValue(type,Long.MAX_VALUE); 
    } 
 
/** 
     * Security risk description: 
     * Each transition of record or local query for r/w/x has a 
     */ 
 
    /** 
     * Productivity risk description: 
     * Task has expected duration-Tex 
     * Time to actually complete task Tact 
     * Productivity Risk = (Tact-Tex)/Tex, can be negative and more than 1, the 
lower the better 








public static synchronized  double getSummedRiskValue(int type, long time){ 
double res = 0; 
        HashMap<Record,LinkedList<Double>> addedValues = new HashMap<>(); 
for(Risk r:currentRisks.risks){ 
if (r.time>time) continue; 
if (r.type==type) { 
if (r.object ==null) 
                    res+=r.value; 
else{ 
if (addedValues.containsValue(r.value)){ 
                        addedValues.get(r.object).add(r.value); 
                    }else{ 
                        LinkedList<Double> list = new LinkedList<>(); 
                        list.add(r.value); 
                        addedValues.put(r.object,list); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
for(Record r:addedValues.keySet()){ 
double mul = 1; 
if (r.getSecurityValue()!=null){ 
                mul = r.getSecurityValue(); 
            } 
            res+=mul*computeLikelihood(addedValues.get(r)); 
        } 
return res; 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  TreeSet<Long> getTimepoints(){ 
        TreeSet<Long> res = new TreeSet<>(); 
for(Risk r:currentRisks.risks) 
            res.add(r.time); 
return res; 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  double computeLikelihood(LinkedList<Double> 
probabilitiesList){ 
double mul = 1; 
for(Double d:probabilitiesList){ 
            mul*=(1-d); 
        } 
return 1-mul; 
    } 
 
public static synchronized  void purgeRisks(){ 
currentRisks.risks = Collections.synchronizedList(new LinkedList<Risk>()); 




















 * Created by root on 12/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Focus implements Runnable{ 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Focus.class); 
    NamedEnvironment<Object>variables = new NamedEnvironment<>(); 
    TaskResults tasksExecuted = new TaskResults(); 
    TaskResults callStack = new TaskResults(); 
    ProcessTree tree; 
 
public Focus(ProcessTree tree) { 
this.tree = tree; 
    } 
 
@Override 
public void run() { 




            
ActionsQueue.currentQueue.addNewEvent(ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime() 
+ current.actualDuration); 








                current = chosenOne.clone(); 
else 
current = null; 
        } while (current!=null); 
    } 
 
public TaskResults getTasksExecuted() { 
return tasksExecuted; 
    } 
 
public Object getVariable(String name){ 
return variables.getObject(name); 
    } 
 
public void setVariable(String name, Object object){ 
variables.addObject(object,name); 
    } 
 
public boolean getBooleanVariable(String name){ 
        Boolean b = (Boolean) variables.getObject(name); 
if (b==null||!b) return false; 
return true; 
















 * Created by root on 10/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class ProcessTree { 
    String name; 
    LinkedList<Task>entryPoints = new LinkedList<Task>(); 
    LinkedList<Task>exitPoints = new LinkedList<Task>(); 
 
public ProcessTree(String name) { 
this.name = name; 
    } 
 
public void addEntryPoint(Task task){ 
entryPoints.add(task); 
    } 
 
public void addExitPoint(Task task){ 
exitPoints.add(task); 
    } 
 
public Task chooseEntryPoint(){ 
return entryPoints.get(Random.getNext(entryPoints.size())); 












 * Created by root on 10/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class Taskimplements Cloneable{//implements Runnable { 
 
private static final org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger logger = 
LogManager.getLogger(Task.class); 
 
    String taskName; 
int standardDuration=10; 
int actualDuration=10; 
    Object parent; 
int status; 
 
    LinkedList<Task>nextNodes = new LinkedList<Task>(); 
    LinkedList<Task>previousNodes = new LinkedList<Task>();     
 







this.taskName = taskName; 
    } 
 
public Task(String taskName, int standardDuration) { 
this.taskName = taskName; 
        setStandardDuration(standardDuration); 
    } 
 
public Task(String taskName, int standardDuration, Object parent) { 
this(taskName,standardDuration); 
        setParent(parent); 
    } 
 
public Task chooseNext(TaskResults executedSoFar,TaskResults callStack, Focus f){ 
Task task = chooseCustomNext(executedSoFar,callStack,nextNodes,f); 
if (task!=null) return task; 
if (nextNodes.size()==0) return null; 
return nextNodes.get(Random.getNext(nextNodes.size())); 
    } 
 
public Task chooseCustomNext(TaskResults taskList, TaskResults 
callStack,LinkedList<Task> nextNodes, Focus f){ 
return null; 
    } 
 
 
public final int runTask(Focus f) { 
        taskActions(f); 
return status; 
    } 
 
public void taskActions(Focus f){ 
 
    } 
 
public Task clone(){ 
try { 
return (Task) super.clone(); 
        } catch (CloneNotSupportedException e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
return null; 
    } 
 
public void addNextNode(Task task){ 
if (task==null) return; 
nextNodes.add(task); 
        task.previousNodes.add(this); 
    } 
 
public int getStandardDuration() { 
return standardDuration; 
    } 
 
public void setStandardDuration(int standardDuration) { 
this.standardDuration = standardDuration; 
this.actualDuration = standardDuration; 
    } 
 








    } 
 
public void setActualDuration(int actualDuration) { 
this.actualDuration = actualDuration; 
    } 
 
public Object getParent() { 
return parent; 
    } 
 
public void setParent(Object parent) { 
this.parent = parent; 
    } 
 
public int getStatus() { 
return status; 
    } 
 
public void setStatus(int status) { 
this.status = status; 
    } 
 
public Task findTask(LinkedList<Task> tasks, String name){ 
for(Task t:tasks){ 
if (t.taskName.toLowerCase().startsWith(name.toLowerCase())) return t; 
        } 
logger.error("not found task named:"+name); 
return null; 
    } 
 
public String getTaskName() { 
return taskName; 
    } 
 
public void setTaskName(String taskName) { 
this.taskName = taskName; 
    } 
 
public boolean isTaskNamed(String taskName) { 
return (this.taskName.toLowerCase().startsWith(taskName.toLowerCase())); 
    } 
 
public String toString(){ 
return taskName+":"+super.toString(); 






 * Created by root on 30/05/2015. 
 */ 
public class TaskResult { 
 
public static final int TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS = 1; 
 








public static final int TASK_STATUS_CONDITIONAL_SUCCESS = 3; 
 
    Task task; 
int status; 
 
public TaskResult(Task task){ 
this.task = task; 
status = TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS; 
    } 
 
public TaskResult(Task task, int taskStatus){ 
this.task = task; 
status = taskStatus; 
    } 
 
public Task getTask() { 
return task; 
    } 
 
public void setTask(Task task) { 
this.task = task; 
    } 
 
public int getStatus() { 
return status; 
    } 
 
public void setStatus(int status) { 
this.status = status; 
    } 
 
public String toString(){ 
        String s = super.toString(); 
        String res = ""; 
if (task!=null) res+=task.getTaskName(); 
if (status==TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS) res+=":Success"; 
if (status==TASK_STATUS_FAILURE) res+=":Failure"; 
return res; 








 * Created by root on 14/06/2015. 
 */ 
public class TaskResults { 
    LinkedList<TaskResult>results = new LinkedList<>(); 
 
public TaskResults(){ 
results = new LinkedList<>(); 
    }; 
 
public TaskResults(LinkedList<TaskResult> copy){ 







    } 
 
public boolean wasCallSuccess(){ 
if (results==null) return false; 
if (results.size()==0) { 
throw new NullPointerException();//not supposed to happen 
//            return false; 
} 
        TaskResult taskResult = results.getLast(); 
if (taskResult==null) { 
throw new NullPointerException();//not supposed to happen 
//            return false; 
} 
return taskResult.getStatus()==TaskResult.TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS; 
    } 
 
public boolean wasCallSuccess(int offset){ 
return getLastStatus(offset)==TaskResult.TASK_STATUS_SUCCESS; 
    } 
 
public void add(TaskResult result){ 
results.add(result); 
    } 
 
public void add(Task t, int status){ 
results.add(new TaskResult(t,status)); 
    } 
 
public void addToStack(Task t, int status){ 
for (int i=0;i<results.size();i++){ 
if (results.get(i).getTask().isTaskNamed(t.getTaskName())){ 
int del = results.size()-i; 
for(int j=0;j<del;j++) 
results.removeLast();; 
            } 
        } 
        add(t,status); 
    } 
 
public Task getLastTask(){ 
return getLastTaskResult(0).getTask(); 
    } 
 
public Integer getLastStatus(){ 
return getLastTaskResult(0).getStatus(); 
    } 
 
public Task getLastTask(int offset){ 
return getLastTaskResult(offset).getTask(); 
    } 
 
public Integer getLastStatus(int offset){ 
return getLastTaskResult(offset).getStatus(); 
    } 
 
public int count(){ 
return results.size(); 
    } 
 







if (results!=null&&results.size()>=(offset)) return results.get(results.size() - 
offset-1); 
return null; 
    } 
 
public boolean wasLastTaskNamed(String name, int offset){ 
return getLastTask(offset).isTaskNamed(name); 
    } 
 
public boolean wasLastTaskNamed(String name){ 
return getLastTask().isTaskNamed(name); 
    } 
 
 
public LinkedList<TaskResult> getList(){ 
return results; 
























 *  
 */ 
public class RMS { 
 
private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger(RMS.class); 
static Thread watcherThread; 
 
static String outputName = "test"; 
static final LinkedList<Record>policiesNotAllowedToPass = new LinkedList<>(); 
static final LinkedList<Record>mandatoryRecord = new LinkedList<>(); 
 
public static void main(String [] args){ 
 
        Main main = new Main(); 
        main.prepareEnvironment(); 
for(int i=0;i<Record.globalList.size();i++) { 
for(int j=i+1;j<Record.globalList.size();j++) { 
















                        Record r = Record.globalList.get(i); 
                        Record r2 = Record.globalList.get(j); 
                        Record r3 = Record.globalList.get(k); 
                        Record r4 = Record.globalList.get(m); 
if (mandatoryRecord.contains(r)) continue; 
if (mandatoryRecord.contains(r2)) continue; 
policiesNotAllowedToPass.clear(); 
 
                        Random.reInit(); 
outputName = "test" + FileNameCleaner.cleanFileName(r.toString() + 
r2.toString()+r3.toString()+r4.toString()); 






watcherThread = createNewWatcherThread(1000 * 60 * 2l, "For not allowing access 
for Record:"); 
 
                        Main.logicalFirewall.addNewPolicy(new FirewallPolicy() { 
@Override 
public Boolean allowAccess(Message m) { 
for (Record r : policiesNotAllowedToPass) 
if (r.hasReference(m)) { 
logger.warn("denying message passing because Record:" + r.toString() + " is 
referenced in this message"); 
return false; 
                                    } 
return true; 
                            } 
                        }); 




                            Thread.sleep(2500); 
                        } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                            e.printStackTrace(); 
                        } 
 
                        ActionsQueue.currentQueue = new ActionsQueue(); 
                        main.prepareEnvironment(); 
                        RiskCollection.purgeRisks(); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        System.exit(0); 








public static void modellingIsCompleted(){ 
watcherThread.interrupt(); 
    } 
 
public static Thread createNewWatcherThread(long time, String message){ 
        Thread t = new Thread(new Runnable() { 
@Override 
public void run() { 
try { 
                    Thread.sleep(time); 
                } catch (InterruptedException e) { 




                ActionsQueue.currentQueue.terminated=true; 
 
try { 
                    Thread.sleep(500); 
                } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 








logger.warn(message+"Time to complete task 
sequence:"+ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime()); 










                } catch (IOException e) { 
                    e.printStackTrace(); 
                } 
            } 
        }); 
        t.start(); 
return t; 
    } 
 
public static void saveResults() throws IOException{ 




        File f = new File(".\\output\\"+utility+outputName+".csv"); 
if (!f.exists()) 
            f.createNewFile(); 








            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
 
            TreeSet<Long> timeTree = RiskCollection.getTimepoints(); 
            LinkedList<Double> securityRiskValues = new LinkedList<>(); 
            LinkedList<Double> productivityRiskValues = new LinkedList<>(); 
            LinkedList<Double> utilityValues = new LinkedList<>(); 
long currentTime = ActionsQueue.currentQueue.getCurrentTime(); 
for(Long l:timeTree){ 
                
securityRiskValues.add(RiskCollection.getSummedRiskValue(RiskCollection.TYPE_SECU
RITY,l)); 
                
productivityRiskValues.add(RiskCollection.getSummedRiskValue(RiskCollection.TYPE_
PRODUCTIVITY,l)); 




                System.out.println(l + "is done of:"+currentTime); 
            } 
for(Long l:timeTree){ 
                fos.write((l.toString()+",").getBytes()); 
 
            } 
            fos.write("\n".getBytes()); 
for(Double l:securityRiskValues){ 
                fos.write((l.toString()+",").getBytes()); 
 
            } 
            fos.write("\n".getBytes()); 
for(Double l:productivityRiskValues){ 
                fos.write((l.toString()+",").getBytes()); 
 
            } 
            fos.write("\n".getBytes()); 
for(Double l:utilityValues){ 
                fos.write((l.toString()+",").getBytes()); 
 
            } 
            fos.write("\n".getBytes()); 
 
        } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
finally{ 
if (fos!=null) 
                fos.close(); 












Appendix C - Documentation Describing Class Attributes 
and Methods 
 




i. allowAccess – returns true if a Message passing or processing is allowed, 
false if Message should not be allowed traversal or processing, depending 
on the Component that is querying AccessControlDecisionMaker 
2. ActionsQueue – stores all scheduled events, starts all events scheduled at the closest 
scheduled time. After starting the events, the ActionsQueue waits until all these events 
are either finished or paused. 
1. Attributes 
i. currentTime - integer, measures current time of simulation since scenario 
start, in milliseconds 
ii. schedule – queue of all scheduled events 
iii. Terminated - boolean, if set to true no more new events would be 
scheduled, purpose is to stop terminate simulation to get the risk data  
2. Methods 
i. ActionsQueue – constructor for this class 
ii. addNewEvent – adds a new event and returns control to invoking thread 
without delay 
iii. addNewEventWithInterruption – pauses execution of the current thread, 
schedules a new event  to be executed and another event to resume the 






iv. addNewEventWithInterruptionAtFirstSchedule – similar to 
addNewEventWithInterruption, this method is present for debugging 
purposes 
v. getCurrentTime – gets current time, multi-thread safe 
vi. printEventQueue – prints all scheduled events with their scheduled time 
vii. progress – progresses simulation for one tick, specifically gets all events 
scheduled to be executed at the time closest to the current simulation time 
and starts the event processing 
viii. removeEvent – removes scheduled, but not yet executed event 
ix. Start – starts simulation, assumes that events queue contains at least one 
scheduled event 




i. Browser – constructor for this class 
ii. messageArrived – this routine is invoked when a Message has arrived and 
OperatingSystem forwards it to this Component 
iii. sendMessage – sends Message to intended recipient 
4. Component – represents software executing in CompUnit managed by OperatingSystem. 
1. Attributes 
i. parent – specifies an OperatingSystem in which the Component is running  
2. Methods 
i. Component – constructor for this class 
ii. getParent – returns the parent OperatingSystem 
iii. messageArrived – via this routine the OperatingSystem sends Messages 
that have arrived for this Component 
5. CompUnit – computational unit representing a piece of hardware that has hardware 
components connected to it and is capable of executing an OperatingSystem. 
1. Attributes 





ii. hardDrives – specifies HardDrives connected to this CompUnit 
iii. location – specifies a Location in physical world 
iv. networkConnections – set of NetworkConnections that connect this 
CompUnit to other CompUnits via networking 
v. os – represents an OperatingSystem that manages this CompUnit 
2. Methods 
i. addHardDrive – adds a new HardDrive to this CompUnit 
ii. CompUnit – constructor for this class 
iii. connect – connects two NetworkConnections, one from this CompUnit 
and another from the specified CompUnit 
iv. createFile – creates a new FileWithRecords at the specified HardDrive 
v. getHardDrives – returns a list of HardDrives that are connected to this 
CompUnit 
vi. getLocation – returns a physical location of this CompUnit 
vii. getNetworkConnections – returns a list of all NetworkConnections 
associated with this CompUnit 
viii. getOS – returns the OperatingSystem that manages this CompUnit 
ix. getSpecificNetworkInterface – returns specific NetworkConnection by its 
name 
x. setLocation – changes a physical Location of this CompUnit 
xi. toString– returns the object representation as a string, for debugging and 
printing purposes 
6. DataSource – specifies the protocol of retrieving a data (i.e., a Record) from a data source 
and lists all necessary information required to access it, such as its current network 
location, username and password. 
1. Attributes 
i. location – CompUnit, machine where this DataSource points to 
ii. name – name of this data source 
iii. password – password of the account required to access the Component 





iv. passwordStatic – password of the account required to access to the 
Component which DataSource refers to, this password would not be 
updated even if actual password will change 
v. record – an instance of the UserRecord class which can be used instead of 
username and password if this attribute is set 
vi. status – contains a status of the last access attempt, can be success, access 
denied, timeout, general failure or not yet started 
vii. target – a Component that is set as the current location of the data 
viii. type – type of the DataSource, can be a file, a database, an email server, a 
web server, or a version control server, this value defines which protocol 
would be used to access the data through this DataSource 
ix. username – username of the account required access to the Component 
which this DataSource refers to 
x. usernameStatic – username of the account required to access to the 
Component which this DataSource refers to, the username would not be 
updated even if an actual username will change 
2. Methods 
i. DataSource – constructor for this class 
ii. getLocation – returns a CompUnit that will be queried for the data 
iii. getPassword - returns a usable password (if set), needed because different 
protocols use different username and password definition mechanisms 
iv. getRecord – starts routine to get the data (the Record), usually results in 
exchange of Messages between the originating Component and the 
Components referred in this DataSource. The only exception is if type is 
file and this file is located on the same machine as the Component that 
originated this call 
v. getRecordCollection – returns a RecordCollection by the name (i.e., entire 
file containing a set of Records) 
vi. getRecordP – internal routine implementing calls to get the data 
vii. getRecordWithErrorHandling – actual routine implementing a logic for 





routine, and the server side protocol logic is executed in the classes that 
override a Server class) 
viii. getType – returns a type of the DataSource 
ix. getUsername – returns a usable username (if set), needed because 
different protocols use different username and password definition 
mechanisms 
x. writeRecord – starts routine to replace a current Record with another 
Record 
7. DataSourceGetResult – results of a DataSource retrieval operation, contains an operation 





i. DataSourceGetResult – constructor for this class 
ii. getRecord – returns a Record by its name 
iii. getStatus – returns a status of the retrieval operation, can be: success, 
access denied, timeout or a general failure 
8. DataSourceGetResults – set of a DataSourceGetResult for a set of calls retrieving data 
1. Attributes 
i. results – a set of DataSourceGetResult instances 
2. Methods 
i. add – adds DataSourceGetResult to the results set 
ii. DataSourceGetResults – constructor for this class 
iii. getLastRecord – returns a last record of the set of calls 
iv. wasCallSuccess – returns true if a call originated sequence of Record 
retrieval operations resulted in success and all records were retrieved; if 
at least one record was not retrieved this method returns failure 







i. processTree – ProcessTree of this role 
2. Methods 
i. calculateProblemSolutionProbabilityPhaseOne – calculates whether a 
developer actually solved the problem of the first part of a task 
ii. DeveloperRole – constructor for this class 
iii. setEnvironmentVariables – sets variables of the process representing the 
ProcessTree execution for this role 
iv. updateReadRecord – updates attributes associated with a Record 
developer may need to read to simulate that the Record was read 
10. EmailRecord – a Record containing information about an email stored in a Server or 
passed from one server to another server 
1. Attributes 
i. antivirusChecked – indicates whether this Email was checked by an 
antivirus 
ii. attachments – a list of the Files attached to this EmailRecord  
iii. body – body of the Email 
iv. copyOf – indicates whether this is a copy of the Email or an original Email 
v. dataLossPreventionChecked – indicates whether this Email was checked 
by a data loss prevention software 
vi. deleted – indicates whether this email was deleted 
vii. from – specifies an address from which this Email came from  
viii. sent – EmailServer that was used to send this Email 
ix. spamChecked – indicates whether this Email was checked by a spam 
control 
x. stored – a location where this Email is stored 
xi. timeReceived – specifies the time when this Email was received 
xii. timeSent – specifies the time when this Email was sent 






i. addAttachment – adds an Attachment to the Email 
ii. addReference – adds a new Reference to this Email, and 
changes a DataLossPreventionChecked value to false since it modifies the 
content of this Email 
iii. EmailRecord – constructor for this class 
iv. getAttachments – returns a set of Attachments (if any) 
v. getBody – returns the Email body value 
vi. getCopyOf – returns the Email copyOf value 
vii. getFrom – returns the Email from value 
viii. getSent – returns a sent value 
ix. getStored – returns a stored value 
x. getTimeReceived – returns a TimeReceived value 
xi. getTimeSent – returns a TimeSent value 
xii. getTo – returns the value of an attribute named to 
xiii. isAntivirusChecked – returns an AntivirusChecked value 
xiv. isDataLossPreventionChecked – returns true if this email was scanned by 
a leak detection system 
xv. isSpamChecked – returns a SpamChecked value 
xvi. setAntivirusChecked – updates an AntivirusChecked value 
xvii. setBody – updates the value of an attribute body 
xviii. setDataLossPreventionChecked – updates the related attribute 
xix. setFrom – updates the value of the from atribute 
xx. setSent – updates the value of the sent atribute 
xxi. setStored – updates the value of the stored atribute 
xxii. setTimeReceived – updates a TimeReceived value 
xxiii. setTimeSent – updates a TimeSent value 
xxiv. setTo – updates the value of the to atribute 
11. FileWithRecords – represents a File located in a HardDrive that contains a list (possible 
empty) of Records. 
1. Attributes 





ii. location  - a CompUnit specifying the file physical location 
2. Methods 
i. FileWithRecords – constructor for this class 
ii. getFileName – returns the file name 
iii. getLocation – returns the CompUnit where the File is located 
12. Firewall – represents a hardware Firewall, using a FirewallDecisionMaker that makes 
access control decisions about the Messages passing through this Firewall. 
1. Attributes 
i. dm – a decision maker, applying a set of Firewall policies to the Messages 
passing through this Firewall 
2. Methods 
i. addNewPolicy – adds a new policy to a set of Firewall policies 
ii. Firewall – constructor for this class 
iii. isAllowedToPass – returns true if the Firewall lets a Message pass 
13. FirewallDecisionMaker - makes access control decision whether to allow a Message to 
pass or not based on a set of FirewallPolicies. 
1. Attributes 
i. policies – a set of policies defining which Messages are allowed to pass 
and which are prohibited to do so 
2. Methods 
i. addPolicy – adds a policy to a Firewall policy set 
ii. allowAccess – returns true if a Message is allowed to pass 
iii. FirewallDecisionMaker – constructor for this class 
iv. makeDecision – makes a decision about whether a Message is allowed or 
prohibited to proceed 
v. makeDecisionOneAccept – returns that a Message is allowed to proceed 
if one Policy is allowing  
vi. makeDecisionOneReject – returns a Message is allowed to proceed if all 
Policies allow it 
14. FirewallPolicy – contains an ABAC policy specifying all types of Messages that fall 








i. allowAccess – returns true if a Message is allowed to proceed according 
to this policy 
ii. FirewallPolicy – constructor for this class 
15. FTPServer – represents a Server that is used to access local files remotely. 
1. Attributes 
i. listCommand – a value identifying a command to list files that contain a 
specified Record 
ii. listFail – a  value specifying that a list command has failed 
iii. listParameter – a  value identifying a name of a specific directory to list 
iv. listParameterRecord – a  value identifying a specific Record which, if 
specified, is used instead of the listParameter attribute 
v. listResponse – a  value specifying a Message type as a response to a list 
request 
vi. logger – contains logs of all relevant activities 
vii. name – a name of the FTPServer 
viii. saveCommand – a  value identifying a command to create a new File or 
append a Record to an existing File 
ix. saveFail – a  value specifying that this Message is a reply to a failed save 
request 
x. saveParameter – a value specifying a File name 
xi. saveParameterRecord – a value specifying a Record to append to a 
specified File 
xii. saveResponse – a value specifying that this Message is a reply to a 
successful save request 
xiii. t – a time difference stored for debugging purposes 
2. Methods 





ii. FTPServer – constructor for this class 
iii. getFile – returns the content of a File 
iv. messageArrived – this method is invoked when a Message has arrived and 
it needs to be processed, overridden method of the Server class 
v. removeFile – deletes a File from a HardDrive 
16. HardDrive – represents a storage device in a CompUnit which stores FileWithRecords; 
this class is an instantiation of the HardwareEntity class 
1. Attributes 
i. driveName – represents a HardDrive name, a prefix for all Files located 
on this Hard Drive 
ii. files – a list of FileWithRecords and their names 
iii. parent – a CompUnit housing this HardDrive 
2. Methods 
i. addRecord – adds a new Record to a specific FileWithRecord 
ii. getDriveName – returns the name attribute of this HardDrive 
iii. getRecords – returns all Records by their names 
iv. HardDrive – constructor for this class 
v. removeFile – removes a FileWithRecord from HardDrive 
vi. removeReference – removes a reference of the Record from a 
FileWithRecord  
vii. setDriveName – changes the name attribute of this HardDrive 
17. HardwareEntity – represents a piece of hardware that can perform certain function. 
1. Attributes 
i. enabled – if this value is false, then a functionality of the HardwareEntity 
is disabled 
ii. name – a name of the HardwareEntity, used for identification purposes 
2. Methods 
i. HardwareEntity – constructor for this class 
18. Listener – an abstract Component that has a Message listening capability which is not 








i. Listener – constructor for this class 
ii. messageArrived – processes a Message that was forwarded to this 
Component by its parent OperatingSystem  
iii. processMessage – consumes an arrived Message 
19. Location – a physical world location, used in risk assessment. 
1. Attributes 
i. Name – a Location name, serves for identification purposes 
ii. nearbyLocations – a list of Locations that are somehow physically 
connected to this Location, for example neighbouring rooms 
iii. objectsItHolds – CompUnits that are located in this Location and 
consequently can be used by a User searching for a computer in which to 
work 
2. Methods 
i. addObjectToLocation – adds a new CompUnit to this Location 
ii. getNearbyLocations – returns other Locations a User can move to 
iii. getObjectsHolds – returns the list of CompUnits that are located in this 
Location 
iv. Location – constructor for this class 
v. removeObjectFromLocation – removes a CompUnit from this Location 
20. Locator – metaclass, that have access to all Records Locations, represents a User’s 
memory about Records Locations (where did a User store the data) and DataSources (how 
to access it, if a User has access to that Location). 
1. Attributes 
i. source – a DataSource created once a Record is located 
ii. targetRecordCollectionName – name of the RecordsCollection that this 
Locator is searching for 






i. getTargetRecordCollectionName – returns a name of the 
RecordCollection the Locator is searching for  
ii. getRecordsLocations – returns a set of Locators, this set contains all 
possible ways of getting the specified Record both with the DataSources 
and anonymous 
iii. getRelatedRecords – returns a set of references for the Record Location 
iv. getShuffledRecordsLocations – reshuffles randomly the output of the 
getRecordsLocations 
v. getSource – returns a DataSource created for a data access 
vi. getTargetRecordName – returns a name of a Record the Locator is 
searching for 
vii. isRecordHere – returns true if target Record is located at the specified 
CompUnit 
viii. Locator – constructor for this class 
21. MailServer – represents a Server that stores and exchanges Emails. 
1. Attributes 
i. data – a set of EmailRecords for each user account on this MailServer 
ii. listCommand – a  value identifying a command to list emails associated 
with a specific user account 
iii. listFail – a  value identifying that a list command has failed 
iv. listParameter – a  value identifying a parameter of a specific Email to 
retrieve 
v. listResponse – a  value identifying a Message as a reply to a list command 
vi. logger – contains logs of all relevant activity 
vii. name – name of the server 
viii. t – time difference for debugging purposes 
2. Methods 
i. addRecord – adds a new Record  
ii. findNameByRecord – returns a Record by part of its name 
iii. getRecord – returns a Record by its name 





v. MailServer – constructor for this class 
vi. messageArrived – this method is invoked when a Message has arrived and 
needs to be processed; this is an overridden method of the Server class 
vii. removeRecord – removes a Record from a set of Records at this Server 
22. Message – relates to an InfrastructureEvent and represents a Message of any protocol 
Components exchange. 
1. Attributes 
i. command – a command to a Server, must match one of  Server values 
otherwise a Message would be ignored (can be empty for Server 
responses) 
ii. currentLocation – current NetworkingInterface where this Message is 
located 
iii. encrypted – boolean flag set to true if Message parameters and contents 
are encrypted and can be read only by target Component  
iv. failedToBeDelivered – boolean flag set to true if a Message could not be 
delivered 
v. from – a CompUnit that has originated this Message 
vi. fromPort – a port from which this Message was sent, a response to this 
Message should be sent to the same port 
vii. messageParameters – a set of parameters that was defined in its 
originating CompUnit 
viii. messageType – a  value defining the type of the protocol used to send this 
Message 
ix. name – a name of the Message used for identification purposes 
x. noRouteForMessage – boolean flag set to true if the originating CompUnit 
could not construct a route to the intended destination of this Message  
xi. path – path of the Message, constructed at the originating CompUnit 
xii. primaryParam – one of the Message Parameters 
xiii. sessionID – id of a Session set by a Server if an authentication was 





from a Server to communication originating a Component back and forth 
to identify a state of the communication Session and its context 
xiv. stringContent – contents of the Message in text, if any 
xv. targetName – name of the Component this Message is intended to be 
delivered to 
xvi. to – a CompUnit that this Message was sent to 
xvii. traversing – an iterator over the path of the Message 
2. Methods 
i. getCommand – returns a command for a Server in the Message 
ii. getCurrentLocation – returns a NetworkInterface where the Message is 
currently located 
iii. getFrom – returns a CompUnit this Message has originated from 
iv. getFromPort – returns a port from which the Message was sent 
v. getMessageParameters – returns a map of Parameter names and their 
values 
vi. getMessageType – returns a  value defining a communication protocol 
used to send this Message 
vii. getParameter – returns (if present) a Parameter by its name 
viii. getParameterRecord – returns (if present) a Parameter as a Record 
ix. getParameterString – returns (if present) a Parameter in textual 
representation 
x. getPath – returns a path of the Message 
xi. getSessionID – returns a Session id (if set) of the Message 
xii. getStringContent – returns a text passed along with the Message 
xiii. getTargetName – returns a name of a Component this Message is intended 
for 
xiv. getTo – returns a CompUnit this Message is sent to  
xv. getTraversing – returns an iterator traversing over the path of the Message 
xvi. isParameterPresent – returns true if a Parameter with a specified name is 
present 





xviii. removeParameter – removes a Parameter by its name 
xix. setCommand – changes a command for a Server in the Message 
xx. setFrom – changes a CompUnit this Message has originated from 
xxi. setFromPort – changes a port from which Message was sent 
xxii. setMessageType – changes a  value defining a communication protocol 
using which this Message was sent 
xxiii. setParameter – sets the Parameter of the Message to a specific value 
xxiv. setPath – changes a path that was constructed for the Message to achieve 
its target 
xxv. setSessionId – changes an id of the Session 
xxvi. setStringContent – changes the text passed along with the Message  
xxvii. setTo – changes a CompUnit this Message is sent to 
xxviii. setTraversing – changes an iterator traversing over the Message path 
xxix. traverse – attempts to send a Message to a next Location; it is invoked 
when an infrastructure event is executed 
23. NamedEnvironment – this class that contains a name of Parameters and their values, used 
in a Task for storing environment variables and in a Message for storing the Message 
Parameters 
1. Attributes 
i. records – a set of objects associated with this NamedEnvironment; each 
object has a name 
2. Methods 
i. addObject – adds a new object to this NamedEnvironment 
ii. getKeySet – returns names of all objects that this NamedEnvironment 
contains 
iii. getObject – finds an object by its name in this NamedEnvironment 
iv. isObjectPresent – checks if any object from specified list of objects is 
present in this NamedEnvironment, returns true if present 
v. NamedEnvironment – constructor for this class 






24. NetworkingInterface – represents a network link between two CompUnits, and is an 
instantiation of HardwareEntity class. 
1. Attributes 
i. connectedTo – another NetworkingInterface this NetworkingInterface is 
connected to 
ii. installedOn – a CompUnit where this NetworkingInterface is installed   
2. Methods 
i. buildPath – creates a path for a Message, calls recursiveBuildPath 
ii. connectTo – connects this NetworkingInterface to another 
NetworkingInterface 
iii. getConnectedTo – returns a Networking Interface that this 
NetworkingInterface is connected to 
iv. getInstalledOn – returns a CompUnit where this NetworkingInterface is 
installed  
v. NetworkingInterface – constructor for this class 
vi. recursiveBuildPath – recursively builds a path for a Message 
vii. toString– casts this object to a string for debugging and printing purposes 
25. OperatingSystem – simulates the functionality of an operating system, including  
Message creation, routing, filtering, consumption, works with Files and includes a basic 
access control 
1. Attributes 
i. children – returns all Components that are running with a specified 
Component 
ii. listeningThreads – all threads (executing Task Events) that have 
subscribed to listening Messages coming to this OperatingSystem 
iii. runningOn – returns a CompUnit that is managed by the OperatingSystem  
2. Methods 
i. addChild – adds a new child Component 
ii. canMessagePass – checks whether a Message can continue its traversal; it 
is used to execute Firewall function 





iv. doneListeningAtPort – marks a Component as no longer interested in 
listening to a specific port activity 
v. getAccessControlDecision – returns an AccessControlDecision, can be 
overridden to implement a Firewall not at an application level as a 
Component, but at a transport level 
vi. getChild – returns a specific Component by its name 
vii. getChildren – returns all Components managed by this Operating System 
viii. getDrive – returns a HardDrive by its name 
ix. getFile – returns a FileWithRecords by its name 
x. getRecord – returns a Record from a FileWithRecords by Record’s name 
and name of a File 
xi. getRunningOn – returns a CompUnit managed by this Operating System; 
this is used for identification and for hardware search 
xii. listenAtSpecificPort – listens at a specific port 
xiii. messageArrived – routine to process a Message once it has arrived at an 
intended CompUnit 
xiv. OperatingSystem – constructor for this class 
xv. passToListeners – sends a received Message to all listeners that have 
subscribed to a specific port where the Message has arrived 
xvi. sendMessage – sends a Message to a specified target 
26. ProcessTree – a graph of Tasks, specifying its entry points, exit points, and possible Task 
connections 
1. Attributes 
i. entryPoints – lists possible entry points for a Process to start 
ii. exitPoints – lists the exit points. Once a Focus traversing over this 
ProcessTree reaches this node, the Process is considered to be completed 
and no future Tasks are scheduled 
iii. name – name of the ProcessTree used for identification purposes 
2. Methods 
i. addEntryPoint – adds a new entry point to this ProcessTree, one of them 





ii. addExitPoint – adds a new exit point to this ProcessTree, once a Focus 
traversing over this ProcessTree is at this node the Process is considered 
to be completed and no future Tasks would be scheduled 
iii. chooseEntryPoint – chooses an entry point for the Process to start, and is  
called by a Focus when it is activated 
iv. ProcessTree – constructor for this class 
27. Record – Risk-related piece of data stored and processed in the simulated system 
1. Attributes 
i. data – an abstract piece of data associated with this Record, typically is 
overridden in child classes to a specific class 
ii. globalList  – a list of all currently existing Records in the simulation, used 
for lookups 
iii. recordName – a Record’s name, serves for records identification 
iv. recordsIncorporatedIntoThisRecord – a list of Records that are contained 
within this Record 
v. references – a list of all objects that reference this Record. These objects 
can either reference other Records or Messages. Each reference contains 
a link to a referenced Record and a name by which this reference can be 
found. For example, an attachment in an instance of the EmailRecord class 
is added with a list of names of attached Records. An EmailRecord can 
have multiple attachments and a Component searching for a specific 
Record attached to an EmailRecord can locate it by its intended name 
vi. securityValue – a value of how sensitive this Record is, based on a security 
risks, which represents the maximum amount of damage the software 
development company will incur if this Record is intercepted by a 
malicious entity 
2. Methods 
i. addReference – adds a new reference to this object 
ii. addReferenceWithRandomizedName – adds a new reference to this 
object; the name of the reference is randomized so that they will not be 





iii. getRecordIncorporatedIntoThisRecord – returns a list of other Records 
incorporated into this Record 
iv. getReferences – returns a list of references to this Record 
v. getSecurityValue – returns a security value associated with this Record 
vi. getValue – returns an object associated with this Record 
vii. hasReference – checks whether an object was referenced by this Record, 
and if it was, the method returns true, and false otherwise 
viii. incorporateRecord – incorporates another Record in this Record. This 
includes setting a reference and iteration over the incorporated Records. 
These incorporated records can be, for example, Records that are 
incorporated in a Record that is intercepted by a malicious entity 
ix. Record – constructor for this class 
x. removeReference – removes a reference from this Record 
xi. setSecurityValue – changes a security value associated with this Record 
xii. toString – casts this object to a string, for debugging and printing purposes 
28. RecordsCollection – A collection of Records 
1. Attributes 
i. Records – a list of all Records contained in this RecordsCollection  
2. Methods 
i. addRecord – adds a new record to the RecordsCollection either by 
specifying a Record name or by using a randomized name if none is 
specified   
ii. addReference – adds an object as a reference to all Records of this 
RecordsCollection; for example, when a Message is created it references 
all Records it contains 
iii. getFirstRecord – returns a first Record of this RecordsCollection 
iv. getNameOfRecord – returns a name of specific Record within this 
Collection 
v. getRecord – returns a specific Record by its name 






vii. RecordsCollection – class constructor 
viii. removeReference – removes an object from a list of references of this 
RecordsCollection; for example, when a Message is consumed, all 
references to it are removed  
29. Risk – accumulated risk level of a specific risk dimension for each Record 
1. Attributes 
i. comment – comments on Risk used for identification purposes 
ii. Object – a Record associated with the Risk 
iii. riskRelatedTo – a Component related to this Risk, typically a Component 
that originated an Event that resulted in this Risk 
iv. time – time of the Risk occurrence 
v. type – type of the Risk; the software development scenario includes two 
types, security and productivity 
vi. value – a probability of realizing that Risk; it is used as part of 
probabilistic model to assess utility of this Risk 
2. Methods 
i. Risk – constructor for this class 
ii. toString – casts this object to a string, for debugging and printing purposes 
30. RiskCollection – collection of Risks for all dimensions and all Records. 
1. Attributes 
i. currentRisks – a list of all Risks that might have been realized at this point 
of time during a simulation. The fact that a Risk is present in this list does 
not mean that the Event associated with the Risk has occurred, it means 
that there is greater than 0 probability that an Event might have had 
occurred. This class is used for utility calculation 
ii. Logger – contains a log of all events associated with added Risks  
iii. Risks – a list of Risks in this RiskCollection 
iv. TYPE_PRODUCTIVITY – a  number identifying a productivity Risk 
v. TYPE_SECURITY – a  number identifying a security Risk 
2. Methods 





ii. addSecurityRisk – adds a new security Risk 
iii. computeLikelihood – computes a likelihood of a set of Risks associated 
with one Record. For example, if there were two cases when a Record was 
intercepted by a malicious listener, each with a probability of 0.5, a 
resulting likelihood of this would be not 0.5+0.5=1, but 0.5+0.5*(1-
0.5)=0.75 
iv. getSummedRiskValue – returns a total utility of a specific risk type 
v. getTimepoints – returns all points on timeline when Risks were incurred 
vi. purgeRisks – removes all risks; this method is used to restart a forecasting 
model simulation. 
vii. RiskCollection  – constructor for this class 
31. Role – specifies a ProcessTree that is associated with a Component that fullfills that role 
1. Attributes 
i. dataSources – a list of Locations, usernames and passwords of 
Components a User can access; it is used to represent memories of the 
User  
ii. location – a current Location of a User with this Role 
iii. RoleName – a name of the Role, serves for identification purposes 
iv. tasks – a list of Tasks a Component (User) with this Role can execute 
v. unitForWork – a CompUnit selected for work of a User with this Role 
2. Methods  
i. addDataSource – adds a new DataSource 
ii. addTask – adds a new task that can be executed by a User 
iii. getDataSource – returns a DataSource by its name 
iv. getDataSourceWithCompUnit – returns a list of all DataSources 
associated with a specific CompUnit, useful when a User tries to get  
access to a certain resource and there are multiple Components that can 
be used to access the resource, e.g., FTP server and SourceCodeServer 
v. getLocation – returns a current Location of a User  
vi. getRoleName – returns a name attribute of the Role 





viii. Role – constructor for this class 
ix. setLocation – changes a Location of a User, e.g., moving from one room 
to another 
x. setRoleName – changes the name attribute of the Role  
32. Server – an abstract class of Components that has a Message consumption capabilities 
with a number of default routines, such as a basic access control and is capable of creating 
Sessions . 
1. Attributes 
i. accessControlFail – a  value identifying a Message as being a reply to a 
request that violates a current ServerLocalAccessControl scheme 
ii. authorize – a  value identifying a Message as being an authorization 
request 
iii. authorizeFail – a  value identifying a Message as being a reply to a failed 
authentication attempt 
iv. authorizeParamPassword – a  value identifying a Message Parameter as 
containing a password for an authorization 
v. authorizeParamUsername – a  value identifying a Message Parameter as 
containing a username for an authorization 
vi. authorizeSuccess – a  value identifying that a request for authorization was 
successful 
vii. dm – (decision maker) a ServerLocalAccessControl that specifies which 
Messages can be processed at this Server 
viii. logger – a logger, used to record this class activity 
ix. responseType – a type of a protocol that this Server uses for 
communication 
x. sessions – a list of all current Sessions opened currently at this Server 
2. Methods 
i. getSession – intended to be overridden in subclasses; it returns the Session 
by its name 
ii. messageArrived –processes arriving Messages 





33. ServerLocalAccessControl – an instantiation of the AccessControlDecisionMaker class 
that stores a set of UserRecords in a DataSource, and can be, for example a 
FileWithRecords. 
1. Attributes 
i. allowNotAuthorizedAccess – allows access without authorization, if this 
attribute is true then any authorization request will be granted and server 
will not require authentication for the actions 
ii. parent – a Server that this ServerLocalAccessControl is providing access 
control for 
iii. passwordData – a DataSource that contains a list of registered usernames,  
passwords and roles  
2. Methods 
i. allowAccess – the Server will invoke this method when a new Message 
arrives. This method returns an access control decision regarding the 
Message based on the type of the Server, the attributes of the Message and 
the set of access control policies 
ii. getAccountRole – returns a role of an account associated with a Server by 
its name 
iii. isAllowNotAuthorizedAccess – returns the allowNotAuthorizedAccess 
attribute 
iv. passwordsMatch – returns true if a specified username and password 
matches an existing Record from passwordData, and false otherwise 
v. ServerLocalAccessControl – constructor for this class 
34. Session – stores all information necessary for a Server to process requests within a 
communication session between a specific Component and the Server. 
1. Attributes 
i. sessionID – an id of the Session created by the Server when the Server 
acknowledges an authentication request from a Component and either 
there was no previous communication between this Component and the 





ii. timeSessionExpires – the time when the Session will expire 
iii. timeSessionStarted – the time when the Session was created 
iv. username – username of an account for which the Session was created 
v. userRole – role of an account for which the Session was created 
2. Methods 
i. getSessionID – returns id of the session 
ii. getTimeSessionExpires – returns time when a Session will expire 
iii. getTimeSessionStarted – returns time when a Session was created 
iv. getUsername – returns a username of an account for which the Session 
was created 
v. getUserRole – returns a role of an account for which a Session was created 
vi. Session – constructor for this class 
vii. setSessioID – changes id of the Session 
viii. setTimeSessionExpires – changes time when the Session will expire 
ix. setTimeSessionStarted – changes time when the Session was created 
x. setUserRole – changes a role of an account for which the Session was 
created 
35. SourceCodeServer – represents a Server that stores source code used in the software 
development case study. 
1. Attributes 
i. data  – a set of Records associated with each User accounts 
ii. listCommand – a  value identifying a command to list source code files 
associated with a specific User account 
iii. listFail – a  value identifying that a list command has failed 
iv. listParameter – a  value identifying a Parameter of specific source code 
files to retrieve 
v. listResponse – a  value identifying that a Message is a response to a list 
command 
vi. logger – contains the logs of all relevant activities 





viii. saveCommand – a  value identifying a command to create a new Record 
associated with a specific User account 
ix. saveFail – a  value identifying that a save command has failed 
x. saveParameterFileName – a  value identifying a name attribute of a File 
to be created on the Server 
xi. saveParameterRecord – a  value identifying a value of a specific Record 
to be created on the Server 
xii. saveParameterRecordName – a  value identifying a name attribute of a 
specific Record to be created on the Server 
xiii. saveResponse – a  value identifying that a Message is a response to a save 
command 
2. Methods 
i. addRecords – adds a Record to a source code File 
ii. getRecords – retrieves a Record from specified source code File 
iii. messageArrived – method invoked when a Message has arrived and needs 
to be processed; this method overrides the same method in the Server class 
iv. removeRecord – removes a Record from a source code File  
v. SourceCodeServer – constructor for this class 
36. Task – contains the logic routines responsible for the execution of the actions, the 
conditions this task execution waits for, and the switching routines responsible for 
selecting a next Task in a ProcessTree. 
1. Attributes 
i. actualDuration – a modified duration of a standardDuration attribute 
ii. nextNodes – a set of all possible next Tasks to be executed after this Task 
is completed  
iii. parent – an object responsible for the Task execution, which can be either 
a Role or a Component 
iv. previousNodes – a set of Tasks that could have lead to the execution of 
the Task 
v. standardDuration – an expected duration of the Task. The duration can 





attributes. It is used to set the time when the Event associated with the  
Task completion would be processed 
vi. status – a status of the Task execution, can be a success, a failure or not 
defined 
vii. taskName – a name of the Task used for identification purposes 
2. Methods 
i. addNextNode – adds the Task in the list of Tasks that can be executed 
after this Task is completed, choosing next Task is done in a method called 
chooseNext, which in turns depends on a method called 
chooseCustomNext 
ii. chooseCustomNext – a method responsible for choosing a Task that will 
be executed next. This method is invoked after the Task has been 
completed and has access to a list of Process attributes and history of 
previous Tasks executions and queue of executions that lead to the Task 
iii. chooseNext – default implementation of a routine that chooses a next 
Task. If chooseCustomNext is not implemented, this routine will be 
invoked, in an implementation exists only for Tasks that has one next Task 
iv. clone – copying constructor. All Tasks defined in scenario are used as 
templates, instead of executing them, they are being copied first and then 
executed  
v. findTask – finds a Task by its name searching through NextNodes Tasks. 
It returns a list of Tasks that can be executed in the ProcessTree after this 
Task is completed 
vi. getParent – return a parent object of the Task, a Role (that represents a 
User) or a Component 
vii. getStandardDuration – returns an expected duration of the Task 
viii. getStatus – returns an execution status of the Task 
ix. getTaskName – returns a name of the Task, used for identification 
x. isTaskNamed – returns true if the Task was named 
xi. runTask – method wrapper for a method called taskActions 





xiii. setTaskName – changes a name attribute of the Task 
xiv. Task – constructor for this class 
xv. taskActions – a method intended to be overridden by classes defining 
actual Tasks, contains actions that are executed during Task execution. 
This method starts when the ActionsQueue starts the Task-related Event. 
This method should finish before the ActionsQueue changes simulation 
time and starts a new set of Events. However if the Task execution was 
paused, for example because of a call of the method 
addNewEventWithInterruption, then this Task has to be activated by a 
timeout or by a scheduled event 
xvi. toString– casts the object to a string, for debugging and printing purposes 
37. TaskResult – results of a Task execution, used in a Task switching routine 
1. Attributes 
i. status – a status of the Task execution and it can either be a success or a 
failure 
ii. task – the Task for which TaskResult is constructed  
2. Methods 
i. getStatus – returns an execution status of the Task and can either be a 
failure, a success, or undefined (if status was not set yet, but it is not used) 
ii. getTask – returns the Task associated with the TaskResult 
iii. setStatus – changes a status of the Task execution. This happens after the 
Task execution has finished and can either be a success or a failure. Both 
statuses are set within the TaskActions method 
iv. setTask – changes the Task associated with the TaskResult 
v. TaskResult – constructor for this class 
vi. toString– casts the object to a string, for debugging and printing purposes 
38. TaskResults – a sequence of TaskResults  
1. Attributes 
i. results – a set of TaskResults. The order of the elements in this set is the 






i. add – adds a new TaskResult to a sequence 
ii. addToStack – used in adding a Task to an execution stack. It does not 
support recursive Task executions 
iii. count – returns a count of the executed Tasks 
iv. getLastStatus – returns a status of a last Task that completed its execution 
(if any) 
v. getLastTask – returns a last Task that completed its execution 
vi. getLastTaskResult – returns a TaskResult of the last Task execution 
vii. getList – returns a copy of an internal list of TaskResults 
viii. TaskResults – constructor for this class 
ix. wasCallSuccess – returns true if the last executed Task was a success, false 
otherwise 
x. wasLastTaskNamed – returns true if the last executed Task was named 
39. Focus – a pointer to a ProcessTree of a User (or an active Component) 
1. Attributes 
i. callStack – a stack of executed Tasks, only contains non-repeating Tasks. 
If while adding a new Task a repetition occurs then all Tasks executed 
between these two calls are removed from this stack. This attribute is used 
to identify which Task has originated the current Task to be executed. 
ii. tasksExecuted – a list of all executed Tasks for the Focus 
iii. tree – ProcessTree of the Process the User (or a Component) is following  
iv. Variables – contains a list of attributes set by the User related to this Focus 
2. Methods 
i. Focus – constructor for this class 
ii. getBooleanValue – returns a Boolean attribute of the User 
iii. getTasksExecuted – returns a list of Tasks that were executed by this 
Focus previously 
iv. getVariable – returns an attribute associated with the User executing the 
Tasks of the ProcessTree  
v. Run – the Focus class executes the logic of Tasks via the Thread class. 





call executes this method and internally it executes a runTask and a 
chooseNext methods sequentially 
vi. setVariable – changes an attribute associated with the User 
40. UserRecord – a Record containing information about a User, including a role, username 
and password, used to provide access to an instance of a Server class. 
1. Attributes 
i. password – a password of the UserRecord 
ii. roleName – a role name of the UserRecord  
iii. username – a username of the UserRecord  
2. Methods 
i. getPassword – returns the password of the UserRecord 
ii. getRoleName – returns the role name of the UserRecord  
iii. getUserName – returns the username of the UserRecord 
iv. setPassword – changes the password of the UserRecord  
v. setRoleName – changes the role of the UserRecord  
vi. setUserName – changes the username of the UserRecord 
vii. UserRecord – constructor for this class 
41. WebServer – represents a Server that allows a User to access its services via HTTP or 
HTTPS communication protocols, for example through a browser 
1. Attributes 
i. data – a set of Records associated with each User account 
ii. listCommand – a  value identifying a command to list EmailRecords 
associated with a User account 
iii. listFail  – a  value identifying that a list command has failed 
iv. listParameter – a  value identifying a Parameter of a specific EmailRecord 
to retrieve 
v. logger – contains logs of all relevant activities 
vi. name – name of the WebServer  
vii. saveCommand – a  value identifying a command to create a new Record 
associated with the User account 





ix. saveParameter – a  value identifying a name of a specific Record to create 
on the WebServer 
x. saveParameterRecord – a  value identifying a specific Record to create on 
the WebServer 
xi. saveResponse – a  value identifying that a save command was successful 
2. Methods 
i. addRecord – adds a new Record  
ii. getRecord – returns a Record by its name 
iii. getRecords – returns a set of Records by their names 
iv. messageArrived – method invoked when a Message has arrived and needs 
to be processed, overridden method of the Server class 
v. removeRecord – removes a Record from a set of Records in this 
WebServer 





Appendix D - Basic Design Model and Risk Assessment 
There is a lack of RAdAC implementations as mentioned in Chapter 2 as well as a significant 
number of different types of risk analysis. Each risk analysis type requires a specific set of 
data as an input. This appendix provides a sample of risk analysis done according to RAdAC 
and explains details of the risk analysis calculation. Moreover, a data model provided in this 
appendix can be used for any type of risk analysis as well as for a combination of several risk 
analysis types. This data model was used as a basic risk analysis model in the proposed 
approach. This appendix also includes an illustrative example of a risk analysis performed 
for a software development scenario. The results of the risk analysis illustrate the outcome 
of using the proposed approach for a software development project. Figure 36 represents a 
plan of the software development project for this example. The plan contains four tasks (A, 
B, C, D) that are required to complete the project, one optional task (E), and a maintenance 






Software Development Scenario Initial Data 
Development Start
























Figure 36. Project development diagram 
 An example is based on the initial data provided in Table 8 and Table 9. This data 
comprises information about resources, the critical project path, the project budget, 
conditions and consequences, which can be rewards or punishments, failure conditions, an 








Table 8. Initial scenario data 
Resources 
Allocated time for project: 5 days, 40 hours; Allocated personnel: two developers; 
Company current reserves:  45K (CAD); Company public reputation: 5 (7 similar 
completed projects, 2 of them were delayed) 
 
Critical Project Path  
Task 1: Add shopping cart component (20 hours); Task 2: Checkout component (15 
hours); Minimum estimated time to complete project: 35 hours; Time reserved for 
unexpected tasks: 5 hours 
 
Project Budget 
Developer salary: 1.5K*2 (CAD); Project manager salary: 2K (CAD); Office space 
rental: 1K (CAD); Total: 6K (CAD) 
 
Rewards and Punishments 
Reward for project completion: 15K (CAD), company public reputation: 1.5 
Project delay, 1 day: Fee 1K, company public reputation: -0.5 
Project delay, 2 days: Fee 1.5K, company public reputation: -1 
Project delay, more than 2 days: fee: 8K, company public reputation: -5 
If the source code was stolen (only relevant if “Create user accounts database” has 
started), company public reputation: -8 
If there are too many bugs when software is delivered to client, 
2 bugs: company public reputation -0.5; 3 bugs: company public reputation -1 
More than 3 bugs: company public reputation -4 
 
Failure conditions 
If company financial reserves are less than zero or company public reputation is less than 
zero, Company will cease to exist. 
 
Impact of reputation 
There is possible large contract (potential revenue: 100K (CAD), 20 in company public 
reputation) 
 
Software Maintenance Statistics 
For each hour of software development, there is a 3% probability that a bug will be 
introduced. Average time to fix a bug is 2 hours  
Projected number of bugs: 1.59 +/- 1.25 
Each hour a developer tests software, there is 30% probability that a bug will be found 







Table 9. Connection between reputation and funds 
Reputation of company after the project ends, 
measured in units of company public reputation 
<3 Units  3-5 Units  >5 Units  
Probability of obtaining the contract 20% 40% 70% 
 
Risk analysis involves gathering data related to a set of possible risks and benefits 
associated with a situation that the AC has encountered. For example, assume that an AC 
decision needs to be made when a project manager has decided to add an external contractor 
to complete the software development project faster. Traditionally, a system administrator 
executes a process, which consists of two tasks: allowing access of a new user (external 
contractor) to Concurrent Versions System (CVS) and copying the existing source code files 
to a new computer where the new user will be working.  
Risk Analysis 
Data related to a general description of possible risks and benefits associated with adding a 
new user is presented in Table 10. Data related to a risk of having the code stolen is provided 
in Table 11.  
Table 10. General risk analysis data 
Risk analysis data that is related to the situation include 
a. Task: new user (contractor) needs permission to get access to project files 
b. Location: user accounts database 
c. Parent Task: Add checkout component (D) 
1. Parent task cannot start without completing it?: yes 
2. Affected attributes: Maximum delay, % 
d. Estimated Duration: 1 hour 
e. Responsible actor: System administrator 
f. Required resources: 
a. System administrator 
b. Target system 
c. Required attribute:  
1. Name: operational 
2. Value: True 







Table 11. Risk of having the code stolen data 
i. Risk of having the code stolen 
1. Child risks: risk of having security compromised 
2. Parent risk: risk of receiving reputation penalty 
3. Adds to parent risk: no 
4. Computed likelihood: 68.6% +- 3% 
a. 10% set value  
b. *1.1 responsible actor is knowledgeable and has sufficient privileges to copy source 
code 
c. *1.7 Tcritical for this risk priority target 
d. *0.4 motivation of responsible actor 
e. *1.5 data transfer process is present 
f. *2.6 data transfer target is external 
g. *1.2 inherited from child risk 
h. *1.4 lack of experience with new user 
i. *1.4 Accumulated child risk 
j. Computed deviation: 
i. 20% set value 
ii. *0.10 experience with selected actor 
iii. *1.5 Thigh priority target 
5. Possible to be combined with other risks: yes  
6. Risks possible to be combined with:  
a. Risk Type: 
i. Attribute Value: security 
7. Computed likely effect: company public reputation -8 
8. Total impact: company public reputation -5.49  
9. Recalculate on (or):  
a. Process has completed 
b. Child task has completed 
c. Time passed (1 hour step) 
d. Recalculating security risk for related processes or resources 
10. Possible activation of undesirable templates: 
a. Asset being stolen 
b. Malformed access control 
c. Suspicious network (or removable devices) traffic 
i. Origin: affected component 
d. Undesirable functionality 







 Data related to the risk of having the security compromised is presented in Table 12.  
Table 12. Risk of having security compromised data 
ii. Risk of having security compromised 
1. Child risks: none 
2. Parent risk: risk of having the code stolen, risk of having additional work to do 
(restoring corrupted components) 
3. Adds to parent risk: yes 
4. Computed likelihood: 43.68% +- 2% 
a. 40% set value  
b. *1.2 responsible actor is knowledgeable and has sufficient privileges to install 
software that will compromise security 
c. *1.3 Lack of experience with new user  
d. *1.4 Tcritical for this risk priority target  
e. Computed deviation: 
i. 20% set value 
ii. *0.10 experience with responsible actor 
5. Possible to be combined with other risks: yes  
6. Risks possible to be combined with:  
a. Risk Type: 
i. Attribute Value: security 
b. Process Attribute: Data Transfer 
i. Attribute Value: active 
c. Process Attribute: name 
i. Attribute Value: create user accounts database(C)  
7. Computed likely effect:  
Company public reputation: -8 
8. Total impact: 0 
a. Risk only increases other risks: true 
9. Recalculate on (or): 
a. Activating processes associated with affected component 
i. Attribute: data transfer active 
b. Recalculating security risk for related processes 
10. Possible activation of undesirable templates: 
a. Malformed access control request 
b. Suspicious network (or removable devices) traffic 
i. Origin: affected component 
c. Undesirable functionality introduced 







 Data related to a benefit of completing project without delay is provided in Table 13. 
Assume that some of this data is based on historical data. An example in this case is the 
history of the system administrator actions resulting under the AC assumption that the AC 
that he or she can be trusted from a security perspective. The remainder of the data comprises 
information about the context of adding a new user, and its associated entities. For example, 
context information can include the availability of the required resources to add a new user 
(e.g., system administrator and working computer). 
 
Table 13. Benefit of completing project without delay data 
iii. Benefit of completing project without delays 
1. Parent benefit: Benefit of not receiving penalties for delay 
2. Adds to parent benefit: no 
3. Computed likelihood: 48%+-10% 
a. Mean Computed: 60% set value (adding new user)*0.8 lack of experience with new 
user 
b. Computed deviation: 10% set value  
4. Possible to be combined with other benefits related to delay: yes 
5. Benefits possible to be combined with: D (+children), A (+children) 
6. Benefits possible to be combined with:  
a. Benefit Type: 
7. Attribute Value: productivity 
8. Computed likely effect: fee +1K and company public reputation: +0.5 
9. Total impact: Reserve +0.48K and company reputation +0.24 
10. Recalculate on (or):  
a. Time passed (1 hour step) 
b. Changing attributes of required resources 
 
The risk analysis data related to this situation, which is informally provided in what 
follows in natural language, is an instance of the class diagram illustrated in Figure 37, which 
presents the UML diagram of the basic design model. The informal data description is 
provided for readability. The data provided by a risk analyst specifies values that are 































































































The importance of provided risk analysis is not the ability of the risk analyst to 
estimate risk-related attributes, however it is the possibility to relate heterogeneous risks 
through their consequence and likelihood. The provided UML diagram can be used to assess 
various risks and combine them in a single frame of reference required to compare them and 
consequently make decisions based on risk levels. Figure 37 is a UML class diagram for risk 
analysis extended with the variable risk of delay. This diagram contains classes that represent 
objects describing the risks.  
 The  risk analysis in the basic design model is based on an hierarchy of risks. Some 
risks are always present. Other risks which are called children risks can only be present if the 
specific predefined risks called parent risks are present. The scenario description, presented 
in Table 10, includes contextual information about the process of adding a new user (a-f) and 
two relevant risks and one benefit: (i) the risk of having the code stolen; (ii) the risk of having 
the security compromised; and (iii) the benefit of completing the project without delays. Each 
of the relevant risks and benefits contains information about the parent and child risks and 
benefits.  
A child risk or benefit is a risk or benefit that affects the parent risk. A risk or benefit 
becomes relevant (computed and involved in the risk analysis) only if there is no parent risk 
or if the parent risk is applicable to the situation. If the parent risk is irrelevant (e.g., with 
zero probability and zero distribution), according to the basic design model, the child risks 
are considered irrelevant and not evaluated. 
The variable adds to parent risk or benefit assumes a boolean value. If this value is 
true, then the effects of child risks or benefits are added to the parent risk or benefit list of 
effects and the parent risk or benefit probability is modified by the function of the child risk, 
for example, by multiplying the probability of the parent risk to the value of the risk impact. 
If this value is false, then the child risks or benefits are considered relevant if the parent risk 
is relevant. The effects and probabilities of the parent risk or benefit are computed and 
applied independently of the child risks and benefits. The variable computed likelihood is a 
likelihood with which the most likely risk effects will occur. For each process, there is a 
predefined set value and a set of modifiers that change the computed likelihood. The variable 




corroborating or lowering the belief of AC in the user activities or the process. The variable 
total impact is a utility related to the risks or benefits. For non-critical risks, i.e., a risk that 
has likely effects greater than the current reserves of a system for which AC is provided, this 
variable is taken into account during making an access control decision. If a risk is critical, 
then the access control decision has to either accept this risk or label the process for which 
this critical risk is too high as “not permitted”. The variable recalculate on is a set of 
conditions that trigger the re-evaluation of the risk or benefit. Whether risks are additive is 
defined by AC designers. If two risks are additive, their utility is calculated by summing 
multiplication of a risk impact and risk probability, the deviation is calculated as a sum of 
multiplication of deviation and risk impact and risk probability of corresponding risks. 
All attributes presented after the recalculate on variable in the provided tables are 
risk or benefit-specific attributes. For example, the variable risk of having the code stolen has 
the attribute possible activation of undesirable templates. This attribute indicates that the AC 
assumes that one or more processes corresponding to such undesirable templates are indeed 
active and need to be stopped. The AC does this operation by increasing the computed 
likelihood and decreasing the computed deviation. 
 The risk analysis indicates that two risks and one benefit are relevant to the analysis 
of the situation: the risk of having the code stolen, the risk of having security compromised, 
and the benefit of completing project without delays. These risks and one benefit are 
associated with the following QRM: financial, measured in K (CAD) and reputation 
measured in units. While risks are associated with the loss of the reputation, the benefit is 
associated with the gain in reserves related to reputation and finances. Thus, it would be 
helpful to establish a relationship between them. 
 As described in the scenario’s initial data, the company has reserves in the financial 
dimension (45K CAD) and reserves in the public relations dimension (5 units of reputation), 





Table 8. Assuming the system for which AC is provided does not fail, neither reserves in the 
financial dimension, nor in the public relations dimension can be less than zero. QRMs 
forecasted at the end of the project are 53K (CAD) and 5.5 units of reputation. The forecast 
is based on the reserves, the project completion reward, and the penalty for delaying a 
software development project for one day and having two bugs in the code. The probability 
of receiving a large contract is projected to be at 70% according to the projected level of 
reputation, 40% if half a unit of reputation is lost, and 20% if 2.5 units of reputation are lost 
at the end of the project. The potential revenue for this contract is 100K and 20 units of 
reputation, which moves the company significantly further away from its failure conditions 
and, therefore, this revenue is desired.  
Building the correlation between reserves of financial and public relations domains 
is calculated based on the following facts: the loss of five units of reputation is equivalent to 
a loss of 45K because if either financial or reputation reserves decrease to zero, the company 
ceases to exist. The projected change of reputation at the end of the project (0.5 units) is an 
equivalent of gaining 70K and 14 units of reputation, which is the mean of the QRMs the 
company is expected to gain and is calculated in this case by multiplying the probability and 
the QRMs of the effect. In this case, the company at the end of the project gains 0.5 units of 
reputation. In addition, a zero change in reputation results in  gaining 40K CAD and 8 units 
of reputation and losing two or more units of reputation by the end of the project, which 
results in obtaining 20K CAD and 4 units of reputation. If one plots a graph of the correlation 
between the reputation and financial reserves, these facts represents points, and a linear 
approximation of this graph is used as one of the sources to calculate the current QRM 
exchange ratio multiplied by the number of reputation units that is considered the equivalent 
of 1K of financial reserves. Consequently, a linear approximation of these points plotted as 
a graph results in a ratio of one unit of reputation, which is equivalent to 19.2K CAD in 
reserves. The linear approximation of the constructed correlation graph between delay 
(hours) and financial QRM, measured in K (CAD) according to the known and projected 
facts indicates that the estimated correlation between a financial QRM and delay is 17.6K 
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Figure 38. Process of the Patient-Privacy Case Study 
